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 THE VISIBILITY OF SEXUAL MINORITY MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS IN 
NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 Ashley McAllister Currier, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2007
The South African state has responded favorably to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 
transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations’ (SMOs) efforts to protect and extend 
sexual and gender minority rights, whereas Namibian state leaders have verbally attacked LGBT 
organizing and threatened to arrest sexual and gender minorities. In these countries, LGBT 
persons have organized themselves into publicly visible social movement organizations (SMOs) 
over the last ten years. Amid such different official responses to LGBT organizing, how, when, 
and why do Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations become publicly 
visible or retreat from visibility? To answer this question, I turn to sociologist James M. Jasper’s 
(2004, 2006) concept of “strategic dilemma.” LGBT social movement organizations encountered 
strategic dilemmas of visibility or invisibility when they decide whether and how to become 
visible, modify their public profile, or forgo political opportunities. To understand the 
micropolitical dynamics of how LGBT social movement organizations negotiated such strategic 
dilemmas of visibility and invisibility, I engaged in intensive, continuous ethnographic 
observation of four Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations for 
approximately 800 hours and analyzed my ethnographic fieldnotes. I also analyzed more than 
2,100 newspaper articles and LGBT SMO documents and conducted 56 in-depth interviews with 
staff, members, and leaders of LGBT SMOs. In this dissertation, I explore the varied strategic 
dilemmas of visibility and invisibility that Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs faced. My 
findings advance social movement theorizing by demonstrating the importance of studying social 
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movements in the global South. In addition, my findings contribute to postcolonial feminist and 
queer theorizing by showing how marginalized sexual and gender minorities in post-apartheid 
Namibia and South Africa used public visibility as a strategy to argue for their democratic 
inclusion.  
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1.0  VISIBILITY AND INVISIBILITY IN FEMINIST, QUEER, AND SOCIAL 
MOVEMENT THEORIZING 
Visibility is a key issue. . . . [C]onstitutional freedoms such as freedom of speech 
and the right to protest publicly make “the debate on sexual issues much freer 
than it was in the past.” This ensures greater visibility and makes it possible for 
people to share a common language about these issues (Hattingh 2005:223-24). 
Despite the efforts of state leaders and members of the public to keep lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals out of public view in Namibia and South Africa, 
sexual and gender minorities have transformed themselves into visible social movement 
organizations (SMOs) at certain times over the past decade.1 LGBT SMOs emerged on the cusp 
of democratic, post-apartheid transformation in Namibia and South Africa, at a time rich in 
political opportunities. By SMO, I mean “a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its 
goals with the preferences of a social movement . . . and attempts to implement those goals” 
(McCarthy and Zald 1977:1218). In this project, I examine the strategies LGBT SMOs in 
Namibia and South Africa used to become publicly visible or withdrawn from visibility. The act 
of promoting itself as an organization to different audiences, including the public, constituents, 
the media, and the state, constitutes “visibility,” whereas withdrawing from target audiences 
constitutes “invisibility.” “Strategies” consist of the choices that SMOs make in the pursuit of 
visibility or invisibility with audiences and constituencies (Gamson 1975; Ganz 2000, 2004). 
Research on sexual and gender minority movements in southern Africa is important 
because it questions the assumption that LGBT movement ideologies, identities, and 
organizational forms travel from a “more developed” global North to an “underdeveloped” 
global South. Virtually all that we know about organized sexual minorities is based on studies of 
groups in North America and Western Europe (Adam 1987; Chauncey 1995; D’Emilio 1984, 
                                                 
1 I use “LGBT” and “sexual and gender minorities” interchangeably throughout the dissertation, but I prefer the term 
sexual and gender minorities because it encompasses emerging public sexualities and genders that may not yet have 
a name. 
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2002; Faderman 1992; Nardi 2001). Although some scholars examine LGBT movements in non-
Western developing nations (Brown 1999, 2002; Green 1999; Palmberg 1999; Parker 1998; 
Thayer 1997) or as a global phenomenon (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999; Altman 2001; 
Chabot and Duyvendak 2002), research on organized sexual and gender minorities in southern 
Africa is scant (see Dirsuweit 2006). This scholarly lacuna can be attributed to a broader sense 
that political repression, homophobia, and a lack of international support in most southern 
African countries, with the exception of South Africa, prevent any civic groups from organizing 
successfully for social change (Ungar 2001).  Such a formulation assumes, rather than finds, that 
southern African LGBT movements will fail and ignores the possibility of a spillover of ideas 
and strategies from South Africa to other nations. In fact, an LGBT minority movement has 
flourished in both postcolonial Namibia and South Africa. 
I selected Namibia and South Africa as comparative case study sites because, despite 
similarities in their eradication of apartheid policies and installation of national liberation 
movements as ruling parties, the countries differ significantly in how they currently treat sexual 
and gender minorities and LGBT movements. As it made the transition to a nonracial 
democracy, South Africa became a world leader in its reconciliation of the racial, social, and 
political abuses of apartheid. Unlike more repressive states in Namibia and Zimbabwe whose 
leaders have issued “vitriolic public statements about homosexuality” (Morgan and Reid 
2003:376), South Africa’s post-apartheid state has responded favorably to LGBT social 
movement organizations’ demands for broadened rights, which include immigration and 
adoption rights for same-sex partners. In contrast, Namibia’s postcolonial state has been 
increasingly authoritarian and hostile toward political dissenters, the media, and social 
movements. LGBT SMOs have waged largely defensive campaigns in this nation, often in 
alliance with women’s rights and human rights movements.  
1.1 LITERATURE REVIEW 
1.1.1 Theoretical Framework 
Asking questions about how LGBT SMOs in Namibia and South Africa devise and 
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deploy strategies of visibility and invisibility means incorporating different theoretical 
perspectives. I draw on theoretical traditions that treat visibility and invisibility as tropes for 
social and political oppression. First, I draw on postcolonial feminist theorizing to understand 
how oppressed groups overcame political and social invisibility by overturning the constructs 
that colonialists used to divide and control indigenous Africans in places like Namibia and South 
Africa. I situate how heterosexism in some African feminist theorizing illustrates the politics of 
visibility that African feminists navigate in their choices to include or exclude sexual and gender 
minority rights. Then, I review how queer theorizing deals with questions of visibility and 
invisibility of sexual and gender minorities.  
Because I am interested in how LGBT SMOs “manage” their visibility, I draw heavily on 
social movement research and theory that explains the behavior of social movement 
organizations. My work extends existing social movement research on the disappearance of 
social movements from public view by challenging the supposition that once an SMO emerges 
publicly, it will remain in public view, and by considering how and why groups may prefer to 
withdraw from the view of target audiences. My research also will contribute to existing work by 
questioning the appropriateness of social movement models based on North American and 
Western European context for use in Namibia and South Africa.  
1.1.2 Postcolonial Feminist Theorizing 
Postcolonial and Northern feminist scholars share an interest in giving voice to women 
(of color) in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Jeater 1993; Schmidt 1992). Postcolonial and 
Northern feminist researchers have investigated how and why historical accounts silenced 
women and sexual and gender minorities in the global South as political agents (Alexander 2005; 
Mohanty 2003).2 Silence is an analogous trope to invisibility in that histories have not treated 
women, and by extension, sexual and gender minorities, in colonial and postcolonial societies as 
publicly visible subjects (Spivak 1988). Such silencing of women’s experiences is sometimes 
duplicated in postcolonial scholarship. Postcolonial feminists have identified and tried to correct 
                                                 
2 I commit the error that Chandra Talpade Mohanty (2003) critiques by characterizing “Third World women” and 
LGBT persons instead as “women and sexual and gender minorities in the global South.” I use this as shorthand in 
my recapitulation of feminist arguments. In this dissertation, I examine in detail the situations in which LGBT 
organizing in Namibia and South Africa arises and unfolds. 
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the masculinist bias of some postcolonial thought. An excellent example of this is Anne 
McClintock’s (1995:64-65) identification of how Homi Bhabha (1994) excludes women as he 
explains colonized subjects’ silent, invisible, and intimate parody (mimicry) of colonialists. 
Bhabha’s focus only on exchanges of power and discourse between colonized men and male 
colonialists “elid[es] gender difference” and “implicitly ratifies gender power, so that 
masculinity becomes the invisible norm of postcolonial discourse” (McClintock 1995:64-65).   
Just as postcolonial feminists locate and remedy gender biases in some postcolonial 
scholarship, they also identify and correct the ethnocentric bias of some Northern feminist 
theorizing. In this manner, postcolonial feminists decenter the United States and other Northern 
countries as default countries of reference (Alexander 2005; Mohanty 2003). Postcolonial 
feminist theorizing faults Western feminist theorizing for homogenizing women’s experiences 
and subjugation under the category of victimization (Bulbeck 1998). In particular, Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty (2003) takes issue with Western feminism’s assumption that it holds the keys 
to the deliverance of all “Third World women.” Uncovering the “ethnographic universalism” that 
plagues some feminist theorizing, Mohanty (2003) questions the appropriateness of the category 
of “women” because the use of the term as a “homogeneous category . . . robs [women in the 
Third World] of their historical and political agency” (p. 39). For Mohanty (2003), feminist 
theorizing must be more sensitive to the multiple, interlocking oppressions women (of color) in 
different countries face when making their experiences visible and recognize how women are 
agents of power and history in their own right. Feminist, historical, and sociological studies that 
examine women’s participation in anticolonial and nationalist struggles are examples of restoring 
women’s agency in colonial and postcolonial contexts (Kuumba 2002; Nhongo-Simbanegavi 
2006; Staunton 1991). Understanding that women make decisions on their own behalf, albeit 
within a sometimes limited range, corrects the tendency of some feminist and postcolonial 
studies to treat women as the “‘site rather than the subjects of certain historical debates” 
(Loomba 1998:222). Postcolonial feminists recognize how “[w]omen are not just a symbolic 
space but real targets of colonialism and nationalist discourses” (Loomba 1998:222). This mode 
of inquiry is useful because it identifies how the agency of women, and potentially sexual and 
gender minorities in postcolonial contexts, can redress persisting colonial inequalities.  
 At the heart of postcolonial feminist theorizing is an incisive analysis about the 
interlocking mechanisms that render women and sexual and gender minorities invisible and 
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powerless. Invisibility may actually afford women and sexual and gender minorities an 
advantage, by hiding their political organizing. However, equating the lack of political 
organizing on the part of oppressed groups to political backwardness or underdevelopment is 
grossly inaccurate (Alexander 2005). M. Jacqui Alexander (2005) demonstrates how 
ethnocentric assessments about the types and levels of political organizing outside the colonial 
metropole imperil the utility of feminist theorizing that originates in the global North. She 
“challenge[s] prevalent metropolitan impulses that explain the absence of visible lesbian and gay 
movements as a defect in political consciousness and maturity, using evidence of publicly 
organized movements in the United States as evidence of their originary status in the West and 
their political maturity” (Alexander 2005:28). Simply because women’s or LGBT political 
organizing is not readily publicly visible does not mean that it does not exist; activists may have 
to negotiate layers of public visibility in order to preserve their resources, and in some extreme 
cases, their lives (Alexander 2005; Cohen 2005; Rothschild 2005). Alexander (2005) articulates 
the importance of examining social movements in the sociopolitical contexts in which they 
originate, while being careful about what theories and methodologies feminist scholars use when 
studying such movements. 
Postcolonial feminist theory provides useful analytic tools for my research because this 
mode of inquiry demonstrates how visibility and invisibility can serve as strategies for contesting 
power, such as through “invisible,” micro-level forms of protest that colonized persons 
performed (Bhabha 1994; Fanon 1963, 1965, 1967; Spivak 1988). This approach highlights how 
the invisibility of non-heterosexual women and persons of color is produced through denying 
them access to social and political rights and institutions. This theoretical perspective illuminates 
how visibility and invisibility can act as a conduit through which oppressed groups, such as 
colonized indigenous groups and black southern African women, materialize publicly as groups 
with political agendas and how they may begin to forge alliances with other oppressed groups. 
1.1.2.1 Homosexuality and African Feminism(s) 
African feminist theorizing has identified a range of nationalist, patriarchal, and 
colonialist mechanisms that have rendered women invisible. Yet within African feminism(s), 
sexual and gender minorities remain invisible. This is due to African feminists’ concerns about 
how state leaders and opponents of homosexuality use non-normative genders and sexualities to 
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discredit feminism. Managing the visibility of feminism in Africa has appeared as a practical and 
theoretical concern for African feminists. “Overt and public feminism has its price, but women 
now seem willing to pay it” (Mikell 1995:418). Southern African feminists, in particular, have 
been sensitive to the portrayal of feminist organizing and the characterization of women’s rights 
in these countries. They are aware of the visibility problem that certain feminisms pose in 
traditional, indigenous southern African societies (Hassim 2005). This type of African feminism 
is conscious about not alienating black African men, an example of how African feminists 
negotiate the public representation of the movement.  
A feminism that interpellates men as gendered subject first and foremost will fail 
to gain the support or attention of most black men. A feminism that acknowledges 
the importance of other identities, especially race and class, and locates itself in 
the context of history and globalization is more likely to succeed (Morrell 
2002:323).  
By projecting an image of feminism that is in step with African nationalism(s), some feminists 
demonstrate that they are concerned with the public profile of their efforts.  
Though national liberation can be a vehicle for appropriating feminist projects, it has also 
served as a political opening for some feminist movements. Melissa Steyn (1998) recounts her 
memory of how South African feminists neutralized nationalist designs on gender equality in the 
transition from racist, apartheid rule to a nonracial democracy. South African feminists worked 
to ensure that “the women’s movement in South Africa [would] not meet the fate of so many 
other women’s movements in nationalist struggles, namely that once liberation had been won, 
women’s issues would once again be relegated to a subordinate role” (Steyn 1998:41-42). In this 
sense, national liberation struggles and the transition from apartheid to a nonracial democracy in 
Namibia and South Africa posed significant political opportunities for feminist activists 
(Penzhorn 2005). Despite these opportunities, African feminists have often been on the defensive 
when patriarchal political leaders demonize feminism. “Feminist organizers in many countries 
now face draconian responses to the portrayal of their work as a threat—to country, community, 
or family” (Rothschild 2005:11).  
Carefully monitoring the content of African feminisms is a priority for some scholars and 
activists. Homosexuality has been particularly problematic for some African feminists (Ampofo 
et al. 2005), as evidenced by how heterosexism and heteronormativity go unquestioned (Muthien 
2003) in some African feminist theorizing. The “localized practices and . . . centralized 
institutions [that] legitimize and privilege heterosexuality and heterosexual relationships as 
  6
fundamental and ‘natural’ within society” constitute heteronormativity (Cohen 2005:24). 
Gwendolyn Mikell (1997:4) describes African feminism—in the singular, not as plural 
phenomena—as being “distinctly heterosexual, pro-natal, and concerned with many ‘bread, 
butter, culture, and power’ issues.” Such a heterosexist bias has rendered African women whose 
sexuality and gender do not map onto traditional gender dichotomies invisible (Mikell 1997), 
such as Ifi Amadiume’s (1987) assumption that woman-to-woman marriages never entail same-
gender sexual contact. Some Africanist scholars dispute this bias empirically, but do not take a 
political stand that examines the basis for Amadiume’s (1987) heterosexist claims and analysis 
(Njambi and O’Brien 2000). Other scholars question whether same-gender erotic desire 
circulated as a possibility for African women before and during colonial occupation (Wieringa 
2005). Same-gender erotic desires may have occurred as a possibility in postcolonial southern 
Africa only recently, as the language to articulate these desires and link them to viable social 
identities has become increasingly available. Nevertheless, “same-sex practices did and do exist 
in Africa, in remarkable quantity and diversity, but not necessarily as identities” (Arnfred 
2004c:21; see also Phillips 2001). When and how same-gender sexual practices occurred under 
the guise of Western sexual identity labels, such as gay or lesbian, or have been incorporated into 
indigenous and coloured linguistic and cultural practices as new sexual identities, remains 
contested (Cage 2003).3
Heterosexist bias in feminism often leads to the debate over whether homosexuality is 
unAfrican (Aarmo 1999; see Hames 2003). Used to force sexual and gender minorities into 
public invisibility and to thwart criticisms of democratization in Africa, this claim that 
homosexuality is unAfrican finds adherents among conservative Christians, state leaders, and 
even feminists throughout southern Africa (Arnfred 2004a:73). Some African feminists deny that 
homosexuality is a reality for African women and worry that taking a stand on sexual minority 
rights will undermine the feminist movement’s public reputation and gains. Relating her 
experience at an African literature conference, Juliana Makuchi Nfah-Abbenyi (2005:275) 
explains how African women in attendance claimed  
lesbianism was not a “problem” in Africa, it simply was not “our problem.” . . . In 
other words, those women vehemently affirmed their heterosexuality. . . . [T]his 
choice continues to stigmatize and perpetuate prejudice against what one can 
conjecture to be a “silenced” number of lesbian African women, who cannot 
                                                 
3 Coloured is a “colonially created category for mixed race people” (Hubbard and Solomon 1995:165). 
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speak openly about their sexuality and therefore cannot publicly and politically 
fight for their rights. Heterosexual women find themselves in an “enviable” 
bargaining position, but it is won at the expense of these silenced others. (P. 275) 
Critical reflection on the exclusion of lesbians from African feminist dialogues stands as a 
potential obstacle for African feminisms. Marc Epprecht (2001a) questions how this exclusion is 
“different in principle from the ways that men historically silenced women’s voices” (p. 23). 
Homophobia is typical of some African feminisms, and exclusionary practices are common for 
some African feminists when homosexuality emerges as a subject of debate (McFadden 1996). 
“[W]hen [an] attack is made on homosexuality in our presence, many women . . . who would 
‘normally’ consider themselves tolerant (that definitive characteristic of African progressives), 
either participate in the attacks (they are perverts!; they are sick!; they are influenced by Whites!; 
etc.) or they shy away” (McFadden 1996:viiii). For McFadden (1996), what angers some African 
feminists about female homosexuality is lesbians’ opting out of heterosexual family and 
community structures, which strikes them as a betrayal. The privileging of individual sexuality 
over group responsibilities underscores some African feminists’ rejection of homosexuality as a 
cause for feminist political organizing (Epprecht 2001a). Maintaining a gender and heterosexual 
dichotomy then is important to some African feminists.  
An African queer critique of the heterosexism implicit in some African feminist 
theorizing focuses on how the latter upholds a gender dichotomy in representing the past and 
present (van Zyl 2005b). Scholars have documented that black southern Africans engaged in 
same-gender sexual practices before, during, and after colonialism, debunking the notion that 
homosexuality is unAfrican (Bleys 1995; Epprecht 1998a; Morgan and Reid 2003; Spruill 2004; 
Swarr 2003).4 Such studies demonstrate how the erasure of same-gender sexual practices and 
relationships from history perpetuates gender inequalities, sexism, and homophobia and 
encourage African feminists to examine the oppressions that sexual and gender minorities face 
(Spurlin 2001; Epprecht 2004). Some African feminists have initiated critiques of heterosexism 
and begun to support LGBT organizing (Machera 2004; Nfah-Abbenyi 2005). In this manner, 
sexual and gender minorities are becoming visible in potentially positive ways for African 
                                                 
4 For historical and contemporary evidence of same-gender sexual relations in Namibia, see Falk (1998) and 
Talavera (2002); for Zimbabwe, see Coutinho (1993) and Epprecht (1998a, 1998b, 1999, 2004); for Lesotho, see 
Epprecht (2002) and Kendall (1999); and for South Africa, see Donham (1998), Epprecht (2001b), Gevisser and 
Cameron (1995), Leap (2002), Moodie, Ndatshe, and Sibuyi (1988), Morgan and Reid (2003), Morgan and 
Wieringa (2005), and Reid (2005).  
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feminists, suggesting possible new alliances between LGBT and feminist organizing. I turn now 
to queer theory’s analysis of the politics of visibility (Clarke 2000). 
1.1.3 Queer Theorizing 
Queer theorists have been interested in questions of visibility for some time, similar to 
feminist theories that examine how heterosexual privilege is invisible to its possessors.5 Queer 
theorizing positions visibility and invisibility as mutually dependent. I extrapolate from queer 
theorizing about individual-level visibility and the visibility of non-normative genders and 
sexualities to organizations that represents sexual and gender minorities. This orients my 
thinking about how visibility and invisibility function differently for individuals and for groups 
as processes and about how individuals and groups use public visibility and invisibility as 
instruments of power. Moreover, I follow calls to consider the constructions of gender and 
sexuality alongside those of race, ethnicity, and class (Barnard 2003; Cohen 2005; Mercer 1994; 
Sullivan 2003).  
Examining the strategic implications of the public visibility of sexual and gender 
minorities is important to my project because it means looking at the impact of sexual and gender 
minorities organizing on a broader structure of social rights. Pierre Bourdieu (2001), who is not 
regarded as a feminist or queer theorist, inspects the mechanisms of “visible invisibility” that 
sexual and gender minorities desire in their quest for full and equal rights that other “good 
citizens[s]” have (p. 123). He describes the LGBT movement as unfolding as though sexual and 
gender minorities “who have had to fight to move from invisibility to visibility, to cease to be 
excluded and made invisible, [and] sought to become invisible again” when activists demand the 
same rights as heterosexuals. Bourdieu’s point is to question whether, in this scenario, sexual and 
gender minorities actually want what they will get because it will mean they will receive the 
same rights as all individuals and thus recede into public invisibility. According to Bourdieu, it is 
difficult to battle homophobia, intolerance, and discrimination from a position of invisibility.  
                                                 
5 For a discussion about the need for theorizing that addresses the oppression of sexual minorities apart from 
feminist theorizing, see Rubin (1993). 
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1.1.3.1 Public Performances of Sexualities and Genders 
Queer theory and feminism intersect in Judith Butler’s (1993) useful work on gender as 
subversive parody and performativity. Subversion involves mimicking the norm and reinforcing 
it as a reference point, much in the same way that same-sex marriage mimics heterosexual 
marriage, some queer critics of same-sex marriage argue. This redefinition of performativity gels 
with Michel “Foucault’s notion that regulatory power produces the subjects it controls, that 
power is not only imposed externally, but works as the regulatory and normative means by which 
subjects are formed” (Butler 1993:22). Performativity as drag is not necessarily subversive for 
Butler (1993), because there are many cases in which it merely mimes, reverses, and reinscribes 
heteronormativity without critically questioning it.  
Sometimes, drag performances do amount to social and political disruption. In their 
ethnography of a Key West, Florida, drag club, Leila Rupp and Verta Taylor (2003) contend that 
performers enact social protest, although the identification of a concrete opponent remains 
elusive in their description. They suggest that “transgressive action . . . destabilizes gender and 
sexual categories by making visible the social basis of femininity and masculinity” (Rupp and 
Taylor 2003:212). For Rupp and Taylor, the broader implication of this transgressive action is 
the communal aspect of the enactment and consumption of the drag performance, which primes 
audience members, especially those who are LGBT persons, to create an oppositional 
consciousness. Although their argument may not satisfy social movement scholars that drag 
performances amount to social and political protest, nevertheless, their work is useful for 
thinking about the visible and performative nature of protest and for naming those involved in 
the staging and consumption of protest. 
1.1.3.2 Sexual Rights and the Public Sphere 
Political organizing around sexual dissidence takes place in a heteronormative public 
sphere (Warner 2002). Understanding Jürgen Habermas’ (1991) distinction between the private 
and public spheres is particularly helpful. In the nineteenth century in North America and 
Western Europe, coincident with rise of colonialism, the source of personal autonomy shifted 
from the private sphere of the conjugal family to the public sphere. “[P]rivatized individuals 
viewed themselves as independent even from the private sphere of their economic activity – as 
persons capable of entering into ‘purely human’ relations with one another” (Habermas 
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1991:48). Individuals attained social relationships apart from economic transactions in civil 
society by exchanging ideas democratically in the public sphere. In the public sphere, individuals 
crafted, developed, performed, and honed their civic subjectivities, affording them the status of 
citizen. Individuals developed and equipped themselves with mentalities that enabled them to 
contribute to the maintenance of the public sphere. Like-minded individuals who objected to 
political mandates engaged in public-spirited debate in the public sphere (Lichterman 1996). In 
this sense, the public sphere could potentially facilitate and constrain political organizing. 
Feminist and queer theorists challenge the exclusionary principles of the public sphere and the 
masculinist, ethnocentric, racist, and classist bias in the construction of a universalist, white, 
heterosexual, middle-class man who participated freely and without constraint in the democracy 
Habermas (1991) describes as emerging from the public sphere (Bell 1995; Fraser 1997; Warner 
2002). However, along with feminist and queer theorists, scholars of colonial and postcolonial 
southern Africa find that the concept of public sphere has some utility, due to the global 
diffusion of capitalism. Class formation and masculine domination of the public sphere typified 
public spheres in the global North and South (Breckenridge 1998).6
Challenging the exclusionary nature of the public sphere permits those who espouse 
queer politics to destabilize sexual identities publicly. Thus, the queer invasion of 
heterosexualized spaces, such as shopping malls, amplifies sexual minorities’ public visibility 
(Richardson 1996:16). “There is an emphasis on occupying space, both culturally and socially” 
(Richardson 1996:15). There is a tension between visibility and invisibility in the public sphere 
in the sense that although a heterosexually saturated public sphere may operate such that it 
demands the invisibility of sexual and gender minorities, enough openings exist to afford sexual 
and gender minorities the agency to determine whether visibility or invisibility is the best 
strategy. Diane Richardson (1996) examines the line of thought that Eric O. Clarke (2000) and 
Michael Warner (1999) expose in gay and lesbian politics that aim for normalcy. She asserts, 
“Being queer is not about seeking the democratic right to privacy, the right to do what one wants 
in private, it is concerned with establishing safe space for public sexualities” (Richardson 
                                                 
6 I have not been able to locate Africanist sources that critique the Western concept of the public sphere. This may 
be due in part to a larger postcolonial critique of the overlay of Western forms of domination and governance on to 
colonized places, which were parceled into territories that became (democratic) nations. The very concept of 
nationhood is itself Western, and as postcolonial feminists have made clear, deconstruction can only take political 
organizing so far (Bulbeck 1998). Yet it is clear that the idea of the public sphere has global currency (Baker 1995; 
Dawson 1995; Jacobs 2002; Zegeye and Harris 2002).  
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1996:15, my emphasis). Within this framework, establishing a safe space for public sexualities 
might entail promoting the visibility of sexual and gender minorities, demonstrating that 
homosexuality is not unAfrican, and challenging widely held assumptions about sexual and 
gender minorities circulating in the public sphere. Visibility emerges as a fundamental question 
for LGBT persons as individuals, but also as a concern for sexual and gender minorities as a 
social group. There is very little research, however, on how organized groups pursue this agenda 
of “establishing safe space for public sexualities,” which is a gap I hope to fill with my research 
(Richardson 1996:15).
1.1.4 Social Movement Theorizing 
Whereas queer theory heralds the promise of public visibility as a means to destabilize 
identity categories (Green 2007; Jagose 1996), social movement research investigates how 
organized sexual and gender minorities package and disseminate their claims. Queer theory is 
interested in why individuals use public visibility to overturn stable sexual identity categories, 
whereas social movement theory attends to how groups make themselves and their claims public.  
I draw on two strains of social movement theorizing—new social movement (NSM) 
theory and political process theory (PPT)—which, together, explain how SMOs devise and 
deploy strategies of visibility and invisibility based on their internal processes and response to an 
external sociopolitical context. Mario Diani and Donatella della Porta (1999) offer a useful 
working definition of social movements as “(1) informal networks, based (2) on shared beliefs 
and solidarity, which mobilize about (3) conflictual issues, through (4) the frequent use of 
various forms of protest” (della Porta and Diani 1999:16). This definition highlights the major 
components of social movements: how collective identities hold members together, how groups 
develop and pursue their goals through protest, and how politics and culture serve as sources of 
conflict that mobilize groups to act.  
I use “strategies of visibility” as a concept instead of “tactics of visibility.”  John Lofland 
(1996:259) differentiates between strategies and tactics in terms of level of abstraction within an 
SMO’s decision-making process. “Strategy is a way of ‘framing’ specific choices about 
targeting, timing, and tactics” (Ganz 2000:1010). Tactics refer to the isolated choices that 
“govern behavior toward” different audiences and opponents (Lofland 1996:259). Thus, tactics 
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make up a particular strategy. Instead of studying choices as discrete occurrences or tactics, I am 
interested in determining if the choices that SMOs make accrue in any meaningful way to an 
overarching strategy of visibility or invisibility.  
1.1.4.1 New Social Movement Theorizing 
New social movement (NSM) theorizing examines the political organization and 
identities of the new middle classes that contribute time, energy, and resources to achieving 
shared goals of social and political change. NSMs are often organized nonhierarchically and put 
consensus-based, participatory democracy into practice (Edelman 2001; Pichardo 1997). 
Theorists regard LGBT movements as NSMs because they occupy a space of “noninstitutional 
politics which is not provided for in the doctrines and practice of liberal democracy and the 
welfare state” (Offe 1985:826). NSMs also respond to the “broadening, deepening, and 
increasing irreversibility of forms of domination and deprivation” that accompany capitalism 
(Offe 1985:845). In their pursuit of “quality of life concerns,” NSMs are self-reflexive in that 
they persistently question their ideological orientation and purpose, inculcating the norm of 
“conscious choices of structures and action” (Pichardo 1997:421, 415).  According to Francesca 
Polletta and James M. Jasper (2001), NSMs seek “recognition for new identities and lifestyles,” 
a statement consistent with the equation of NSMs with identity politics (p. 286). 
NSM theorizing will remain limited as long as researchers cite only cases from North 
America and Western Europe, which suggests that this phenomenon depends on a certain mode 
of economic development with attendant rights and privileges for the new middle class (Pichardo 
1997). NSM theorizing also offers an identity-based account of how movement groups recruit 
members and make their identities relevant and worthy of public attention. An account of these 
processes “gives us a window on the implicit meaning that makes organization in the abstract . . . 
mean very different things in different contexts” (Lichterman 1998:408). By itself, NSM 
theorizing can account for the initial emergence of a group through the solidarity that sexual and 
gender minorities express through their shared experiences of oppression and for the collective 
identity that develops within the group and sustains participation. Yet it does not account for the 
processes by which the group perceives external opportunities for deploying sexual identities that 
contest a dominant heteronormative framework.  
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In an important move for social movement theory, Mary Bernstein (2002) advocates 
abandoning the distinction between “political” and “cultural” movements (p. 536). Using the 
U.S. gay and lesbian movement as a case study, she demonstrates how the movement pursues 
political and cultural goals in the interest of provoking wider social structural change. I follow 
Bernstein’s (2002) example in bringing together NSM and political process theorizing in order to 
understand how, when, and why LGBT social movement organizations in Namibia and South 
Africa use strategies of visibility and invisibility. Though she does not use the concept of 
visibility and invisibility, Bernstein (2002) shows how aspects of sexual and gender minority 
identity are neither entirely visible nor entirely invisible because “to mobilize a constituency, a 
social movement must draw on an existing identity or construct a new collective identity,” which 
is drawn from the submerged experiences of activists (p. 539). Whereas Sean Chabot and Jan 
Willem Duyvendak (2002) assume that there is a one-to-one correspondence between individual 
and group visibility in sexual minority movements’ coming out routines, Bernstein (2002) 
instead portrays how groups assemble and mobilize a collective identity related to their sexuality.  
1.1.4.2 Political Process Theorizing 
Political process theorizing (PPT) considers social movements as the primary actors in a 
field of political opportunities and constraints (della Porta and Diani 1999). Although theorists 
initially designed the model to explain social movement mobilization in Western democratic 
contexts (Schock 1999), other scholars have used the framework to explore how revolutionary 
movements in developing countries toppled authoritarian regimes and transformed themselves 
into political parties. PPT casts social movements as capable of taking advantage of shifting 
opportunities in “cycles of protest” to pursue their goals (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; 
Tarrow 1998). For Sidney Tarrow (1998), shifts in the political opportunity structure can incite 
or obstruct social movement activity and also initiate a new phase of political action. PPT also 
assumes that public visibility is an intrinsic feature of any social movement, for as Francesca 
Polletta (1998) observes, scholars often define movement emergence using a spatial metaphor: 
its ability to surface, to emerge, and to gain enough momentum that scholars notice it.  
Within a PPT framework, the shift to democracy in Namibia and South Africa resulted in 
more opportunities for sexual and gender minority movement organizations to make demands, 
generating cascading effects such as increased LGBT cultural and political visibility. PPT is 
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useful for explaining the ascendancy, maintenance, and dissolution of LGBT movements in 
Namibia and South Africa (Adam, Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999; Croucher 2002; Engel 2001) 
because it draws attention to the ebb and flow of movements over time as shifts in the external 
political environment make certain actions possible, and other less possible, for SMOs. In 
addition, PPT’s emphasis on “cycles of protest” raises questions about how changes in strategic 
choices among LGBT SMOs may be patterned in a cyclical fashion, such that they may accrue to 
an overall strategy of visibility and invisibility. 
PPT also offers social movement scholars another useful analytic category for 
understanding strategies, that of the repertoire of contention. Tarrow (1998) elaborates on how 
social movements store and transmit knowledge about strategies that have yielded success and 
failure to offspring movements through a repertoire of contention. A structural and cultural 
concept, the repertoire of contention encompasses “not only what people do when they are 
engaged in conflict with others but what they know how to do and what others expect them to do” 
(p. 30). In other words, the repertoire of contention entails actions groups take, how they 
determine what constitutes a feasible action, and how other audiences will respond to the action. 
Charles Tilly (1988) enumerates examples of different strategies that populate the repertoire of 
contention, all of which have a component of publicity: “meetings, marches, demonstrations, 
petitions, strikes, public confrontations with authorities, and similar forms of collective action” 
(p. 4). The equation of visibility with the repertoire of contention deserves closer scrutiny from 
scholars. 
1.1.4.3 Strategic Choice Framework 
A strategic choice framework can merge a culturalist (NSM) and political (PPT) 
approach by allowing analysts to focus on how, when, and why SMOs make certain choices 
(Jasper 2004, 2006). By strategic choices, I mean the decision to use SMO resources to execute a 
task in the pursuit of a larger organizational or movement goal. Internal SMO dynamics and an 
external sociopolitical context influence the choices that SMOs make (Edwards and McCarthy 
2004; Jasper 2004). “Strategic choices are made within a complex set of cultural and institutional 
contexts that shape the players themselves, the options perceived, the choices made from among 
them, and the outcomes” (Jasper 2004:5). For instance, Bob Edwards and John D. McCarthy 
(2004) found that the decision of anti-drunk driving activists in the United States to assist 
  15
survivors of drunk-driving incidents could boost a chapter’s credibility with different audiences, 
but such assistance also siphoned resources and emotional energy from chapter leaders and 
members, creating a deficit for the SMO (pp. 641-2). By focusing on the micropolitical decisions 
that take place within SMOs, researchers can examine how choices unfold and affect the 
development of SMOs (Blee and Currier 2005). Strategic choices can encompass deciding whom 
to recruit (Gamson 1975; McAdam 1988), which tactics to use (Carmin and Balser 2002; 
Downey 1986; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004), which audiences to target (Gamson 1975), how to 
present a collective identity publicly (Bernstein 1997; Einwohner 2006), and whether and how to 
respond to political opportunities (Blee and Currier 2006).  
The strategies LGBT SMOs in one country use may influence those that LGBT SMOs in 
a neighboring country uses. Examining the diffusion of strategies among LGBT SMOs can lead 
to questions about fundamental assumptions of social movement theory. Such scrutiny 
challenges whether confrontational queer politics like that which ACT-UP favored in North 
America are suitable in Namibia and South Africa, where the cultural, social, and political 
histories of sexual and gender minorities are quite different. Strategic choices develop in and are 
constrained by local sociopolitical contexts, but it does not mean that SMOs devise them in 
isolation. It is possible that activists draw on their understanding of how SMOs in a neighboring 
country use strategies of visibility and invisibility. Activists in these organizations may consult 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or local SMOs about what other groups 
have done in similar circumstances. By examining the refinement and shifts of Namibian and 
South African LGBT SMOs’ strategic choices in their sociopolitical contexts, I hope to shed 
light on internal SMO dynamics, as scholars know little about SMOs in both countries or about 
LGBT SMOs in the global South. However, I do not draw conclusions about the effectiveness of 
SMOs’ strategic choices due to the difficulty associated with measuring SMO outcomes (Ganz 
2000). 
1.1.4.4 Visibility as a Social Movement Concept 
How groups manage to achieve public visibility remains a mystery for some social 
movement scholars. Ruud Koopmans (2004) casts this question in the following way 
On an average day in a random Western democracy, thousands of press 
statements are issued by a variety of parties, interest groups, and movement 
organizations, hundreds of demonstrations, meetings, strikes, vigils, and other 
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protests are staged, and numerous press conferences vie for the attention of the 
public and policy-makers. (P. 371) 
This statement indicates the uphill struggle for groups to attain public visibility. Very little social 
movement activity percolates into public view (Blee and Currier 2005), if scholars take a strict 
view of the media controlling visibility in a top-down manner. By studying visibility and 
invisibility through SMOs’ strategic choices, I hope to disrupt the assumption that events or 
issues only achieve public visibility in one way: through the media. Examining a range of 
strategies demonstrates how variable organizational visibility and invisibility can be. 
SMOs often achieve public visibility when they take advantage of political opportunities. 
Koopmans (2004) uses political opportunity as a concept to describe how SMOs try to obtain 
media coverage or reach certain audiences as they manipulate opportunities to their advantage. 
Koopmans and Susan Olzak (2004) portray these opportunities as distinctly discursive because 
activists use the public sphere strategically to “communicate messages to fellow activists and 
potential adherents” and “to gain crucial information about the actions and reactions of 
authorities, political opponents, allies, and sympathizers” (p. 199). This description demonstrates 
how SMOs may use the media strategically for gathering and disseminating information (Carroll 
and Ratner 1999; Ryan 1991). Although Koopmans (2004) expressly focuses on visibility from 
the media’s perspective, I am more interested in examining visibility and invisibility from the 
perspective of SMOs.
Just as organizations may pursue public visibility at times, they may also pursue public 
invisibility. This is an unstated assumption in Koopmans’ (2004) and Koopmans and Olzak’s 
(2004) discussions of social movement actors’ pursuit of strategic public visibility. They use 
political process theory as a way to examine the media as a political opportunity (Koopmans 
2004), but other potential audiences, such as the state, the sexual minority community, human 
rights organizations, and other sympathetic or hostile groups, constitute part of the larger 
external sociopolitical environment (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004). There may be groups in the 
external sociopolitical environment to which LGBT SMOs may not want to be visible. An SMO 
in a repressive sociopolitical context may eschew public visibility in favor of invisibility in order 
to avoid confrontations with a group that makes threats against the well-being of the organization 
or its members or to concentrate on projects that do not necessarily require media attention (Earl 
2003). Hostile groups, such as antigay religious groups or political parties with antigay 
platforms, may comprise audiences to which organizations may want to be invisible (Miceli 
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2005).7 In this sense, hostile audiences may not be safe for LGBT SMOs. Activists may decide 
that it is more judicious to wage their protest through backchannels by engaging in subtler 
cultural and political forms of resistance, such as “behind-the-scenes behaviors rather than public 
ones” (Earl 2003; see also Johnston 2006). In periods of political and cultural tranquility, SMOs 
may appear stagnant because they do not engage in overt protest (Taylor 1989), but invisible 
forms of protests may indicate subtle forms of resistance to political domination and social 
inequalities (Bhabha 1994; Scott 1985). SMOs may also not want to wear out their welcome in 
the media, or if they change their goals, they may recede from visibility to tailor their visibility 
strategies to fit the new goals.  
SMOs may construct interior spaces to allow members to withdraw from public scrutiny 
and plan their next moves safely. Such free, or safe, spaces “are the environments in which 
people are able to learn a new self-respect, a deeper and more assertive group identity, public 
skills, and values of cooperation and civic virtue” (Evans and Boyte 1992:17). Safe spaces are 
variations of free spaces. They are likely more insular than free spaces, due in part to the feared 
repression that an SMO or individuals who possess a stigmatized identity face. Free or safe 
spaces are often unobtrusive and not readily observable by casually interested individuals 
because they are part of pre-existing groups or social institutions or are physically more 
inaccessible to public viewing (Morris 1984). Though some scholars question the utility of free 
and safe spaces as a concept (Emirbayer and Sheller 1999; Polletta 1998, 1999), Mai Palmberg 
(1999:267) regards safe spaces as key to the relationship between LGBT SMOs and the sexual 
and gender minority community. For Palmberg (1999), safe spaces function as a precursor to 
political organizing. She contends that organizations operate as a “safe space” for sexual 
minorities because they “provide meeting places and . . . answer the psychological needs of 
insecure and harassed gays and lesbians” (Palmberg 1999:267). However, this supposes that 
perhaps all sexual and gender minorities in southern Africa experience marginalization because 
of their sexual orientation, which is a dangerous generalization. Nevertheless, SMOs may 
operate as concrete safe physical spaces where sexual and gender minorities can explore their 
sexual and gender identities. Additionally, the public action of “lobbying for gay rights” is an 
important political reminder to sexual and gender minorities that organizations are fighting for 
their rights, but this public visibility “can take a more ostentatious form, giving the world a ‘here 
                                                 
7 I use the term “antigay” as an umbrella term to capture a wide array of anti-LGBT prejudice and attitudes. 
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we are’ message, through carnivals and other manifestations of visible existence” (Palmberg 
1999:267; see also Spruill 2004; Swarr 2004). The latter form of cultural visibility reminds 
sexual and gender minorities that the more they enter the public sphere, the safer they may feel, 
increasing the likelihood they may engage in political and cultural work. 
Pursuing visibility may be an important overall strategy for LGBT SMOs in Namibia and 
South Africa since countering homophobia involves exposing it in multiple places: the state, 
social institutions, public sphere, and private sphere (Koopmans 2004). Some scholars insist that 
visibility is an imperative first step for sexual minority groups, by allowing LGBT persons to 
meet safely and bring their grievances to the public (Palmberg 1999). The argument that LGBT 
SMOs must be visible to protect and advance the interests of LGBT persons is the foundation for 
the “coming out” visibility strategy that some LGBT SMOs in North America and Western 
Europe use. Yet it is unclear to what extent Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs employ 
such strategies (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002).   
1.1.5 LGBT Visibility in Movements 
LGBT social movement organizations are emerging throughout the global South (Adam, 
Duyvendak, and Krouwel 1999; Bacchetta 2002). In his analysis of LGBT movements in 
southern Africa, Mark Ungar (2000) links the globalization of the movement to the growing 
authority of international human rights organizations—Amnesty International, the International 
Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission (IGLHRC)—which pressure states that sponsor homophobia or persecute sexual 
and gender minorities to be more tolerant of sexual and gender diversity. International NGOs 
may facilitate the transmission of movement ideologies, identities, and organizational forms 
from the global North to the global South, but LGBT SMOs in the global South may selectively 
borrow strategies from the North, an example of how strategic choices unfold differently in 
various places. Considering how political strategies are unevenly dispersed globally, Sean 
Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak (2002) dispute Sidney Tarrow’s (1998) seemingly 
ethnocentric understanding of protest cycles as containing periods of turbulence that spread from 
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“center to periphery”8: from urban to rural and from the United States and Western Europe to 
underdeveloped countries. “Although he [Tarrow] acknowledges that non-Western people may 
receive diffusion items generated in the West, he pays little attention to how such cross-border 
dissemination evolves or why it occurs in some times and places and not others (Chabot and 
Duyvendak 2002:703-4, original emphasis). Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) disagree with the 
ethnocentric, essentialist tendency in Tarrow’s (1998) formulation because it misses the 
dynamics of how strategies travel from one place to another or why this transmission occurs 
within some movements and not in others.  
I return to Chabot and Duyvendak’s (2002) analysis of the transnational diffusion of 
strategies across LGBT movements because they make several erroneous assumptions about the 
visibility of LGBT movements in southern Africa. The linchpin of their argument is that 
“although it has never gone uncontested, ‘coming out’ represents the diffusion item 
disseminating within and between gay and lesbian movements since the end of the 1960s” 
(Chabot and Duyvendak 2002:712). They first assume that LGBT movements opt to “come out” 
in public. This premise is linked to the metaphor of visuality implicit in much social movement 
literature, which presumes that social movement emergence amounts to groups accruing enough 
internal momentum and/or external interest that they achieve public visibility with their actions 
or statements. In this sense, all LGBT movements must evolve in the direction of public 
visibility if they are to succeed. However, there is danger in promoting a single model of social 
movement evolution because it may not be applicable to contexts outside of Western 
democracies in which there has been or is limited democratic debate in the public sphere.  
Second, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) suppose that individual “coming out” routines 
accrue systematically to the level of group organization. If enough individuals come out publicly 
as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, Chabot and Duyvendak assume that they will somehow 
organize themselves into a publicly visible group, as though social movement organization is an 
organic occurrence emerging spontaneously from the public outing of many sexual ange gender 
                                                 
8 I attribute ethnocentrism to Tarrow’s (1998) formulation, though Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) do not use this 
term. They prefer the concept “essentialist diffusionism,” a burdensome term that still captures the criticism of how 
some North American and Western European social movement scholars privilege the global North as the site of 
“developed” political strategies, which are then exported to the global South. Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) are 
interested in showing how sometimes, “diffusion items” such as strategy and ideology, as in the case of Gandhian 
nonviolence, originate in the global South and enter circulation in the global North (see also Chabot 2004). 
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minorities.9 This logic is faulty because it presumes that there is a natural correspondence 
between individual visibility and group visibility, much in the same way that some activist 
groups in the U.S. assume that gay economic visibility, as in increased spending power, or gay 
cultural visibility, as in television shows featuring gay characters, is equivalent to gay political 
visibility (Clarke 2000). Cities may have neighborhoods where gay men and lesbians dominate 
the public space as consumers and “citizens,” but their presence does not guarantee that these 
individuals have actively sought to organize themselves (García Canclini 2001). The formulation 
also assumes that personal sexual and gender identity becomes politicized through the coming 
out routine. Certainly, coming out may involve consciousness-raising of a sort for individuals, 
but this does not necessarily translate into political action.  
Ungar (2000:64) similarly errs when describing the political opportunities that 
accompanied the eradication of apartheid resulted in the “increased visibility of lgbt 
communities.” Implicit in his analysis is that organized groups took advantage of these 
opportunities to make political advances. The public visibility of a sexual and gender minority 
community means that there will also be publicly visible sexual and gender minority movement 
organizations. Organizations may or may not deploy strategies of visibility in places where they 
are known, as in the sexual minority community: gay-owned businesses, nightclubs, and 
bookstores, community centers, and health clinics that cater to persons living with HIV/AIDS. 
Third, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) assume that once groups and individual “come 
out,” they remain out. Social movement scholarship, especially Verta Taylor’s (1989) work on 
the abeyance structures of the U.S. women’s movement that sustained the movement during its 
doldrums, dispels this assumption because it demonstrates that in politically hostile 
circumstances, groups may recede from public visibility or limit their visibility so that they can 
pursue projects without harassment from the state or other opponents. Mark Gevisser (1995) 
chronicles the ebb and flow of LGBT organization efforts from the 1950s to the present in South 
Africa, offering evidence that internal and external factors led to the disappearance of groups. 
Individuals may be “out” publicly as sexual and gender minorities with friends, family, and 
coworkers, but organizations may not be so visible to the public or even to the sexual and gender 
                                                 
9 I omitted “intersexed” from this list because only one South African LGBT SMO, Behind the Mask, I observed 
included intersexed individuals in the list of sexual and gender minority interests it represents. Behind the Mask 
covered few stores related to intersexed persons in South Africa. 
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minority community. Activists in these organizations may preserve the organization’s anonymity 
so that they can offer discreet counseling services to sexual and gender minorities and persons 
living with HIV/AIDS or withdraw from public view to refashion its objectives and strategies. 
Invisibility may have its rewards for groups because if they reemerge to the general public and to 
the sexual and gender minority community, they may appear revitalized, resulting in more 
political clout for their efforts.  
Fourth, Chabot and Duyvendak’s (2002) emphasis on coming out routines exaggerate the 
importance of a group’s (or individual’s) emergence as publicly visible because the SMO (or 
individual) becomes reduced to or synonymous with its initial coming out story. The 
preoccupation with origins can lead to unproductive debates about an SMO’s authenticity and if 
it “really” pursues the interests of the sexual and gender minorities that it purports to represent. 
While these debates may be important to SMO, it can paralyze social movement research. It is 
difficult to assess if an SMO hews to its “original” intent because the passage of time may lead to 
contradictory accounts from activists about the SMO’s origins.  
Fifth, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) claim that the HIV/AIDS pandemic spurred the 
transmission of coming out routines from Western democracies to developing countries. 
However, it does not seem to be the case that Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs 
emerged as organizations primarily in response to HIV/AIDS. Though Chabot and Duyvendak 
(2002) acknowledge that LGBT movement in South Africa owes its emergence to activist ties 
with the antiapartheid movement and the African National Congress (ANC) in the 1980s, even 
this does not consider earlier attempts at LGBT organizing that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Gevisser 1995). HIV/AIDS organizing emerged as an offshoot of LGBT activism in the 1980s 
and 1990s when HIV-positive gay activists such as Zackie Achmat called on LGBT SMOs to 
address how the pandemic went unacknowledged among men who have sex with men and 
women who have sex with women. Achmat’s Treatment Action Campaign stands out an 
exemplar of militant AIDS activism, calling on the state to provide treatment to persons living 
with HIV/AIDS and to attend to the transmission of HIV among men who have sex with men 
and women who have sex with women (Friedman and Mottiar 2005, 2006; Robins 2006).  
Finally, Chabot and Duyvendak (2002) do not entertain the notion that events or 
advances in political organizing in neighboring southern African countries can and do ignite 
sexual minority debates locally. For instance, President Robert Mugabe’s antigay rhetoric in 
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relation to the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe’s attempt to lease a booth at the Zimbabwe 
International Book Fair from which to distribute pamphlets promoting safer sex and counseling 
groups sparked homophobic statements from leaders in other southern African countries 
including Namibia (Epprecht 2004; Hoad 1999, 2000; HRW and IGLHRC 2003). South African 
LGBT SMOs staged protests in objection to Mugabe’s homophobia when he visited South 
Africa in the mid-1990s. As I will elaborate in Chapter Three, LGBT movement ideologies and 
strategies circulated from South Africa to Zimbabwe and Namibia, and Zimbabwean 
organizational forms also impacted Namibian LGBT organizing. 
1.1.6 The LGBT Movement as a Case for Studying SMO Visibility 
Visibility is a useful strategy and theoretical orientation that LGBT movements in the 
global South have embraced (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002). Just as publicity functions 
differently in distinct political fields (Beissinger 1999), LGBT persons around the world 
experience visibility and invisibility in diverse ways. Processes of visibility become hybridized 
as LGBT SMOs incorporate them into their own repertoires of action and cultures (Bhabha 1994; 
Phillips 2001).  
Many scholars have examined the production of visibility of LGBT persons as 
individuals and as a social group, primarily in the North. These processes include promulgating 
positive messages about LGBT persons in the media, which “can prepare the ground for gay civil 
rights protection” (Hennessy 1994:31-32). A large body of scholarship shows how performing 
sexualities publicly creates spaces for fluid social and sexual identities (Butler 1990, 1993). 
Geographers, in particular, have studied how LGBT persons in North America and Western 
Europe mask their sexual identities to avoid harassment or violence in heterosexualized public 
settings (Corteen 2002; Steinbugler 2005). Research on the queering of spaces in the Ivory Coast 
(Nguyen 2005), Thailand (Sinnott 2004; Wilson 2004), Brazil (Green 2001), and Argentina 
(Foster 1998) expands existing research on LGBT identities outside of North America and 
Western Europe, the use of public space by LGBT persons and groups, and the processes by 
which LGBT persons opt to become visible or to withdraw from visibility (Corteen 2002).  
Though these studies make important contributions to the burgeoning literature on LGBT 
performances of identities, the conceptual opacity of visibility still beleaguers many studies of 
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LGBT publicity. What happens after LGBT persons become visible? Does the performance of 
visibility end with a permanent state of visibility? Unless scholars address these questions, the 
assumption that after “coming out” publicly, LGBT persons in the global North and South 
remain out, goes unquestioned. Visibility for LGBT persons becomes a default outcome or 
accomplishment dispersed across time and space, rather than an unfolding social process, 
strategy, or performance that takes place within a confined time and space. LGBT public 
visibility may be a political victory in North America or Western Europe, but regarding the 
concept only as an accomplishment obscures the processes by which LGBT persons elsewhere 
emerge publicly and the obstacles they face in so doing.  
Just as scholars ignore the processes by which LGBT persons become and remain visible, 
they also disregard how LGBT SMOs become visible. The “struggle to be seen” (Guidry 
2003:493, emphasis removed) transcends movements for social change, yet few studies 
interrogate how social movements cultivate visibility. How social movements or SMOs manage 
their public visibility remains a process that many scholars overlook, even though it is crucial to 
an organization’s ability to broker relations between unconnected activists or groups (McAdam, 
Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) or to obtain funding or support from international donors (Bob 2002, 
2005). Studying how SMOs cultivate public visibility or retreat from public view can shed light 
on how activists prioritize and tailor their messages for certain audiences.  
The LGBT social movement is an excellent case study for examining how social 
movement organizations craft their own visibility. Social movement organizations are guarantors 
of “safe space[s]” for LGBT persons because they “provide meeting places and . . . answer the 
psychological needs of insecure and harassed gays and lesbians” (Palmberg 1999:267). How, 
when, and why do LGBT social activists use a collective identity publicly? Does the deployment 
of markers of LGBT public collective identities, if there are any, differ in the global North and 
South? If so, how?10 If scholars do not pose these crucial questions about the strategic nature of 
visibility, it runs the risk of becoming a flypaper concept, catching all forms of LGBT movement 
publicity.11
                                                 
10 Though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to contrast strategies of public visibility among LGBT SMOs in the 
global North and South, such a study could problematize how these strategies are diffused from one nation to 
another and how movement cultures and strategies evolve locally. 
11 Other forms of publicity include how LGBT persons consume goods and how corporations target them with 
advertising (Chasin 2000). These may be less relevant forms of publicity for LGBT persons in poor nations.
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1.2 THE AIM OF THIS PROJECT 
In this dissertation, I will examine the strategies of visibility and invisibility of LGBT 
SMOs in Windhoek, Namibia, and Johannesburg, South Africa, from 1995 to the present. 
Strategies of visibility refer to decisions and actions that a sexual minority movement 
organization takes to become visible to an audience or constituency, a group from which the 
SMO can recruit members (Gamson 1975). A group may also use “strategies of invisibility” to 
remain hidden from certain audiences or simultaneous strategies of visibility and invisibility 
when it wants to work with certain organizations in coalitions, for instance, but not be publicly 
visible to everyone. Possible target audiences include the state and its appendages, general 
public, mass media, political parties, Northern donors, “religious, medical, and educational 
organizations, professional associations, and private associations” with their grievances and 
messages (Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004:28; see also Jenkins and Eckert 1986; Lind and 
Share 2003).   
In South Africa, the LGBT movement has percolated to greater public visibility in the 
media than the Namibian movement has, due in part to the success the South African movement 
had in getting the African National Congress (ANC) to enshrine sexual minority rights 
permanently in the constitution. The Namibian movement has not experienced such a large win. 
Nevertheless, it is worth studying how movements in differing sociopolitical contexts make 
strategic choices about their public visibility and invisibility. A comparison of cases will help to 
shed light on this lingering question. 
In addition to supplementing the scarcity of research on LGBT movements in general, 
this research will contribute to the understudied cases of LGBT movements in southern Africa, 
specifically, in Namibia and South Africa. Most research on social movements in these nations 
concentrates on the labor movement (Seidman 1994), anti-apartheid movement (Gurney 2000; 
Seidman 2001), national liberation movement (Leys and Saul 1995; McConnell 2000; Melber 
2004), and the women’s rights movement (Becker 1995; Hassim 2005; Kuumba 2002). Although 
a few scholars are beginning to investigate sexual minority movements in southern Africa 
(Aarmo 1999; Epprecht 2004; Hoad 1999), they focus on episodes, such as the constitutional 
protection of sexual rights in 1996 in South Africa (Cock 2003; Croucher 2002; Gevisser 1995) 
or on Namibian President Nujoma’s rhetoric that attacks sexual minorities (Dunton and 
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Palmberg 1996; Palmberg 1999). Such attention to extraordinary episodes misses the cultural 
and political mechanisms by which organizations sustain a long-term campaign against 
homophobia in official and public spaces (Epprecht 2004). In addition, my research will help 
rectify the paucity of research of SMOs in the global South, specifically in Namibia and South 
Africa, by highlighting the strategic range and capacity of SMOs in differing sociopolitical 
contexts (Ganz 2000, 2004; Minkoff and McCarthy 2005). My multi-method data collection 
procedure captures the external sociopolitical context in which Namibian and South African 
LGBT SMOs operate and SMOs’ internal dynamics. I use micro-level ethnographic fieldwork 
and intensive interviews to understand the internal dynamics of social movement groups and 
historical document analysis and interviews to examine the external sociopolitical field in which 
groups operate (Ray 1999). 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE DISSERTATION 
In Chapter Two, I chronicle the rise of South African LGBT organizing in the context of 
apartheid laws and policies from the 1960s to 2006. I pay particular attention to how 
antiapartheid and gay and lesbian organizing was intertwined. I also document the emergence of 
Namibian LGBT organizing after national independence and in response to state repression. I 
also introduce the four LGBT SMOs with which I conducted intensive ethnographic observation 
and explain their organizational structure and goals. 
In Chapter Three, I detail how I collected and analyzed ethnographic, interview, and 
document data. I explain how I operationalized the concept of visibility and invisibility through 
ethnographic observation, qualitative interviews, and archival and organizational documents. I 
also consider the effect of my subject position as a white American female academic on research 
sites and participants who were diverse in terms of their race, gender, sexual orientation, and 
class. 
In Chapter Four, I examine how LGBT SMOs’ strategic choices about their visibility 
unfolded differently for the Forum for the Empowerment of Women and Sister Namibia in 
differing sociopolitical contexts in South Africa and Namibia. Scholars sometimes regard SMOs’ 
strategic choices as infinite, reflecting this framework’s utility in open, democratic systems. I 
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explore, in great detail, the constraints that LGBT SMOs in these newly democratizing nations 
faced when making certain choices. I answer three research questions in this chapter. First, how, 
when, and why do LGBT SMOs choose to become visible to different audiences? Second, how 
and why do LGBT SMOs choose which constituency/ies they will represent? Third, how and 
why do LGBT SMOs choose in which campaigns they will become involved? 
In Chapter Five, I analyze how LGBT SMOs in South Africa and Namibia receded into 
invisibility by forgoing political and legal opportunities. In the first part, I consider how South 
African LGBT SMOs failed to mobilize around the same-sex marriage win. I focus on events 
that siphoned attention away from SMOs’ commitment to the same-sex marriage campaign. In 
the second part, I investigate how Namibian LGBT SMOs eschewed a legal strategy in light of 
the state’s hostility. This contributed to the movement’s overall invisibility on legal challenges, 
such as striking down sodomy laws. In this chapter, I consider how strategic inaction on the part 
of LGBT SMOs accrues into an overall pattern of invisibility. 
In Chapter Six, I explore how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement 
organizations handled the strategic dilemma of public presentation. First, Behind the Mask and 
The Rainbow Project encountered the dilemma of being perceived as unAfrican because they 
received funding from Northern donors. Second, Namibian and South African LGBT social 
movement organizations confronted the dilemma of whether and how to introduce a unified pan-
African LGBT movement to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. They were 
concerned that unfavorable visibility at the African Commission could result in negative 
consequences for their local organizing and for LGBT persons in different African countries. 
Third, Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs had to decide whether to include transgender 
persons in the African LGBT activist contingent that would attend the African Commission’s 
meeting in Banjul, The Gambia. I contextualize this dilemma by probing how Namibian and 
South African LGBT SMOs integrated and defined transgender rights, identities, and issues 
differently. 
I conclude my examination of South African and Namibian LGBT SMOs in Chapter 7 by 
revisiting the contributions my dissertation makes to social movement, postcolonial feminist, and 
queer theorizing. I also examine the implications of my findings for transnational queer studies. 
Of importance for transnational queer analyses is an ongoing interrogation of the portrayal of 
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LGBT persons in countries in the global South as victims. I also consider the ethnocentric bias 
implicit in some queer scholarship and international LGBT organizing. 
  28
2.0  THE SEXUAL MINORITY MOVEMENT IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 Apartheid profoundly affected the lives of South African and Namibian sexual and 
gender minorities and limited opportunities for political organizing (Holmes 1997:162). The 
South African apartheid state treated sexual and gender minorities differently depending on their 
race and gender. For instance, the state regarded homosexuality as a white problem, leaving 
black and coloured sexual and gender minorities untouched (Gevisser 1995; Retief 1995). 
Legally, nonwhite sexual and gender minorities did not exist as governable subjects based on 
their sexual or gender identity, but rather as racialized subjects under apartheid. As such, the 
apartheid state interpreted sexual and gender categories rigidly, polarizing heterosexual and 
homosexual identities and practices (McClintock 1995). In general, white lesbians were not 
visible to state leaders because they were “assumed to exist in lesser numbers than homosexual 
men” and not to be mothers; however, when they became the subject of state scrutiny during 
discussions of amending the Immorality Act in Parliament in the late 1960s, members of 
Parliament discussed lesbians “in terms of their sexual activity, looks, and butch role-playing” 
(Retief 1995:103). Legislators worried about white lesbians only to the extent that they did not 
conform to white Afrikaner expectations about femininity, heterosexual marriage, and 
motherhood (McClintock 1995). Black and coloured lesbians and gay men ultimately remained 
invisible to apartheid authorities, but enterprising black and coloured South Africans operated 
informal township bars out of their homes and provided spaces for black and coloured lesbians 
and gay men to socialize (Chetty 1995a, 1995b; Gevisser 1995). 
In this chapter, I situate the emergence and growth of LGBT organizing in Namibia and 
South Africa against the backdrop of apartheid laws and policies and antiapartheid and national 
liberation movements. I also introduce the four lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
social movement organizations (SMOs) that I studied: Behind the Mask (South Africa), the 
Forum for the Empowerment of Women (South Africa); Sister Namibia (Namibia); and The 
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Rainbow Project (TRP). I begin by describing how and why South Africa and Namibia 
constituted the same country until 1990 and how apartheid affected the citizens of both countries 
and sexual and gender minority organizing. 
2.1 APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA AND NAMIBIA 
Until 1966, South Africa ruled Namibia—formerly South West Africa, a German 
colony—but between 1966 and 1989, South Africa defied United Nations directives to relinquish 
Namibia as a colonial possession and subjected Namibians to apartheid laws and policies (Saul 
2005; Saunders 2000). South Africans and Namibians share a common history of being subject 
to apartheid laws, practices, and policies. Under apartheid, the state banished many Africans to 
ethnic homelands, or “bantustans” (Kössler 2000; Mamdani 1996). Implemented formally in 
1948, the apartheid principle of “separate development” held that cultures would evolve 
independently of one another, according to their own gifts and trajectories, on homelands that 
“aimed to engineer a complete balkanization of the country” (Jacobs 2002:282). The relocation 
of black South Africans and Namibians to homelands reduced many to extreme poverty. Other 
apartheid policies and practices included controlling the movement of nonwhites with pass laws, 
using nonwhites to police and repress nonwhites, and preventing nonwhites from accessing high-
paying, prestigious jobs and educational opportunities (James and Lever 2001; Jensen 2001; 
Landis and Davis 1979; Mamdani 1996). “In Namibia, as in South Africa, oppression occurred 
not so much by terror per se as by the routinization of terror in day-to-day interaction” (Gordon 
2002:77). Though the apartheid regime politically excluded nonwhite South Africans and 
Namibians through legislation, whites needed the economic participation and labor of nonwhites 
to propel South Africa’s economic development forward (Younis 2000:80). The simultaneous 
economic inclusion and political exclusion of nonwhite South Africans nurtured a budding 
working class and underclass that enabled the African National Congress (ANC) to mastermind a 
mass antiapartheid movement within the country’s borders (Younis 2000).  
Despite the extreme set of controls that the state instituted, white South Africans became 
nervous about the independence movements in neighboring central and southern African nations, 
and “the determination to maintain white supremacy grew” (Frederickson 2002:133). Covert 
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resistance became organized public displays of resistance, as in the cases of black women 
protesting the implementation and enforcement of pass laws in the 1950s (Kuumba 2002; Walker 
1982) and of armed violent conflict in Namibia and South Africa (Leys and Saul 1995). 
Resistance owed its emergence to working-class interests as white and nonwhite workers 
protested worsening industrial working conditions (Seidman 1994; Younis 2000). By the mid-
twentieth century, each country had a national liberation movement that was antiapartheid and 
anticolonial in political orientation. In South Africa, antiapartheid activists organized into 
different groups, with many aligning with the ANC, and some leaders voluntarily went into exile 
in Europe and North America to pressure Northern governments and citizens to take action 
against South Africa (Thorn 2006). In Namibia, the movement focused on liberating the nation. 
The South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in Namibia fought for independence 
on two fronts: internationally by demanding that the United Nations force South Africa to give 
up its mandate over South West Africa and locally by resisting South Africa’s apartheid rule 
through armed fighting. Thus, the Namibian struggle for independence from South Africa had a 
decidedly local and international flavor, a strategy that antiapartheid and sexual minority 
activists continued to utilize.  
2.2 GAY AND LESBIAN ORGANIZING IN APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA:  1960S-
1970S 
South African gay and lesbian activists have tended to distinguish between the formation 
of gay and lesbian subcultural institutions, such as bars, clubs, and similar meeting places, and 
political organizing (Gevisser 1995).12 This dichotomy mirrors the tendency of some scholars to 
separate culture and politics when analyzing social movements (Bernstein 1997; Polletta and 
Jasper 2001; Staggenborg 2001). This distinction stems from the apartheid state’s repression of 
sexual minorities through policing and laws, thus forcing black, coloured, and white gay and 
lesbian subcultures into invisibility (Gevisser 1995). In the 1950s, white gay bars and parties 
                                                 
12 I intentionally use the terms “gay and lesbian” and “LGBT” to indicate historical shifts in sexual and gender 
minority organizing in including individuals and issues that did not map neatly on to “gay and lesbian” identities and 
issues. 
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escaped notice from apartheid authorities who were too busy trying to stamp out black national 
liberation activists in the 1950s (Cage 2003:12), but state repression in the 1960s made some 
white gay men and lesbians question the utility of public organizing, initiating a trend of sporadic 
public visibility and invisibility of sexual minority organizing in South Africa. Thus, few gays 
and lesbians “have been prepared to ‘go public’ as leaders” since the 1960s due to a feared state 
backlash (Gevisser 1995:45).  
Any talk of “rights” was regarded by suspicion not only by the authorities, but by 
the conservative white gay community itself, which eschewed any 
identification—either overt or implicit—with the broader liberation struggle. But 
even in the largely black gay organisations of the 1990s, which have embraced 
strongly liberationist politics, the tension between political activism and the 
maintenance of social space still exists (Gevisser 1995:45). 
Gulfs between black, coloured, and white gay and lesbian organizing in South Africa have 
existed since the 1960s, just as the inclusion of white lesbians in white gay male organizing has 
been uneven over the years. Yet white gay men and lesbians did not form communities and 
social spaces before or even independently of coloured and black gay men and lesbians. White 
and coloured gay urban subcultures coexisted and flourished in Johannesburg, Pretoria, Cape 
Town, and Durban between the mid-twentieth century and the present (Chetty 1995a; Gevisser 
1995; Isaacs and McKendrick 1992; Lewis and Loots 1995; Reid 2005).13 Gay men, however, 
consistently excluded lesbians from gay venues because “in the patriarchal society of apartheid 
South Africa, these places were the hunting grounds of men only” (Cage 2003:11). White gay 
men and lesbians periodically joined forces to oppose repressive legislation and policing between 
the 1960s and 1980s.   
 South African LGBT activists long regarded the state as a primary target. The apartheid 
state’s legal and social control over citizens made it a principal social institution in the lives of 
South Africans and Namibians (Mamdani 1996). “[F]or white lesbian and gay South Africans . . 
. the force of antigay laws was profound,” yet “the criminal laws against homosexuality entailed 
significantly worse problems for lesbians and gays of color” (Goodman 2001:94). Intent on 
eradicating homosexuality among whites, the police raided urban epicenters of white gay 
                                                 
13 Relationships among black South African men of differing ages and statuses were also common in mines, 
sometimes resulting in “mine marriages” (Moodie, Ndatshe, and Sibuyi 1988; see also Epprecht 2004). Black 
lesbian sangomas (traditional healers) have been mainstays and important religious leaders in their communities in 
the past and present (Morgan and Reid 2003; Nkabinde 2005). Earlier in the twentieth century, same-gender sexual 
relationships were visible to German anthropologist Kurt Falk, who documented such relationships among the 
Herero and Damara (Falk 1998; see also !Khaxas 2005). 
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socializing, such as bars, massage parlors, and clubs, between the 1950s and 1970s. Organized 
outrage in the white gay community did not surface until January 1966 when the police raided a 
private party in the Johannesburg suburbs and arrested white gay men attending the party, 
claiming that the host was an unlicensed alcohol vendor (Gevisser 1995; Isaacs and McKendrick 
1992:154). This raid and proposed amendments to the Immorality Act of 1967 prompted white 
gay and lesbian professionals to launch the Homosexual Law Reform Fund in 1968, which 
operated mostly in Johannesburg and Pretoria. The group opposed proposed amendments to the 
Immorality Act that would criminalize both male and female same-gender sexual acts; this 
legislation “would have had the effect not only of bringing lesbians into the scope of the law, but 
of making male homosexuality itself statutorily illegal, whereas previously, only public male 
homosexual acts had been regulated by statute” (Gevisser 1995:31; Isaacs and McKendrick 
1992:155). In this period of public and state scrutiny, the Homosexual Law Reform Fund made 
strategic choices about how to publicize their meetings and whom to include in the organizing 
effort. They held their first meeting on 10 April 1968 “at the Park Royal Hotel in Joubert Park,” 
in the then-white gay neighborhood of Hillbrow.14 This constituted the “first gay public meeting 
ever held in South Africa” (Gevisser 1995:32). Members advertised the meeting “by word of 
mouth and by very discreet pamphleteering in the bars. About 100 people attended. There was 
strict screening at the door—to prevent intrusion by either police or the media” (Gevisser 
1995:32). The attention activists paid to how and to whom organizing was visible demonstrates 
how public visibility and safety were concerns for white gay and lesbian activists in the 1960s. 
Instead of mobilizing the enervated white gay and lesbian community for a sustained political 
campaign, the Homosexual Law Reform Fund only targeted the state (Gevisser 1995:33). A 
white gay male oligarchy limited the group’s focus and controlled the group’s funding. The Fund 
succeeded in persuading Parliament to drop some of the more stringent criminalization measures, 
though Parliament did pass amendments that prohibited dildoes, raised the age of consent of 
same-gender male sexual acts from 16 to 19, and criminalized the congregation of two or more 
men for the purpose of “‘sexual gratification’” (Gevisser 1995:35). Sodomy laws remained 
intact; the Homosexual Law Reform Fund “simply staved off even more repressive legislation” 
(Gevisser 1995:36). In fact, authorities had the power to construe gay activist meetings as 
                                                 
14 See Chapter Four for a discussion of Hillbrow’s transformation from a white gay suburb to a poor black inner-city 
neighborhood. 
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illegally promoting and inducing sexual acts between members of the same gender under the 
revised laws; however, the police only concentrated on eliminating public sex between men 
(Gevisser 1995:36-37).15 Repressive laws that penalized gay men and lesbians still remained in 
effect. 
Why didn’t the Homosexual Law Reform Fund draw on the liberatory rhetoric and ideas 
circulating among antiaparthied movement activists? Mark Gevisser (1995:33-34) suggests that 
the Homosexual Law Reform Fund could have drawn on the protest formula that the early 
antiapartheid movement favored with the Defiance Campaign or on the model of nonracial 
equality espoused in the Freedom Charter. In 1955, the South African Congress of Trade Unions 
and the ANC passed the Freedom Charter, “which projected a nonracial future South Africa that 
‘belongs to all who live in it, black and white’” (Younis 2000:89); this document cast South 
Africa as a country in which black and non-black South Africans could live peacefully (Welsh 
2000). In 1952, in the form of a national Defiance Campaign, the ANC asked members to 
transgress apartheid curfew, pass, and segregated facility laws (Younis 2000:85). “By inundating 
the prisons and courts beyond their capacity, the campaign was intended to demonstrate their 
ability to impair the functioning of the system, and, it was hoped, achieve the repeal of the 
oppressive laws” (Younis 2000:85). White gay and lesbian law reform activists did not borrow 
antiapartheid rhetoric or strategies for several reasons. First, employing a transgressive strategy 
like violating laws constituted “high-risk activism” for middle-class gays and lesbians; they had 
too much to lose in terms of their class position and safety (McAdam 1988). Second, the ANC’s 
status as a banned political party at the time alienated many white gay and lesbian activists who 
did not want to invite further state scrutiny of their lives (Gevisser 1995:36). Third, because 
apartheid laws kept white and nonwhite gay men apart, black African gay men involved in 
antiapartheid politics were not able to introduce white gay men to equality rhetoric, though white 
and coloured gay men socialized in urban areas before the introduction of apartheid legislation 
(Gevisser 1995; Isaacs and McKendrick 1992). Fourth, the state defined homosexuality purely as 
                                                 
15 Lesbians were invisible under South African law until the proposed changes to the Immorality Law, which failed 
to materialize. The apartheid state and white society did not consider same-gender relationships among women to be 
threatening or even possible because Afrikaner nationalism was so androcentric (McClintock 1995). However, the 
threat of Communism and black insurgency changed the political landscape, as they introduced ideas that could 
fundamentally alter the white supremacist, classist, sexist, and heterosexist South African society. Under these 
circumstances and with the carefully managed public profile of the Homosexual Law Reform Fund, same-gender 
relationships among white women were understood as possible and potentially threatening to Afrikaner nationalism 
and ideals of family purity.  
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a white problem (Gevisser 1995; Retief 1995). Had the state targeted black gay men and lesbians 
for arrest and harassment, antiapartheid activists may have treated this as yet another instance of 
the oppression of black South Africans. Finally, the Homosexual Law Reform Fund’s narrow 
focus on preventing the passage of anti-homosexual legislation kept the movement from situating 
the issue within a larger framework of equality. White gay and lesbian activists could not sustain 
legal reform organizing in the late 1960s because “it was a narrowly-defined, single-issue 
campaign aimed at blocking potential legislation rather than at building an enduring gay and 
lesbian community” (Gevisser 1995:36). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the movement drew 
on hallmarks of antiapartheid organizing, such as liberatory rhetoric and broad outreach to South 
Africans of different races.   
Racist and homophobic policies that the apartheid ruling party, the National Party, 
penned reinforced one another throughout the 1970s. “[A]n obsessive interest in sexual policing 
was as important to successive Nationalist governments as racist legislation was. The Christian 
Nationalist apartheid ideology was based on keeping the white nation not only racially pure, but 
‘morally’ pure as well” (Cage 2003:14). In this period, the white lesbian and gay community 
retreated inwardly and concentrated on creating venues for socializing, rather than mobilizing 
around political goals (Gevisser 1995). Many individuals who would emerge as key gay, lesbian, 
and bisexual activists in the 1980s and 1990s became involved with and learned valuable lessons 
from the antiapartheid and student movements in South Africa during the 1970s through SMOs 
such as the National Union of South African Students (Kraak 2005). However, toward the end of 
the decade, several white gay and lesbian SMOs were launched and failed; most did not 
percolate to public view because they did not widely advertise their goals. For example, in April 
of 1972, white students at the University of Natal in Durban tried to form the South African Gay 
Liberation Movement, but the organization disappeared from public view when police 
investigated whether the group was encouraging others to engage in “illicit activity” (Gevisser 
1995:43). In 1976, the Gay Aid Identification Development and Enrichment (GAIDE), a white 
gay and lesbian organization, formed also in Durban, but leaders did not intentionally seek 
publicity; a psychologist affiliated with the SMO demanded that the state cease its “repression of 
homosexuals” (Gevisser 1995:44-45). GAIDE initiated the trend of gay and lesbian SMOs 
relying too much on individual powerful leaders, only to buckle when leaders sought refuge 
beyond South Africa or mishandled SMO funds (Gevisser 1995:45). A few short-lived 
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publications that targeted white gay men emerged and quickly disappeared in the late 1970s, due 
to the financial unsustainability of white gay magazines and the Publications Control Board’s 
censorship (Gevisser 1995:46).  
Though police raids of gay clubs abated after 1969, they resumed in the late 1970s amid 
the social opprobrium that alleged drug and alcohol abuse brought. Well-versed in the history of 
the gay liberation movement in the United States, some white gay activists depicted a police raid 
at a bar called The New Mandy’s as the South African equivalent of the Stonewall raid and 
protests (Gevisser 1995:47).16  
[P]atrons were manhandled [by police], photographed, verbally abused, and kept 
locked up in the building until morning. There were a few black gay men present 
at the club, and they came in for the harshest treatment. . . . [C]lientele, and 
particularly the drag queens, fought back . . . . [T]his raid—and a subsequent one 
the following year at the same club—. . . prompted some gay people to . . . begin 
talking of rights once more (Gevisser 1995:47). 
Mark Gevisser (1995) attributes the rekindling of talk of gay and lesbian rights to a similar 
emotional outrage that white lesbians and gay men felt a decade earlier when lawmakers were 
intent on imposing more negative sanctions on them; at that time, activists organized to halt the 
repressive legislation. After the raid at The New Mandy’s bar, members of the sexual and gender 
minority community channeled their anger at the state into political organizing. Though The 
New Mandy’s raid was not the actual crucible for tying sexual minority rights to the 
antiapartheid movement, disgruntlement with the apartheid state’s treatment of sexual minorities 
positioned the gay and lesbian movement in the 1980s to have more in common with the 
antiapartheid movement than it had in the past.  
2.3 GAY AND LESBIAN ORGANIZING IN SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1980S 
Larger gay SMOs still distanced themselves from antiapartheid organizing in the early 
1980s. One reason for this distancing is that some white, middle-class gay men were racist 
(Kraak 2005:123). Though LGBT bars and nightclubs slowly were becoming racially integrated, 
some white gay men worried that “people of colour [were] ‘taking over,’” which resulted in the 
                                                 
16 In “gayle,” what Ken Cage (2003) calls South African gay slang, “mandy” means “to masturbate” (p. 81). 
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enforcement of apartheid measures within gay venues by ignoring or excluding sexual minorities 
of color (Isaacs and McKendrick 1992:94). Additionally, “[t]here was very little sense of a black 
gay community. So for white political activists the spheres of political and gay identities just did 
not come together, as they might have in a Western country” (Kraak 2005:123). Such a 
contradiction would result in some SMOs’ downfalls and the spinoff of multiracial LGBT 
SMOs. Some white, middle-class gay and lesbian activists did not want to provoke the state’s 
hostility, a continuing thread of white gay activist reluctance. In 1981, the launch of Lambda in 
Johannesburg as an “activist organisation [was] aimed at protecting the rights of homosexuals 
while at the same time remaining apolitical” (Gevisser 1995:47). Remaining apolitical proved 
difficult for activists while a mass antiapartheid movement was brewing. As antiapartheid 
activists expressed their discontent more visibly in the mid- and late 1970s, more moderate white 
Afrikaner South African leaders such as President P.W. Botha claimed that Afrikaners “‘must 
adapt or die” and modify their leadership style and policies (Welsh 2000:479). Such a change 
would require a corresponding transformation of Afrikaner nationalist ideals, which historically 
had been “synonymous with white male interests, white male aspirations and white male 
politics” (McClintock 1995:369), and of how Afrikaners and white South Africans generally 
viewed the nation as a country to share, rather than as a “land of their own” (Shearing 1986:295, 
emphasis original). Botha’s proposed constitutional reforms included  
giving Asian Indian and coloured persons the right to vote in their own separate 
parliamentary chambers; abolishing pass laws restricting the movement of Blacks 
into cities; increasing spending on Black education; and abandoning the laws 
prohibiting interracial sex and marriage (Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 2003:28). 
However, Botha and his National Party supporters also intended these reforms to undermine and 
deflate the growing antiapartheid insurgency (Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 2003), or as former 
banned sociologist Fatima Meer (1984) stated, the reforms manifested a “desire to manage 
conflict, involving a dangerous plan to control, coerce and eliminate all opposition” (p. 83).17  
Racial and sexual politics in the gay and lesbian movement collided in the 1980s. The 
tension between remaining apolitical or becoming political dogged sexual minority SMOs 
throughout the 1980s as the antiapartheid movement gained momentum and as international gay 
rights organizations pressured white South African gay SMOs to develop an antiapartheid 
                                                 
17 Banned persons could only meet with a limited number of other people at a time and could not publish any 
material, thus allowing the apartheid state to preempt the publication of what leaders deemed incendiary. 
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platform. In April of 1982, the Gay Association of South Africa (GASA), the first national-level 
gay and lesbian SMO, recruited white, middle-class gay men and lesbians as dues-paying 
members and established branches throughout country, but remained silent on oppressive 
apartheid legislation and policing. Ann Smith (1982:12), a white lesbian founding member of 
GASA, called on other lesbians to join GASA, “as [gender] separatism within a gay movement is 
totally inappropriate given the reasons why such a movement is necessary in the first place.” 
More than twenty years later, Smith (2005) acknowledged the short-sightedness of GASA in 
remaining apolitical and not defining gay liberation as a larger problem of social and political 
oppression that both sexual minorities and nonwhite South Africans faced. She stated that the 
only connections that GASA leaders identified with other liberation ideology was with a “kind of 
basic feminism. . . . [W]omen were fighting for equality and so were we” (Smith 2005:60). 
Feminist theorizing vaguely informed GASA, but it did influence the formation of a white 
lesbian feminist SMO, Lesbians in Love and in Compromising Situations (Armour and Lapinsky 
1995). According to Mary Armour and Sheila Lapinsky (1995:299), lesbians remained a 
numerical minority in gay SMOs because some lesbian feminists opted to participate in “women-
centred and women-only organisations.” In addition, lesbian-only SMOs did not take off because 
South African lesbians hesitated to “work on issues that have to do with lesbians alone,” as this 
form of identity politics forced “black and white women . . . to ignore other forms of oppression” 
(Armour and Lapinsky 1995:299).    
Black gay men and lesbians remained minorities in GASA. The organization’s 
marginalization of black members and its apolitical stance ultimately led to its demise. At a time 
when antiapartheid politics were heating up, it became impossible for the SMO to remain 
relevant. In 1983, the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) first discussed whether 
to decline the group’s application for membership after it refused to take a stand on apartheid 
(Croucher 2002). If the International Lesbian and Gay Association were to reject GASA for this 
reason, GASA’s representative asserted that other members of ILGA “must be scrutinised for 
their lack inclusiveness towards women and racial or ethnic minorities” (Croucher 2002:308; 
Rydström 2005:35). Ann Smith (2005:61) explicates GASA leaders’ approach to handling calls 
to oppose apartheid.  
[W]e were afraid in our white liberal safety, to rock the boat too much: it was 
dangerous enough in those days to defy the tenets of apartheid by having an 
association open to people regardless of their colour. A founding principle of 
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GASA was that we would . . . “keep out of politics.” What we understood by the 
word “politics” was overt opposition to the apartheid laws of the government. . . . 
We thought that such a stance would guarantee us at least some measure of 
protection from the draconian laws which frequently led to the banning of 
organisations and individuals. . . . [W]e perpetuated the myth . . . that it is possible 
to compartmentalize forms and expressions of oppression (Smith 2005:61). 
For GASA members, providing a “racially integrated space” was “not just the best we could do, 
it was all we could do” (Smith 2005:61). The International Lesbian and Gay Association and 
black GASA members, such as Simon Nkoli, disagreed. Nkoli joined GASA in 1982, formed an 
internal group of black gay men, faced opposition from white GASA members, and was 
threatened with expulsion from the group (Gevisser 1995). Nkoli had joined the Congress of 
South African Students in 1976, and in 1984, he was arrested and jailed alongside United 
Democratic Front members for killing a supposed police informant at the funeral of victims 
killed by police in Sebokeng township (Luirink 2000:19).18 Gay and lesbian activists hailed 
Nkoli’s bravery in coming out while in prison, much to the dismay of his United Democratic 
Front (ANC) comrades.  
Nkoli’s actions not only challenged the notion that homosexuality was unAfrican, 
but demonstrated the presence of gay men and lesbians in the anti-apartheid 
movement. . . . Gay groups in the US and Europe took up Nkoli’s cause, 
demanding his release, and brought the issue of gay and lesbian identity into the 
foreground of anti-apartheid politics (Kraak 2005:130). 
Nkoli became internationally visible as a bridge between gay and antiapartheid organizing. The 
International Lesbian and Gay Association interpreted GASA’s silence about Nkoli’s 
imprisonment as confirmation of its apolitical stance and grew concerned that “after Nkoli’s 
arrest, there was no group [in South Africa] that reached out to black people” (Rydström 
2005:37). The formation of the Rand Gay Organisation (RGO), a black gay and lesbian SMO, by 
Alfred Machela in August 1986 offered an alternative to GASA and demonstrated that taking a 
stand against apartheid and for gay rights was not contradictory (Gevisser 1995:57). Machela 
disputed GASA’s statements to the International Lesbian and Gay Association and argued, 
“‘GASA does not represent the entire gay movement in South Africa. We would like to distance 
ourselves from GASA. And we don’t wish them to represent us at any level without our 
mandate” (qtd. in Croucher 2002:319). The International Lesbian and Gay Association 
                                                 
18 The United Democratic Front, “a local and legal front for the ANC, was launched nationwide in 1983 upon the 
crest of [a] new wave of township resistance” (Bozzoli 2004:37). 
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ultimately expelled GASA in 1987 for not following through on promises to support Nkoli and 
not opposing apartheid publicly (Cock 2003; Rydström 2005; see also Botha 2005a, 2005b).  
The Rand Gay Organisation soon disappeared, but any vacuum that it may have left was 
quickly filled by the founding of Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression (LAGO) in 1986 in 
Cape Town. Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression emerged to address GASA’s failure to 
oppose apartheid and demonstrate that “‘[g]ay rights are human rights’” (Nicol 2005:72). The 
antiapartheid movement did not necessarily welcome the support and action of gay and lesbian 
activists. Members of Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression faced accusations that they were 
“hijacking the anti-apartheid struggle for our own partisan ends. The fact that both LAGO and 
OLGA had approximately 90 per cent white membership made us especially vulnerable to such 
perceptions” (Nicol 2005:72-73). The charge that homosexuality was not African became a 
vehicle for silencing black gay and lesbians within the antiapartheid movement who tried to 
characterize sexual rights as human rights and has continued to function as a way to make black 
LGBT persons and organizing invisible. Lesbians and Gays Against Oppression eventually 
dissolved and was replaced by the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists (OLGA) because 
members experienced an ideological division: some members believed it impossible to separate 
gay and lesbian organizing from a broader struggle to liberate South Africa, whereas others who 
hewed to gay liberationist ideology thought that the SMO’s opponents were both the National 
Party and the antiapartheid movement because both groups were “equally homophobic” (Nicol 
2005:73). The emergence of politicized groups like the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay 
Activists and black and coloured gay and lesbian SMOs, such as the Cape Town-based African 
Gay Association and Johannesburg-based Gays and Lesbians of the Witwatersrand (GLOW), 
signified a shift in the gay and lesbian movement’s shunning of antiapartheid politics to engaging 
with the antiapartheid movement (Nicol 2005:75).  
Black, coloured, and white gay and lesbian activists who supported and/or were involved 
with the antiapartheid movement within South Africa pursued a range of strategies. For instance, 
as part of a broader attempt to eradicate apartheid policies and laws, activists targeted the ending 
of military conscription as a way to thwart the state’s campaign of terror inside and outside South 
Africa. In 1988, the highly publicized trial of a white gay conscientious objector, Dr. Ivan Toms, 
revealed the fissures in the End Conscription Campaign. The Campaign demanded that Toms, a 
core member of the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists, hide that he was gay, in order to 
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preserve the support of white South African families affected by compulsory military service and 
sympathetic to the antiapartheid movement (Conway 2004; Nicol 2005; Toms 1995). By 
refusing to support Toms’ conscientious objector defense, the ECC “avoided attacking the nexus 
of heterosexual masculinity, militarization and citizenship that underpinned the apartheid order 
and reduced the ECC’s potential for posing a radical challenge to the apartheid order” (Conway 
2004:26; see also Nicol (2005) and Toms (1995)).  
Toward the end of the 1980s, multiracial gay and lesbian SMOs directed their attention to 
ANC leaders within and outside of South Africa to persuade them to include sexual minority 
rights in their revision of exclusionary apartheid laws.19 Gay and lesbian antiapartheid activists 
in Great Britain, the Netherlands, and several Scandinavian countries pressured ANC leaders to 
include sexual minority rights in their proposal for a new constitution (Kraak 2005). Peter 
Tatchell (2005), a famed British gay rights activist, exposed homophobia within the ANC in his 
interview with Ruth Mompati, a women’s rights activist and executive member of the ANC. 
Insinuating that homosexuality was unAfrican and a Western phenomenon that had not appeared 
in South Africa “until recently,” Mompati stated: 
I cannot even begin to understand why people want gay and lesbian rights. The 
gays have no problems. . . . I don’t see them suffering. No one is persecuting 
them. . . . We don’t have a policy on gays and lesbians. We don’t have a policy on 
flower sellers either (qtd. in Kraak 2005:132; see also Tatchell 2005). 
Mompati’s statements illustrates the sentiment that racial oppression trumped sexual oppression, 
a position against which antiapartheid gay and lesbian rights activists railed, especially since so 
many were themselves white (van Zyl 2005c). Mompati viewed gay and lesbian organizing as 
potentially derailing the ANC’s efforts to liberate South Africans from apartheid rule. Within this 
framework, the antiapartheid movement and national liberation outranked sexual minority 
liberation. However, sexual minority activists did not hierarchize each movement’s goals; 
instead, they emphasized the complementarity of these goals in the creation of a nonracial, 
nonsexist, and non-homophobic South Africa. Mompati’s remarks elicited concerned responses 
from British, Dutch, and other Scandinavian gay and lesbian antiapartheid activists, and the ANC 
countered by issuing statements in support of gay rights (Fine and Nicol 1995). Through Thabo 
Mbeki, “then Director of Information,” the ANC formulated an official policy on sexual minority 
                                                 
19 From my archival research, ABIGALE was apparently the first LGBT SMO to include bisexual persons alongside 
lesbians and gay men. However, despite the inclusion of bisexual persons, there has been no organizing specifically 
around bisexual issues or examination of biphobia within the movement. 
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rights: “‘The ANC is . . . firmly committed to removing all forms of discrimination and 
oppression in a liberated South Africa . . . That commitment must surely extend to the protection 
of gay rights’” (qtd. in Fine and Nicol 1995:271; emphasis removed). The ANC adopted a pro-
gay rights stance to distinguish itself from the apartheid regime’s anti-homosexuality platform; 
the more distance the ANC put between itself and the National Party, the more successful it 
hoped it would be in generating a nonracial democracy (Altman 2001). 
Within South Africa, the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists took the lead in 
organizing gay, lesbian, and bisexual SMOs to generate a policy recommendation for the ANC 
about sexual minority rights, which the SMO submitted to the ANC in September 1990 (Fine and 
Nicol 1995). Lobbying political parties thus became a customary strategy for LGBT activists. 
This trend emerged a few years earlier. For instance, the Gay Association of South Africa 
(GASA) brought activists together to form the National Law Reform Fund; they sought to take 
advantage of President P. W. Botha’s proposed National Party reforms and raise thousands of 
rands to fund this campaign and to organize mostly white gay men and lesbians to express their 
support for gay and lesbian-friendly candidates (Gevisser 1995).20  
The 1980s also marked another significant change in South Africa’s landscape. 
HIV/AIDS emerged as a health concern among sexual and gender minorities. For a few years, 
GASA devoted a column in its newspaper Link/Skakel, which later became the monthly 
publication Exit, to updating the (white) gay community about HIV/AIDS-related services and 
information about how to reduce their vulnerability to exposure. The media played a role in 
depicting gay men as responsible for the transmission of HIV/AIDS. Around 1985, the media 
stopped referring to HIV/AIDS as the “gay plague” and racialized and de-gayed AIDS as the 
“black death” (Gevisser 1995:59). “[B]lack gay men who moved between the white gay 
subculture and the townships” were blamed “for importing the epidemic into heterosexual black 
society” by black heterosexual South Africans (Gevisser 1995:59). Multiracial gay and lesbian 
SMOs such as the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists offered AIDS social support 
services to nonwhites and whites alike from the mid-1980s onward. This marked the beginning 
of the LGBT movement’s work on HIV/AIDS, such as by providing counseling and other social 
services to HIV-positive persons and lobbying for treatment access. South African LGBT 
                                                 
20 The currency of South Africa is the rand, and the Namibian currency is the dollar, which is pegged to the rand. 
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activists developed a public reputation as one of the only groups willing to address the 
seriousness of the pandemic. 
2.4 LGBT ORGANIZING IN NAMIBIA AND SOUTH AFRICA IN THE 1990S 
2.4.1 South Africa 
In the years immediately during and after the post-apartheid transition, the antiapartheid 
movement demobilized, as participants were hopeful that the new government would quickly 
and evenly implement laws and policies guaranteeing equality. South African LGBT activists 
seized political opportunities to pursue broadened rights, which include immigration, adoption, 
and marriage rights for same-gender partners. In this receptive, post-apartheid political 
environment, former antiapartheid activists fled political parties and mass democratic movement 
organizing, in favor of interest group politics (Jacobs 2002). “Well-funded non-governmental 
organizations, pressure groups and lobbyists are replacing the mass-based and grassroots 
organizations that arose to oppose the apartheid regime and serve as the voice of the citizenry” 
(Zegeye and Harris 2002:255). 
In the 1990s, black South Africans more visibly organized themselves to address the 
needs of sexual minorities in townships. Launched in 1988 by Simon Nkoli, the Gays and 
Lesbians of Witwatersrand (GLOW), a primarily black gay and lesbian SMO, emerged as a 
visible force. According to a former member of GLOW,  
[B]lack people never had a movement that they could go to and feel at home. 
[T]here was GASA, and there were other white movement [organizations]. But a 
lot of black people didn’t feel welcomed, or they didn’t feel safe to go to those 
organizations. When GLOW was started in 1988, we found that a lot of black 
people . . . came out and then they joined the movement (Interview, 4 November 
2005). 
For many black sexual minorities in Johannesburg, GLOW was the first SMO to recruit them 
actively and to demonstrate that the gay and lesbian movement was not restricted to white South 
Africans. Beginning in 1990, GLOW sponsored the yearly Lesbian and Gay Pride march in 
Johannesburg and championed “gay rights as human rights” (Gevisser 1995:63). In the early 
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1990s, white sexual minorities dominated the march, though more black sexual minorities 
participated with each year, a trend that has continued (Gevisser and Reid 1995). Throughout its 
existence until its demise in the mid-1990s, GLOW balanced the tension between supporting the 
goal of obtaining gay liberation through pursuing sexual minority rights and between providing 
social spaces and social services, evincing the tendency of LGBT SMOs to combine strategies of 
being publicly visible and responding to the social and material needs of impoverished sexual 
and gender minorities of all races (Gevisser 1995; Gevisser and Reid 1995). In part, this reflects 
a divergence in SMO leaders’ interest in challenging homophobia and obtaining gay rights and 
SMO members’ interest in “anything that generates income and provides a safe social space” 
(McLean and Ngcobo 1995:182). GLOW also faced the difficulty in maintaining a public 
presence in both Johannesburg and surrounding townships. The SMO created a “Lesbian Forum” 
to offer a “consciousness-raising space for its largely-black membership” and regularly 
concentrated its activities, such as the annual general meeting and drag competitions in Soweto 
(Gevisser and Reid 1995:279). Yet the annual Lesbian and Gay Pride march, though it generated 
“an annual moment of public visibility” for sexual and gender minorities and for the movement 
in general, did “little to build organisation in the townships” (Gevisser and Reid 1995:280).21 
Mark Gevisser and Graeme Reid’s (1995) well-meaning criticism of GLOW’s priorities in 
staging the march/parade demonstrates the range of strategic choices that many South African 
LGBT SMOs face. 
[The march] is a costly affair that swallows most of GLOW’s budget and takes up 
most of the time of the activists who organize it. Perhaps, if more time and money 
went into organising the townships, township chapters of GLOW would march 
under their own banners . . . . The march would then present to South Africa a 
more representative spectacle of gay life (Gevisser and Reid 1995:280). 
Neither Gevisser and Reid (1995) nor GLOW wanted the South African LGBT movement to 
promote a normalized image of gay men and lesbians. Instead, the authors and the SMO viewed 
the march as an opportunity to draw attention to the LGBT movement’s insistence on equality 
and that “in South Africa all oppression must be challenged” (Gevisser and Reid 1995:281).  
The march also indicated that the LGBT movement was serious about seizing the 
coalescing political opportunities in the transition from apartheid to a nonracial democracy 
                                                 
21 The march has taken place each year in Johannesburg since 1990. A few years ago, as Cape Town gained a 
reputation internationally for its bustling LGBT community, it began to stage its own march (Oswin 2005). 
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(Croucher 2002). Early in 1990, President F.W. de Klerk authorized the release of Nelson 
Mandela from prison and unbanned the ANC as a political party, official recognition of the sea 
change that was taking place (Lodge 2002; Welsh 2000). LGBT SMOs similarly took advantage 
of the transformation. 
[T]hat was the time of the revolution and things changing for South Africa 
because people like Nelson Mandela were released from prison. We were looking 
into our future; we were looking into having our first elections. So many things 
were happening at once at that time, and I think our [Lesbian and Gay Pride] 
march also made that stand to say, “We are there. Gay people exist” (GLOW 
member, interview, 4 November 2005). 
With the first free elections within reach, LGBT SMOs continued to press the ANC about sexual 
minority rights. However, the movement faced homophobic opposition within the ANC and 
other less sympathetic political parties. Between 1991 and 1993, Winnie Mandela, the wife of 
acclaimed ANC and antiapartheid leader Nelson Mandela, scandalized gay and lesbian activists 
with her antigay defense at her trial for her role in the 1988 death of teenager Stompie Moeketsi 
Seipei and assault of three other young men (Holmes 1995, 1997). Her defense alleged that she 
and members of the football club she led rescued the four young black men from the homosexual 
advances of a white gay Methodist minister, who were cloistered together in cramping sleeping 
quarters “familiar to many subjects of apartheid residential conditions, such as in industrial 
compounds and hostels” (Holmes 1995:289; see also Elder 2003). Not only did her defense 
claim that Mandela saved the four young black men from homosexuality, which they painted as a 
perversion, but they also insinuated that homosexuality was a product of apartheid—“a white 
contamination of black culture. This [was] a directly oppressive dismissal of the rights of black 
lesbians, gay men and bisexuals” (Holmes 1995:289). Staging protests regularly, GLOW 
demanded that the ANC reject her antigay defense (Gevisser 1995; Holmes 1995). The ANC 
National Executive Committee failed to act on the homophobia that the trial perpetuated and 
reflected “an executive-level inability to deal with real public differences within the ranks of the 
liberation movement” (Holmes 1995:291).  
Despite the ANC’s failure to address homophobia within the party, LGBT SMOs worked 
closely with ANC officials and representatives from other political parties to develop a 
constitution that would protect sexual minorities from discrimination. An important step in this 
process involved the Organisation of Lesbians and Gay Activists’ (OLGA) creation of a Charter 
of Lesbian and Gay Rights in 1990, which the SMO revised in 1992 based on consultation with 
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Xhosa-, English-, and Afrikaans-speaking gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons (Fine and Nicol 
1995). Based on the ANC Freedom Charter, which emphasized nonracialism and inclusionary 
politics (Hirschmann 1990; Seekings 1991), OLGA hoped the Charter of Lesbian and Gay 
Rights would “serve as a judicially-recognised guideline” for the constitutional protection of 
sexual minority rights (Fine and Nicol 1995:275). The ANC included sexual minority rights in 
its Bill of Rights late in 1992, as did the Democratic Party and Inkatha Freedom Party (Croucher 
2002:320; see also Christiansen 2000 and Johnson 1997). In December 1994, more than 60 
SMOs formed a “single-issue” umbrella organization, the National Coalition for Gay and 
Lesbian Equality (NCGLE), also known as the Coalition, to “coordinate the lobbying effort to 
retain the sexual orientation clause in the draft South African Constitution” (Cock 2003:37; 
NCGLE undated brochure; Oswin 2007:649-51).22 An “atmosphere of inclusivity” typified the 
constitutional drafting and ratification (Croucher 2002:322). The ANC ushered in this open 
atmosphere by soliciting public input on its Bill of Rights and on the formulation of 
constitutional amendments between 1990 and 1993 (Croucher 2002:322). Once the ANC 
included sexual minority rights in its Bill of Rights, other political parties engaged in the same 
action because “few if any political parties wanted to be seen in the media as promoting any 
form of animus in light of South Africa’s history of brutal racial injustice” (Massoud 2003:303). 
In recognition of the potential electoral might of sexual minorities, both the ANC and 
Democratic Party advertised in gay publications, encouraging gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons 
to vote for their candidates. 
The Coalition participated fully at all stages in the drafting of the Equality Clause and 
responded specifically to different political parties’ statements supporting, modifying, or 
opposing the clause. Part of the Coalition’s success in persuading the ANC to include sexual 
minority rights in the Equality Clause stemmed from its strict adherence to a master frame of 
“equality and non-discrimination.” In its formal submission to Parliament, the Coalition 
recommended that the state undo the painful shared “history of legislated prejudice, exclusion 
and discrimination,” including “discrimination against gays and lesbians,” by prohibiting 
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation (NCGLE 1995).23 In May 1996, after the 
                                                 
22 GLOW cofounded the Coalition. 
23 The “Equality Clause” (Section 9:3-4) states: 
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Equality Clause was permanently enshrined in the constitution, the Coalition “shifted its focus to 
the implementation of the rights protection in this historic Constitution and to supporting the 
continued development of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender movement throughout 
Southern Africa” (NCGLE undated brochure).24 The reference to disseminating the LGBT 
movement throughout southern Africa is important because the Coalition played a crucial role in 
fostering the Namibian LGBT movement. 
After securing a win with the Equality Clause, the Coalition pursued legal extension and 
clarification of sexual minority rights. The “next step was to use the [Constitution] to overturn 
local sodomy laws and, more importantly anti-gay public sentiments” (Massoud 2003:304). The 
Coalition’s Equal Rights Project added public education of the general public and of sexual and 
gender minorities as a strategy efforts due to the discrepancy between conservative political 
attitudes among South Africans toward sexual minority rights and the progressive national 
constitution (NCGLE 1996). A 1995 national survey of South Africans revealed that only 38 
percent favored equal rights for sexual minorities and 41 percent believed homosexuality was 
unAfrican (Reid and Dirsuweit 2002:104). Massoud (2003:304) states that those who supported 
sexual minority rights “were more likely to be white, literate, from urban areas, Catholic, Hindu, 
or Protestant, and younger than those who were against gay rights,” suggesting that older South 
Africans and blacks who lived in rural areas and had little education were likely to oppose equal 
rights for sexual minorities. Building on the success of the Equality Clause, the Coalition, which, 
in 1999, became the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, also known as the Equality Project, 
(Dirsuweit 2006), subsequently filed successful lawsuits that decriminalized sodomy (1998), 
permitted same-gender couples to access pension benefits jointly (1999), granted immigration 
rights to foreign same-gender partners of South African citizens (1999), allowed same-sex 
couples to adopt children (2002), and obtained the right for same-gender couples to marry 
                                                                                                                                                             
3. The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
4. No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in 
terms of subsection (3). National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination 
(Republic of South Africa 1996). 
24 This was the first reference to “lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered,” which became LGBT as shorthand 
among activists, I located within the South African LGBT movement. 
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(Behind the Mask 1999; Epprecht 2004; SAPA 1999b).25  
Leading the charge on legal issues enabled LGBT SMOs to concentrate on a wider range 
of issues, such as providing mental and physical health services to sexual and gender minorities, 
monitoring media portrayals of LGBT persons, and caring for the specific needs of HIV-positive 
LGBT persons; such social organizing is concentrated around urban centers and universities. 
These SMOs worked together as a loose coalition named the Joint Working Group, which met 
twice a year. SMOs selectively worked together on campaigns that benefited them and their 
constituents, as was the case of joint research projects that SMOs used to lobby local and 
regional state officials. I describe the purpose and structure of the South African LGBT SMOs I 
selected to study below. 
2.4.1.1 Behind the Mask 
Behind the Mask (BTM) publishes a website with information about the cultural and 
political status of sexual and gender minorities throughout Africa, including Namibia and South 
Africa. The name “Behind the Mask” referred to the cloak of social, cultural, political, and legal 
invisibility that African LGBT persons don every day. Launched in 2000, Behind the Mask 
described its goals of linking sexual and gender minority SMOs and LGBT persons as 
proceeding from South Africa’s progressive constitution in the hope that “African gays and 
lesbians, whatever class or ethnicity, or those supporting the rising GLBT-movement on the 
African continent” will embrace equal rights for sexual minorities (Alexander 2002:229). 
Reporting on LGBT issues and providing a forum for LGBT persons to express their concerns 
online comprised Behind the Mask’s efforts to peel back such masks. In particular, Behind the 
Mask addressed issues of interest to black LGBT persons, such as hate crimes, poverty, 
HIV/AIDS, and unemployment (Interview, BTM staff member, 13 January 2006). On its 
website, Behind the Mask stresses its efforts to offer “a platform for exchange and debate for 
LGBTI groups, activists, individuals and allies” through online chat rooms and frequently 
                                                 
25 Dirsuweit (2006:330) attributes the Coalition’s transformation into the Equality Project to the “unsustainability” 
of inclusion. The Coalition had 80 member organizations at the height of its existence and could not cope with the 
“resource drain” of so many groups that needed funding and bureaucratic support, not all of which were SMOs or 
even LGBT in focus (Dirsuweit 2006:330). The Coalition dismantled its coalitional form and became a “‘network’ 
that [would] be the channel of communication for people on the street and [would] work at grass roots level to 
ensure that everyone [would] have access to the law reforms secured” by the Equality Project (“Change of Face” 
2000:10). 
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updated stories about organizing, state repression of sexual and gender minorities, what it is like 
to be LGBT in different African countries (http://www.mask.org.za/).26 Some stories focused on 
the negative consequences of being LGBT in repressive countries like Uganda or Zimbabwe, but 
many stories illuminated the benefits of coming out as a LGBT person. Behind the Mask’s 
website design allowed for “anonymous” viewing. A staff member distinguished the SMO’s 
website from other gay-themed websites. “It’s not a gay site with pictures of naked men or 
pictures of women with [bare] breasts. . . . Our strength is we’re able to give people information 
without it . . . blaring on the screen” (Interview, 31 October 2005). In this sense, Behind the 
Mask eschewed prurient visual content, such as nude pictures, to distinguish itself from 
commercial LGBT websites in South Africa. 
Due in part to its financial and geographical base in Johannesburg, South Africa, Behind 
the Mask dedicated most of its journalistic resources to reporting on LGBT issues in the country, 
although it was developing a network of correspondents throughout Africa. The organization 
also worked to strengthen bonds with and among other southern African LGBT SMOs. In its 
early years, Behind the Mask was housed in the Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa. The 
organization itself served as an incubator for the Forum for the Empowerment of Women. 
Behind the Mask sponsored and supported another organization, the South African Youth 
Liberation Organisation, a grassroots effort based in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal provinces 
linking young black LGBT youth to one another by providing them with access to computers and 
the Internet and by cultivating leadership among LGBT youth.  
Eleven people staffed the organization when I observed Behind the Mask from October 
2005 to March 2006: the Dutch founder who served as a part-time paid consultant,27 the director, 
                                                 
26 Although Behind the Mask and other South African LGBT SMOs included intersexed persons in their definition 
of LGBT persons, I gathered only a few stories on the BTM website that addressed issues specific to intersexed 
persons. In addition, some activists had not incorporated the “I” in their use of the LGBT acronym, as they admitted 
that they do not understand intersexed persons’ issues yet. As such, I use the LGBT acronym in keeping with South 
African LGBT activists’ vocabulary. 
27 In 2000, a Dutch investigative journalist, Bart Luirink (2000), launched Behind the Mask to supplement the 
paucity of Internet reporting on LGBT organizing in southern Africa. After confirming that no other Internet 
magazine fulfilled this purpose, Luirink secured a small grant from a Dutch donor, Hivos, to design a website. 
Luirink’s experience combining antiapartheid and LGBT activism is reflected in Behind the Mask’s commitment to 
antiracism, antisexism, and anti-homophobia. On the surface, a foreigner’s founding of an African LGBT SMO 
might smack of paternalism, and one could claim that Behind the Mask’s origins are not African. It is not my goal to 
prove whether the website and SMO are truly African. However, it is necessary to acknowledge debates that encircle 
foreign funding of African LGBT SMOs, which I address later. Over the years, Luirink made a concerted effort to 
ensure that black African staff guided Behind the Mask. Though he retained a leadership position throughout Behind 
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the managing editor, the office administrator, the housekeeper,28 the webmaster, the part-time 
French translator, the junior reporter, the human rights researcher, and two temporary, unpaid 
interns from Germany and Uganda.29 Eight staff identified as black, and three staff identified as 
white. All staff members sometimes wrote stories for the website, although the reporter and 
managing editor wrote regular feature stories as their primary duties. Apart from the Dutch 
founder, American office administrator, Burundian French translator, and German and Ugandan 
interns, the rest of the staff were South African. Reporters wrote in English, and some stories 
were translated into French. Behind the Mask also recruited correspondents living in other 
African nations to report on LGBT social issues, increasing the organization’s ability to gather 
firsthand information about what was happening in other African countries.  
Most Behind the Mask staff members were, by definition, amateur journalists or 
“journalistic activis[ts]” (http://www.mask.org.za, Accessed 23 January 2006, see also Atton 
2003). Apart from the founder and the managing editor, both of whom were trained journalists, 
no staff member staff had formal journalism training, though the junior reporter was pursuing a 
degree in communication at a South African university. Behind the Mask provided compulsory 
training and writing workshops for staff and foreign correspondents who wrote for the website. 
To address the lack of formally trained journalists, Behind the Mask overhauled its hiring 
policies to ensure that it recruited staff with professional journalism experience.30
Amateur journalism has been a valuable tool for African LGBT activists in generating a 
network capable of disseminating the movement’s claims and demands around the world. Aware 
of the widespread hostility to homosexuality, Behind the Mask framed its stories to show LGBT 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Mask’s early years, he actively recruited qualified black staff to fill journalist and director positions. Luirink 
retired to a role as consultant, occasionally meeting with staff to offer guidance. My field observations supported 
this latter description of Luirink’s role at Behind the Mask. 
28 All four SMOs I observed employed a housekeeper on a full- or part-time basis. With the exception of Sister 
Namibia, the housekeepers at Behind the Mask, the Forum for the Empowerment of Women, and The Rainbow 
Project were treated as staff members. Housekeepers at Behind the Mask and FEW participated in staff meetings 
and gave updates about their work. TRP’s housekeeper worked on a part-time basis; staff meetings occurred on the 
days that the housekeeper was not present. All four SMOs were keen on employing members of the constituencies 
they represented and helping them to gain professional skills that would enable them to work elsewhere. Part of the 
insistence of retaining housekeepers might stem from Namibia and South Africa’s colonial past and colonialists’ 
demand for cleanliness (Burke 1996; McClintock 1995). 
29 While I observed Behind the Mask, the position of senior reporter remained vacant because the organization’s 
hiring committee found that applicants were over- or under-qualified. 
30 I was unable to verify the exact number of foreign correspondents Behind the Mask claimed, as the organization 
was unsure which correspondents to classify as active.  
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persons that they were not alone and LGBT SMOs what groups in other African countries were 
doing to fight social and political repression.  
2.4.1.2 Forum for the Empowerment of Women 
The Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) aimed to increase the visibility of 
black South African lesbian women and to create safe spaces for black lesbian women vulnerable 
to violence. FEW developed as a project of Behind the Mask, but each group’s focus diverged 
from one another. A couple of black lesbians who were Behind the Mask staff members became 
interested in local South African problems affecting black lesbians in 2002; their activism 
siphoned energy and resources from Behind the Mask and sometimes derailed that SMO’s 
commitment to journalistic activism. In 2003, FEW established itself as an independent SMO 
and succeeded in obtaining funding from Northern donors in 2004 for its Rose Has Thorns hate 
crimes and anti-rape awareness and eradication project, which started a couple of years earlier.  
For such a young SMO, FEW had a large staff. During the time of my ethnographic 
observation, FEW employed five full-time staff consisting of a director, a public relations and 
outreach officer, a junior training officer who functioned as the director’s personal assistant, a 
computer specialist responsible for maintaining the office’s computers and teaching computer 
skills classes to FEW members, and a receptionist who doubled as an officer manager.31 The 
organization employed six part-time staff, all of whom identified as black: one domestic worker; 
one activities coordinator who oversaw the SMO’s soccer team, the Chosen FEW, and dramatic 
troupe named SAfrodykes management; and four community representatives who served as 
liaisons between the SMO and Johannesburg townships. The SMO built in staff turnover into its 
plan by implementing six-month contracts for the junior training officer and community 
representative positions so that more members would benefit from gaining employment 
experience and on-the-job skills training that they could take with them to other jobs. The SMO 
also allowed two or three part-time volunteers whom the director had elevated to leadership 
positions related to the management of the SMO’s soccer team and dramatic troupe to attend 
staff meetings to report on their activities; these volunteers were likely to be hired in the future as 
paid community representatives because they were familiar with the organization’s procedures.  
                                                 
31 The SMO planned on hiring a bookkeeper after my observation ended. 
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2.4.2 Namibia 
LGBT SMOs became visible in the early 1990s. The first SMO was the Gay and Lesbian 
Organisation of Namibia (GLON). In its first and only public action in 1995, GLON opposed the 
Lutheran Church’s attempt to block sexual minorities from becoming ordained ministers and 
announced plans to form their own church for gays and lesbians (Frank and !Khaxas 1996:111; 
Munamava 1995). However, the organization’s history and reputation as a mostly white gay and 
lesbian prevented GLON from effecting substantive social change for sexual minorities (Sister 
Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006). 
Homophobic comments made by Namibian government officials catalyzed the movement 
in the mid-1990s. By attacking LGBT persons publicly, former President Sam Nujoma and the 
ruling party, the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO), handed sexual minorities 
a politicized identity around which they could organize. “In this sense, Mugabe [the President of 
Zimbabwe] and Nujoma are indeed ‘promoters’ of ‘homosexuality’ in their societies” (HRW and 
IGLHRC 2003:8). However, the Namibian LGBT movement and its supporters developed a 
pattern of reacting to official state-sponsored homophobia. In 1995, state leaders’ attacks on gays 
and lesbians commenced, making political organizing on the part of LGBT persons necessary. 
The state-run newspaper, New Era, fanned antigay flames by interviewing state leaders and 
featuring opinion columns written by government ministers who denied sexual minority rights in 
the new democracy, even though the Namibian Constitution guaranteed equal rights for all 
citizens (Diescho 1994). Such comments included columns authored by then-Finance Minister 
Helmut Angula in which he claimed that “homosexuality is an unnatural behavioural disorder 
which is alien to the African culture” (Angula 1995b) and even suggested that women could 
“abort a foetus if they thought it might grow up to be gay” (Angula 1995a). Responding to 
government ministers’ antigay declarations, Sister Namibia, a feminist SMO, cleverly stated, 
“[h]omophobia (unlike homosexuality and lesbianism) can be cured,” and asserted that 
homosexuality is African (Sister Namibia 1995). Dismissing Angula’s contention that 
homosexuality could be cured, the Namibian Clinical Psychological Association (1995) 
admonished state leaders for airing their ignorance about homosexuality so publicly because 
“statements such as this will portray senior officials of this country as ill-informed and 
visionless” (p. 21).  
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After a year of official silence on homosexuality, Nujoma used the SWAPO Women’s 
Council Congress in Gobabis in December 1996 as an opportunity to denigrate sexual minorities 
(Günzel 1996). Namibian civil society responded to and condemned Nujoma’s attack “‘as an 
indication of emerging authoritarianism in Namibia’” (HRW and IGLHRC 2003:5-6). Sister 
Namibia and the newly formed Rainbow Project (TRP) also responded to Nujoma’s aggression 
by publicly calling on Nujoma to withdraw his comments and stop making “statements regarding 
issues with which he is not familiar and which could have a detrimental impact on part of the 
Namibian population” (TRP 1996, see also Fild 1997). Drawing on what would become a 
familiar anti-Western, antigay, and xenophobic refrain, then-SWAPO Secretary for Information 
and Publicity Alpheus Naruseb articulated SWAPO’s official position on homosexuality, 
“[M]ost of the ardent supporters of this (sic) perverts are Europeans who imagine themselves to 
be the bulwark of civilisation and enlightenment. They are not only appropriating foreign ideas 
in our society but also destroying the local culture by hiding behind the façade of the very 
democracy and human right we have created” (“Alpheus Comes Out” 1997).  
Foreign onlookers became unnerved by such unprecedented homophobia from state 
officials. Diplomats including ambassadors from European Union (EU) members and foreign 
LGBT movement organizations voiced their concern about SWAPO’s suddenly public antigay 
position (“EU ‘Concern’” 1997). Attempting to quell foreign diplomats’ concerns, then-Prime 
Minister Hage Geingob promised that “‘no homosexuals or lesbians have ever been prosecuted, 
intimidated, arrested or denied employment” (“Geingob Steps” 1997). To clarify misconceptions 
about homosexuality, activists from Sister Namibia and TRP jointly organized a panel of 
speakers featuring Namibian and South African LGBT persons and Namibian human rights 
experts, which was the first public LGBT-specific event in Namibia (Maffeis 1997). 
Nevertheless, Nujoma continued to use SWAPO venues such as the Youth League Congress to 
remind Namibians loyal to the party to persecute gays and lesbians on the grounds that 
homosexuality is foreign to Namibia; he also queried, “Where were they [gays and lesbians] 
when we sacrificed our lives during the bitter liberation struggle?” (“Nujoma Renews” 1997). 
Nujoma soon widened his intended targets to include “independent media, political opposition 
leaders, women’s rights activists, and foreigners” (HRW and IGLHRC 2003:5-6). 
With the exception of occasional antigay letters from newspaper readers, antigay attacks 
ceased for more than a year until late in 1998 when then-Minister of Home Affairs Jerry Ekandjo 
  53
threatened to criminalize homosexuality (Weidlich 1998). TRP and other human rights non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Legal Assistance Centre (LAC) asked Ekandjo 
to retract his statement and asserted that such legislation would contravene the Namibian 
Constitution (Maletsky 1998). In a public statement, TRP observed, “[W]henever there are 
political conflicts, gays are always drawn into” them, suggesting that official homophobia might 
be little more than a ruse to deflect attention away from serious problems like corruption and 
poverty (Nanyeni 1998). For example, in 1999, when discussing the national budget, an unlikely 
forum for debating sexual minority rights, Ekandjo’s deputy, Jeremiah Nambinga, renewed his 
boss’ demand to criminalize homosexuality (Maletsky 1999). Playing a characteristically 
conciliatory role, Geingob assured Namibian sexual minorities that the state would not 
criminalize homosexuality. However, the matter resurfaced several years later in May 2004, 
when then-Justice Minister Albert Kawana repeated that homosexuality is “‘illegal and 
criminal’” during a debate in the National Assembly about including a clause in the new Labour 
Bill prohibiting discrimination of sexual minorities (Dentlinger 2004a).32 Politicians seemed bent 
on jettisoning sexual minorities from the Namibian socio-political imaginary entirely. Resuming 
his verbal harassment of LGBT persons, Ekandjo exhorted police officers to “‘eliminate’” gays 
and lesbians, which elicited demands from TRP and other human rights NGOs for the Minister to 
apologize for and take back his statement (Amupadhi 2000). Though Ekandjo stated that his call 
for eliminating gays and lesbians was not an incitement to violence, he maintained, “‘We never 
had moffies in mind when Swapo drafted the Namibian Constitution 10 years ago,” insisting on 
referring to same-gender-loving persons pejoratively (Hamata 2000; emphasis added).33
State leaders’ harassment of sexual minorities did not stop after civil society displayed 
solidarity with LGBT SMOs. In March 2001, when addressing University of Namibia students, 
whom Nujoma regarded as youth vulnerable to the supposedly predatory appetites of gays and 
lesbians, he encouraged police to “arrest, imprison, and deport homosexuals and lesbians found 
in Namibia” (“President Nujoma” 2001). Joining other organizations such as the LAC and TRP 
(Menges 2001), the National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) condemned Nujoma’s antigay 
                                                 
32 The new Labour Bill no longer protects workers from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. 
33 “Moffie” is a term that became popularized among Western Cape Coloured gay communities in South Africa in 
the 1950s. The word originated as “[s]ailor slang” in 1929, as a derivation from “morphy . . . a term of contempt 
among seamen for effeminate, well-groomed young men” (Cage 2003:83). The term was used by gay men to 
valorize and recognize other gay men, but also was deployed pejoratively as in Ekandjo’s statement. 
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remarks because they “not only contradict[ed] the Namibian constitution but may also endanger 
the physical safety of this minority group” (“Gays Will Be Detained” 2001). The NSHR’s fears 
were realized when the members of the Special Field Forces (SFF) singled out men in Katutura, 
a township outside of Windhoek,  
wearing earrings and, in some cases, ripped them off the surprised victims’ ears. .  
.  One of the SFF members . . . said the order had come from the President.  
“Where did you see men wearing earrings in our Oshiwambo culture? These  
things never happened before Independence. Why are they [men wearing 
earrings] only happening now after Independence?” (Hamata 2001) 
Nujoma’s remarks once again drew international criticism from varied sources: the Black 
Radical Congress in the United States, the South African Durban Lesbian and Gay Community 
and Health Centre, the International Lesbian and Gay Association and the EU (Black Radical 
Congress 2001; Council of the European Union 2001; Mkhize 2001; Mtetwa 2001). Attributing 
Nujoma’s antigay attacks to authoritarian tendencies, Sister Namibia denounced Nujoma and 
SWAPO’s scapegoating tactics: “Creating enemy images diverts attention from the failure to 
stem poverty, unemployment, violence against women and children and HIV/AIDS, and makes it 
easier to fiddle with the constitution while no-one is looking” (Sister Namibia 2001). Though 
Nujoma suspended his antigay attacks in 2002, he resumed in September 2003 when addressing 
a “hastily-organised gathering of University of Namibia and Polytechnic students” and 
collectively dressed down “some whites, homosexuals and journalists” whom he accused of 
openly opposing the state and “policy of national reconciliation” (Kuteeue 2003). State leaders 
utilized the rhetoric of declaring any political dissent as unpatriotic, reactionary, and 
undemocratic, demonstrating SWAPO’s supreme claim to legitimacy as the democratizing and 
decolonizing authority in Namibia (Melber 2006a, 2006b). In 2004, as the state continued to 
harass human rights organizations, journalists and LGBT persons, TRP bemoaned the “slow 
erosion of good governance practices” as evidenced in the difficulties that many sexual 
minorities experienced in being open about their sexualities (Shigwedha 2004). Recently, Sister 
Namibia and TRP quickly neutralized homophobic remarks that current Deputy Minister of 
Home Affairs and Immigration Theopolina Mushelenga made in September 2005 by naming her 
comments as “hate speech” and regarding her comments as a “‘direct attack against the civil 
rights” of LGBT persons in Namibia (Graig 2005). Since Nujoma left office in March 2005, 
President Hifikepunye Pohamba and the ministers he appointed refrained from ridiculing LGBT 
persons, with the exception of Mushelenga’s unexpected comments. The absence of hate speech 
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gave hope to LGBT activists that they might be able to negotiate LGBT human rights with 
Pohamba’s administration in the future.  
How did the state and SWAPO come to single out sexual minorities for attack? There are 
three strands of thought about this issue. The first strand states that other political goals and 
concerns, such as anticolonial, antiapartheid, and antiracist struggles, merely submerged and 
displaced homophobia. Political opportunities arose for marginalized and oppressed groups, such 
as sexual and ethnic minorities, to express their concerns under an umbrella of tolerance in the 
newly independent state. But these struggles did not specifically pinpoint homophobia as a 
problem, even though the rhetoric of equality promises rights for all, including sexual minorities 
(Epprecht 2004). Therefore, homophobia resurged as a problem and fascination, just as it did 
under colonialism (Bleys 1995).  
The second strand of thought regards state-sponsored homophobia as indicative of state 
leaders’ increasing authoritarianism and general hostility to criticism (HRW and IGLHRC 2003). 
This is evident in the state’s crackdown on journalists, SWAPO’s barring of journalists’ access 
to its yearly congress, the state’s condemnation of the National Society of Human Rights’ 
scathing reports on the state’s performance, and the state’s hostility toward the Council of 
Churches in Namibia’s attempt in 1996 to stage a national reconciliation conference. The 
Council of Churches in Namibia’s efforts at national reconciliation upstaged the state because it 
became painfully clear that the state was not acting quickly enough for civil society and that civil 
society was seizing the reins of national reconciliation, an action that the SWAPO and the state 
had determined that they were the best equipped to take. 
The third strand of thought treats SWAPO as a national liberation movement that never 
fully lived up to its promise to liberate the country entirely from the shackles of inequality 
(Melber 2004). Instead, it focused on retaining control of the state. State leaders’ increasingly 
authoritarian positions affirmed this view. Although SWAPO claimed to be democratizing the 
nation, Henning Melber (2004) counters that the movement’s primary goal was decolonization, 
not democratization, and it did not even fully succeed in decolonizing Namibia. Human Rights 
Watch and the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (2003) support 
Melber’s interpretation of the state’s crackdown on political dissent. Because decolonization 
supplanted democratization as the movement’s primary goal, the state and public sphere were not 
as completely transformed as those in South Africa.  
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In the midst of the Namibian nation-building, democratization, and decolonization 
processes, LGBT organizing expanded in scope (Lorway 2006). Though the movement remained 
confined to Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project, it became entrenched in Namibian civil 
society. For example, both LGBT SMOs played important roles in the Namibian Non-
Govermental Organisation Forum (NANGOF). Below I describe the purpose and structure of 
Sister Namibia and The Rainbow, the two Windhoek-based LGBT SMOs I studied. 
2.4.2.1 Sister Namibia 
The Namibian women’s movement emerged out of the struggle for national liberation 
(Becker 1995). Many Namibian women joined the armed struggle and SWAPO’s women’s wing 
(Hubbard and Solomon 1995). From the beginning, SWAPO and political parties dominated 
women’s movement politics (Geisler 2004). Some autonomous women’s organizations sprouted 
up on the eve of independence, but SWAPO frowned on activities that siphoned energy and 
resources from the business of liberation. However, the ruling party relaxed its stance when 
leaders realized that women’s rights activists could accomplish a great deal through grassroots 
efforts, alleviating the state of some responsibilities. A number of women’s rights organizations 
distanced themselves from an overtly feminist stance, though many practiced feminism in their 
social and political work, such as eradicating violence against women (Geisler 2004:146; 
Hubbard and Solomon 1995:182). Feminist organizations thus emerged in Namibia, undeterred 
by SWAPO’s political domination. One such SMO was Sister Namibia. 
A small group of feminist formed Sister Namibia in 1989 just before the country formally 
declared independence (Frank and !Khaxas 2006). Core SMO members focused on publishing a 
magazine of the same name for the SMO’s first decade of existence (Frank and !Khaxas 2006). 
Early in its existence, Sister Namibia functioned more informally, suggesting that the SMO took 
a while to consolidate its structure and internal culture.  
[A]ll of us who joined Sister were interested in the magazine. [W]e called 
ourselves a collective.  So when I joined, we still didn't have a building; we didn't 
have paid staff. We were meeting in private people's houses. We were stealing 
paper from various government ministries and photocopying at night or [using] 
other people's copying machines and doing the layout by hand.  So it was just a 
collective of women who wanted to make a magazine (Sister Namibia member, 
interview, 23 May 2006). 
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Settling into formal routines and growing as a collective, Sister Namibia established a volunteer 
(member) management committee and paid staff, who were initially recruited from the cadre of 
volunteers. “The organization had grown, but our structures hadn't really. Our ideology hadn't 
grown with it” (Sister Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006). For a time, a disjuncture 
existed between volunteers and paid staff. The SMO suffered growing pains, as volunteers 
chafed against the guidelines that paid staff instituted. “There was this kind of feeling [that] . . . 
the volunteers are the intellectuals who can lead the organization, who can fundraise, who can do 
things, and the staff are there to implement” and to report to the management committee (Sister 
Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006). Nevertheless, the SMO concentrated decision-
making power in membership body that elected members of the management committee at the 
annual general meeting (Sister Namibia member, interview, 23 May 2006). This friction 
alienated some staff in the mid-1990s, who left the SMO and moved on to other job 
opportunities. Staff and the SMO outgrew one another in a sense as Sister Namibia became more 
political, but the SMO settled into a comfortable staff and management relationship. Staff 
included a director, bookkeeper, receptionist, a delivery person, part-time housekeeper, and 
contract media officer. Black and white lesbian Namibians held prominent roles in Sister 
Namibia, with at least three working formally as the SMO’s director, and staff and members 
were multiracial. Three staff identified as black, two as coloured, and one as white. 
After allowing LGBT activists to use the organization’s office and resources for the first 
TRP meetings in 1997, Sister Namibia has been at the forefront of the movement ever since.34 
Sister Namibia embraced lesbian rights and an anti-homophobic stance in 1993. The 
organization committed itself to fighting sexism, racism, and homophobia, which is evident in 
articles in Sister Namibia that educated readers about how these forms of oppression limited girls 
and women’s choices and potential. For instance, in an article about bisexuality, the author 
explored the personal, social, and political significance of being bisexual and exposed 
misconceptions about being bisexual, such as the assumption that bisexuals were intersexed and 
possessed both male and female sexual organs because they were attracted to members of the 
same and opposite gender. The author also interviewed local psychologists and bisexual women 
to find out what it meant to Namibians; one Namibian bisexual stated that some gay and lesbian 
activists were upset that bisexuals were not as involved in the movement. “Therefore lesbians 
                                                 
34 In TRP’s early years, several activists worked both with TRP and Sister Namibia. 
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sometimes feel a bitterness towards bisexuals, who are less likely to become politically involved. 
They act like butterflies who harvest the fruits that lesbians have struggled for, without thinking 
what it costs” (Cuijpers 1997:9). Sister Namibia did not shy away from addressing such 
controversy within or outside the feminist or LGBT movement in Namibia. This refusal to back 
down made the organization an internationally recognized defender of women’s and LGBT 
rights. Sister Namibia achieved international acclaim when the International Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) awarded the organization with the Felipa de Souza 
Award in 1997 for standing up for sexual minority rights in the face of homophobic attacks from 
state officials and ensuring that lesbian rights were on the agenda at the 1995 United Nations 
Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China (“Sister Wins” 1997).  
No stranger to controversy, Sister Namibia was often on the receiving end of criticism 
from the state for its unswerving support of women’s and LGBT human rights. This was the case 
when Sister Namibia launched the Namibian Women’s Manifesto, a document that cast lesbian 
rights as women’s rights. Sister Namibia experienced an anti-lesbian backlash firsthand when the 
state divided lesbian rights from women’s rights. The state and SWAPO-dominated groups 
hostilely responded to Sister Namibia’s efforts (Rothschild 2005). Notably, state officials’ 
campaign to discredit the Namibian Women’s Manifesto coincided with a member of Sister 
Namibia who filed for permanent residency on the grounds of being in a committed relationship 
with her lesbian partner and raising her partner’s son (Frank 2001b).35 Though Sister Namibia 
ended its work related to Namibian Women’s Manifesto, the organization incorporated concepts 
of diverse gender and sexual expressions in its work. Later in 2006, Sister Namibia planned to 
unveil its pioneering project aimed at increasing women’s sexual autonomy and awareness of 
sexual rights. 
2.4.2.2 The Rainbow Project 
Establishing a public profile was a priority for TRP from the organization’s launch in 
1997. The first meeting at Sister Namibia’s office drew more than 100 members of the LGBT 
                                                 
35 The state used sexuality as a smear tactic to silence opponents. For example, attempting to discredit the opposition 
party, the Congress of Democrats (CoD), Nujoma alleged that the party’s leader, Ben Ulenga, and fellow councillors 
in Oshakati were homosexuals who did not have the nation’s best interests in mind (Shivute 2004). Ulenga and his 
CoD colleagues subsequently demanded that Nujoma apologize for labeling him a homosexual (Amupadhi 2004). 
Conversely, in August 2004, the SWAPO Women’s Council accused Sister Namibia of being little more than an 
extension of the Congress of Democrats, a label that Sister firmly rejected (Dentlinger 2004b). 
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community. Attendees agreed that GLON would not be an appropriate vehicle for their concerns 
because GLON’s history as a white gay and lesbian organization might alienate LGBT persons 
of other races and ethnicities. Approximately fifteen core volunteers with the skills, resources, 
and time enabled TRP to start with great success unlike many other under-resourced African 
LGBT SMOs. TRP also benefited greatly from guidance from the South African National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, which taught 
TRP how to operate in repressive circumstances. A major obstacle that TRP faced in its 
development concerned the recruitment of nonwhite members. Foreign and Namibian whites 
dominated the core group of volunteers. TRP began to reach out to different ethnic groups by 
offering services that diverse communities needed, such as a soup kitchen and a sexually 
transmitted disease clinic. TRP eventually suspended these “bread-and-butter” activities because 
they siphoned energy and resources from other projects, such as a legal rights and education 
campaign. The SMOs partnered with other organizations that provided such services so that 
LGBT persons could still meet their basic needs. 
TRP mainstreamed LGBT rights as human rights instead of treating all problems that 
sexual minorities experience as LGBT-specific. This strategy recognized how important support 
from other human rights NGOs was to TRP and the Namibian LGBT movement. To this end, 
TRP joined the Namibian NGO Forum’s (NANGOF) Human Rights and Democracy Sector and 
participated in the Multimedia Campaign Against Violence. TRP inaugurated its “LGBT 
Awareness Week” in late November 1999, an event that ultimately metamorphosed into a 
Human Rights Week and included human rights NGOs in its planning and execution. In April 
2001, TRP and other civil society NGOs staged a human rights march, which marked an 
important turning point in mainstreaming LGBT rights with human rights. In 2005, TRP returned 
the Human Rights Week to the originally named LGBT Awareness Week, highlighting LGBT 
rights and celebrating achievements in the LGBT community. 
In March 1998, when TRP held its first strategic planning workshop, attendees “stressed 
the need for increased visibility of the project at community, national and international level 
[sic]” (“Adding Colour” 1998). Throughout 1998 and 1999, TRP regularly held workshops for 
members on themes such as “It Is OK to Be Gay.” After TRP opened its office in June 2000 
(Menges 2000), it prioritized giving all members of Namibia’s LGBT community a space in the 
organization and office, which was concretized in the resource center. Filled with educational 
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and entertainment materials, the office’s resource center functioned as a safe meeting space for 
LGBT persons. Additionally, different segments of the LGBT community found a home at TRP. 
A Women’s Caucus formed in 1998 and was renamed the Different Identities Group. Gay men 
organized the Male Think Tank, and LGBT youth founded the Rainbow Youth. The office drew 
visitors, researchers, and members. TRP employed the following staff: a director, an office 
manager, an information and publicity officer who was designing the organization’s website and 
produced a weekly radio show, “Talking Pink,” a project director who oversaw a project on 
incorporating sexual diversity and spirituality, an outreach officer who informed members of 
upcoming events and ran a video project that traveled to smaller towns throughout Namibia, a 
part-time housekeeper, and a full-time volunteer who assisted with the production of the radio 
show.36 Three staff members identified as black, two as coloured, and one as white. 
TRP focused on several different projects. First, the organization aimed to build the 
capacity of staff, trustees, volunteers, and beneficiaries, knowledge that TRP passes on to other 
African LGBT SMOs. Second, within the broad LGBT human rights and advocacy program, 
TRP addressed how LGBT Christians could integrate their spirituality and sexuality, and it 
devised a pilot program for schools in which students would learn about and discuss democracy, 
human rights, and diverse sexualities. For instance, in June and July 2006, the director met with 
students and teachers at a secondary school to discuss sexual diversity within a context of human 
rights; TRP’s director viewed the education program as introducing students and teachers to 
critical thinking and understanding about democracy and human rights at a time when dissent 
with and questioning of the state and SWAPO was not encouraged. Two new programs under 
development would fall under the human rights and advocacy program: later in 2006, the health 
program would take up the health needs of LGBT persons, and in 2007, the law reform project 
was intended to inventory existing laws that pertained to sexual minorities and to investigate how 
TRP could seek changes to laws without upsetting the fragile tolerance that existed under 
Pohamba’s administration. Third, TRP’s leadership program assembled a coherent strategy for 
the movement and exported skills training to other African LGBT SMOs. Fourth, under the 
outreach program fell the yearly LGBT Awareness Week, the award-winning radio show on 
Katutura Community Radio, “Talking Pink,” one of the few shows in Africa that dealt with 
                                                 
36 In 2006, the outreach officer, the project director, and the information and publicity officer took the video project 
to Tsumeb, Oshakati, and Aranos. 
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LGBT issues, and a video project that brought LGBT-themed films to different Namibian 
communities in order to initiate dialogue around LGBT issues. 
Sister Namibia and TRP established themselves as credible SMOs working for LGBT 
rights in Namibia, as demonstrated by their continued funding from international donors such as 
the embassies of the Netherlands and Finland, HIVOS (a Dutch NGO), and Astraea Lesbian 
Foundation. Such credibility and success in mobilizing LGBT persons in Namibia enabled both 
SMOs to lead efforts to broaden the LGBT movement in southern Africa and throughout the 
continent. Both SMOs contributed to the founding of the Coalition of African Lesbians, the first 
organization of its kind in Africa to address African lesbian women’s issues, in 2003. The 
Coalition of African Lesbians met annually, and in June 2006, the organization adopted a 
constitution and elected a management committee to guide its evolution. TRP managed the All-
Africa Rights Initiative, which evaluated the social and political situation in different African 
countries and assisted fledgling SMOs in applying for funding and developing their internal 
capacities. At the behest of foreign donors, TRP also joined the East Africa Convening to 
investigate the lack of LGBT activism in Tanzania, Uganda, and Kenya. In addition, TRP 
intended to work with the Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals of Botswana. 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
Namibia’s independence from South Africa and South Africa’s liberation from apartheid 
initiated democratic nation-building. Amid these changes, the LGBT movement in each country 
responded to changes in the state. In South Africa, LGBT activists successfully made impressive 
legal gains for sexual and gender minorities thanks to accommodating state leaders, but in 
Namibia, LGBT activists had to contend with opposition from state leaders and the ruling party, 
making some strategies impossible or at least untenable. In this dissertation, I examine how 
Behind the Mask, the Forum for the Empowerment of Women, Sister Namibia, and The 
Rainbow Project made certain strategic choices related to their visibility or invisibility in these 
changing political environments. In the next chapter, I explain how I conducted this study. 
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3.0  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION: COMPARATIVE CROSS-NATIONAL RESEARCH 
To understand variation in the strategic choices that social movement organizations 
(SMOs), the unit of analysis in my research, made about their public visibility and invisibility, I 
studied comparable LGBT SMOs in Windhoek, Namibia, and Johannesburg, South Africa. I 
selected Namibia and South Africa as nations in which to conduct my research because each 
national state treated LGBT organizing and rights differently. The Namibian state’s hostility to 
LGBT organizing and rights limited the strategic choices that SMOs could make about their 
visibility and invisibility. The South African state’s receptiveness to LGBT organizing and rights 
enabled SMOs to diversify their strategic choices about whether, how, when, and why to become 
publicly visible or invisible. Selecting these countries also allowed me to hold each nation’s 
sociopolitical context constant because Namibia and South Africa shared a common history 
(Frank and !Khaxas 1996). They constituted the same country until South Africa relinquished 
control of Namibia in 1988 and Namibia formally declared independence in 1990 (Melber 2003). 
Choosing to study LGBT social movement organizations in these two countries thus constituted 
the basis for my paired comparisons approach (Blee and Currier 2005; della Porta 2002; Minkoff 
and McCarthy 2005). A paired comparisons approach permitted me to examine in-depth case 
studies side by side “without losing the ‘thick description’ of the units of analysis” (della Porta 
2002:297, see also Ragin 1987:38-44).  
Practical decisions about where to execute my research became necessary due to the 
SMO density of each national LGBT movement and to each country’s population size. The 
South African LGBT movement differed in size from the Namibian LGBT movement. In the 
mid-1990s, approximately ten South African LGBT SMOs were operational during this period of 
movement organizational density (Armstrong 2002; Dirsuweit 2006). In contrast, only three 
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Namibian LGBT SMOs emerged in 1997 to oppose state leaders’ antigay remarks. The 
difference in the each movement’s organizational density likely stems from the difference in 
each country’s population. Namibia has a population of two million, while South Africa has a 
population of 45 million (World Bank 2006). Because of this different population size and SMO 
density in each country, I confined my case study selection geographically to Windhoek and 
Johannesburg, to focus on organizations in urban centers. At the time I initiated my field 
research, the Johannesburg metropolitan area was home to an estimated eight million people, 
whereas approximately 250,000 people inhabited the Windhoek metropolitan area. Though 
Johannesburg was significantly larger than Windhoek, I decided that this size difference would 
not bias my data collection, as the unit of analysis for this study was the LGBT social movement 
organization. When formulating my research design, I thought that I would be able to select from 
several LGBT social movement organizations with differing levels and types of visibility 
because LGBT organizing in other countries in the global South was concentrated in urban 
centers (Brown 1999; Green 1999; Palmberg 1999). In addition, both cities had features that 
made them suitable as case study sites. Multiple local and national newspapers and women’s 
human rights SMOs were located in Johannesburg and Windhoek. Johannesburg was also home 
to the Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa (GALA), which stores historical materials from 
LGBT SMOs in Namibia and South Africa (Manion 2005).  
Practical considerations also limited my selection to two sites. With limited financial 
means and a constrained timeline, I began my data collection immediately in Johannesburg.37 
Because I delayed selecting LGBT SMOs for more intensive study until I had inventoried SMOs 
in Johannesburg and engaged in archival research, this siphoned time that I could have used to 
observe internal SMO dynamics. In addition, studying SMOs in Cape Town or another South 
African city would have upset the balance I established by limiting my case study sites to 
Johannesburg and Windhoek. I located no other existing LGBT SMOs beyond Windhoek before 
and during my fieldwork, which made the addition of another Namibian city to my case study 
sites impossible.  
                                                 
37 Before entering the field, I only had a Mellon Predoctoral Fellowship and small grant from the Society for the 
Scientific Study of Sexuality to support my data collection. I received a Dissertation Improvement Grant from the 
National Science Foundation (SBE 0601767) in March 2006, which covered the costs of transcribing the in-depth 
qualitative interviews I conducted. I decided to confine my data collection to less than one calendar year because the 
Mellon Fellowship only guaranteed one year of support. 
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A cross-national study has advantages and shortcomings (Dogan and Pelassy 1990). 
Carrying out research in two comparative case study sites can facilitate the in-depth examination 
of micro-level phenomena, such as internal social movement organizational dynamics (Hantrais 
1999:99). However, collecting data in two comparative case study sites can limit the 
generalizability of findings across social movements in general and LGBT movements in 
particular. Since my goal with this project has been to examine how, when, and why LGBT 
SMOs exercise certain choices related to their visibility or invisibility, my focus on 
micropolitical dynamics outweighs the potential analytic deficit that accompanies a small cross-
national sample (N) size. 
3.2 DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Understanding the internal logic that drove Namibian and South African LGBT social 
movement organizations’ strategic choices motivated my use of multiple qualitative methods. 
Multiple methods can “illuminate previously unexamined or misunderstood experiences” and 
“increase the likelihood of obtaining scientific credibility and research utility” (Reinharz 
1992:197). Researchers describe the use of multiple methods as “triangulation,” which describes 
the process of using mixed multiple methods to generate coherence about and increase the 
validity of findings (Blee and Taylor 2002:111; Moran-Ellis et al. 2006:47-50; Richardson 
2000:934). I gathered and analyzed newspaper and historical organizational data, conducted and 
analyzed in-depth qualitative interviews, and engaged in ethnographic observation to understand 
LGBT SMOs’ strategic choices about visibility and invisibility.  
3.2.1 Data Collection Sequencing Strategy 
I employed a sequencing strategy for executing my data collection (Mason 2002). By a 
sequencing strategy, I mean that I staggered my data collection so that I only gathered 
information relevant to Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations’ 
strategies of visibility and invisibility. The information I gathered informed and limited the 
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subsequent data I collected. Figure 3 depicts my data collection in chronological order. Though 


















Figure 1: Sequencing of Data Collection 
The first step consisted of amassing and analyzing articles from Namibian and South 
African news media. I began collecting online newspaper articles in September 2004 from 
Namibian and South African mainstream and LGBT-specialty media, and I visited Northwestern 
University’s Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies and photocopied newspaper 
articles from Namibian and South African mainstream sources. Second, between September and 
November 2005, I gathered archival data at the Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa 
(GALA) in Johannesburg about the historical development of the Namibian and South African 
LGBT movements. I did not engage in archival research in Windhoek because I gathered 
Namibian LGBT movement records at GALA, as Namibia lacked an LGBT historical archive. 
For the third step, I engaged in intensive, daily ethnographic observation of two LGBT SMOs in 
Johannesburg between October 2005 and April 2006 and of two LGBT SMOs in Windhoek 
between April and July 2006. While I observed the activities at SMO, I collected records related 
to SMOs’ strategic choices about their visibility and invisibility. After I had engaged in 
ethnographic observation of SMOs for a few weeks, I engaged in the fourth and final step, 
interviewing SMO staff and members. I discuss my collection and analysis of news articles and 
archival documents together below.  
Before entering the field, I had intended to observe LGBT public and commercial spaces, 
such as bars, bookstores, and clubs, in Johannesburg and Windhoek because I had anticipated 
that SMOs might casually recruit members from and advertise events in such venues. After 
engaging in archival research and ethnographic observation of SMOs and interviewing SMO 
members and staff, I discovered a gap between LGBT SMOs and LGBT public and commercial 
spaces (Gevisser 1995; Isaacs and McKendrick 1992). SMOs did not use such spaces for 
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recruitment or advertisement, unless they held specific organized events at these venues. 
Examples of such events include SMO-sponsored events at gay and lesbian bars in 
Braamfontein, a suburb north of downtown Johannesburg, during the Lesbian and Gay Pride 
march in September every year. Thus, I decided to forgo observing LGBT public and 
commercial spaces. 
3.2.2 Newspaper and Archival Research  
I limited my online search of newspaper articles to those published between 1995 and 
2006. In 1995, Namibian state leaders began publicly issuing antigay statements that elicited 
responses from LGBT SMOs, and South African LGBT SMOs campaigned for sexual minority 
rights to be permanently enshrined in the Constitution. Before entering the field in Johannesburg, 
I acquainted myself with developments in the South African and Namibian LGBT movements 
over the previous decade by gathering and coding news articles from Namibian and South 
African mainstream and LGBT-specific online news sources. My primary online South African 
mainstream news sources were The Mail and Guardian and South African Press Association, 
and my online Namibian mainstream news sources were The Namibian and New Era. South 
African LGBT-specific online news sources included Exit, Mambaonline, and Behind the Mask.  
When I entered the field, I quickly realized the limitations of media data. I had a distorted 
sense of which South African and Namibian LGBT SMOs existed before I started my archival 
research and ethnographic observation. This distortion is likely attributable to different forms of 
bias that affect how the media portray social movements and protests (Barranco and Wisler 
1999; Danzger 1975; Davenport and Ball 2002; Earl et al. 2004; Hug and Wisler 1998; Martin 
2005; Oliver and Maney 2000; Ortíz et al. 2005; Smith et al. 2001). To illustrate this sense of 
distortion, I present how my preliminary analysis of two South African LGBT SMOs’ standing 
in the movement based only on media coverage differed from what I learned about these 
organizations when I conducted fieldwork in Johannesburg from September 2005 to April 2006.  
In 2006, the South African LGBT social movement organization, the Gay and Lesbian 
Alliance, to receive the second largest amount of media coverage seemed to supplant the SMO, 
the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, with the largest amount of media coverage as the most 
featured South African LGBT organization in the media. In fact, the Lesbian and Gay Equality 
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Project disappeared altogether from media coverage. Figure 3 below charts the peaks and low 






































Figure 2: Frequency of Selected South African LGBT SMOs in News Media, 1998-2006 
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Between 1998 and 2006, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (NCGLE), which 
later became the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project (LGEP) in 1999 (Dirsuweit 2006:331),38 was 
featured in 237 articles, and the Gay and Lesbian Alliance (GLA) garnered mention in 80 
articles.39 Of 17 South African LGBT SMOs that appeared in the news between 1998 and 2006, 
the Coalition-Equality Project (48.6%) and GLA (16.4%) received 65 percent of the total LGBT 
SMO news coverage. 1999 was an important year for both SMOs, as the Coalition-Equality 
Project appeared in almost 70 news articles, while the GLA received mention in about 20 
articles. After 1999, the Equality Project appears to have declined in importance, while the GLA 
steadily climbed in the amount of the media coverage it received. Based on these data, I surmised 
that Coalition-Equality Project and the GLA were the largest South African LGBT SMOs 
because they appeared in the news media most frequently (Vliegenthart, Oegema, and 
Klandermans 2005). Given the Equality Project’s lack of and GLA’s rise in media coverage, it 
seemed reasonable to infer that the GLA supplanted the Equality Project as the most influential 
LGBT SMO in South Africa; I gauged influence by media coverage. 
After I was immersed in the political reality of the South African LGBT movement, I 
learned that my preliminary findings were false. The Equality Project and the GLA were not 
equivalent, large, and powerful organizations within the movement, as their prominence in the 
media suggested. Once I gathered organizational records about the Coalition from the Gay and 
Lesbian Archives and GLA press releases from Behind the Mask, I conducted a content analysis 
of these documents and discovered a different explanation for why these two organizations 
figured so prominently in mainstream and LGBT-specific media coverage. Mainstream and 
LGBT-specific media concentrated on the legal status of sexual and gender minorities. The 
Coalition—later the Equality Project—was the public face of the LGBT movement for its entire 
existence, from the time that it was formed in 1994 to persuade political parties to protect sexual 
minority rights (Oswin 2007). The GLA emerged in November 1998 as a gay and lesbian 
political party and subsequently issued statements about the legal and political status of South 
African sexual and gender minorities (Hagen 1998). The Coalition-Equality Project and the GLA 
                                                 
38 The National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality was also known as the Coalition, and the Lesbian and Gay 
Equality Project as the Equality Project. 
39 I began this analysis in 1998, the year in which the GLA publicly emerged. 
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featured prominently in such reportage because each organization’s stated goals were achieving 
and defending the legal equality of sexual and gender minorities. 
The media treated the GLA and Coalition-Equality Project as legitimate representatives 
of the South African LGBT movement. The Coalition-Equality Project and other LGBT SMOs 
excoriated the GLA and informed the media that the GLA was a sham organization consisting of 
one person who faxed provocative press releases to the media and LGBT social movement 
organizations (DeBarros 2006; IRIN 2006). Between 1998 and 2006, the GLA issued many 
controversial public statements about the following: excluding transvestites and transgender 
persons from membership (“SA Gay Group” 2004); calling on police to arrest drag queens at the 
Johannesburg Gay Pride parade for violating an apartheid-era law that forbids people from 
disguising their faces in public (Mambaonline 2004); asking the state not to give antiretroviral 
medication to persons who contracted HIV sexually (Mambaonline 2005); outing lesbian and 
gay students at their high schools who planned on bringing their same-gender partners to dances 
in an effort to encourage them to be public about their sexualities (SABC 2005); and advocating 
for the reinstatement of the death penalty (SAPA 2003, 2004). Mainstream media did not verify 
such statements that the GLA made until January 2006 when the GLA claimed to have 
encouraged more than a hundred gay men who did not know their HIV status to donate blood at 
South African National Blood Service centers in protest of a ban on blood donations from men 
who have sex with men (Gallagher 2006).40 Such sensationalized media coverage of Namibian 
and South African sexual and gender minorities demonstrates how articles about LGBT 
organizing in these two countries were biased. This is the case with the media’s treatment of the 
GLA as a legitimate LGBT SMO.  
The media sometimes misrepresents [sic] what [SMOs] want to say. . . . For 
example, . . . the GLA put out ridiculous press statement saying they’d had a big 
national conference and had decided to change their name from the Gay and 
Lesbian Alliance to the Death Penalty Party. Of course, the newspapers responded 
by putting out articles saying, “Gays Call for Death Penalty.” That’s despite that 
organizations . . . repeatedly informed the media about the nature of the GLA and 
warned them not to publish these press releases, which have little basis in the real 
world. That illustrates how big a gap there is between organizations and the media 
because organizations are still struggling to get their messages into the media. 
(South African LGBT activist, interview, 26 October 2005). 
The LGBT activist’s statement illustrates the bias of media reporting about sexual and gender 
                                                 
40 LGBT-specific media stopped treating the GLA as a reputable organization in 2004. 
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minority organizing, making the media an unreliable indicator of public visibility. Not only did 
LGBT SMOs experience problems with publicizing their efforts in the media, a problem that 
many other movements around the world share, but they also had to contend with the Namibian 
and South African media’s tendency to stereotype sexual and gender minorities. With the GLA, 
the media opted to cover the group’s eccentricity in keeping with the mainstream news media’s 
commercial interest in entertaining readers. According to a Behind the Mask staff member, the 
media “always want to portray us [LGBT persons] in a negative light. . . . They can never write 
something positive about the LGBT community” (Interview, 13 January 2006). Due to this 
media bias, I decided not to select SMOs solely based on their media visibility because 
synonymizing social movement or SMO visibility with media coverage flattens visibility into an 
outcome. Instead, I treated the media as one of many audiences available to social movements 
and SMOs and as one source of information about SMO strategies (Gamson 1975).  
I spent several weeks at the Gay and Lesbian Archives in Johannesburg between the end 
of September and November 2005 photocopying and analyzing historical documents from each 
country’s LGBT movement. I first gathered historical documents related to the LGBT 
movement’s role in drafting the Equality Clause, a portion of the South African Constitution that 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; this meant that I gathered documents 
going back to the late 1980s. I did not include these data in my document analysis, but they 
enabled me to write more detailed historical account of movement activities between the late 
1980s and mid-1990s. I also pored over the records of key SMOs that were or had been based 
and active in Johannesburg, including the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality, the 
Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, the Gays and Lesbians of the Witwatersrand, and 
ACTIVATE. I spent the bulk of my time scanning and photocopying articles from Exit, a South 
African newspaper targeting white middle-class gay men, and from GALA’s collection of news 
clippings related to LGBT issues, rights, and movement activities. From my online searches, a 
visit to Northwestern University’s Melville J. Herskovits Library of African Studies, and my 
research at GALA, I gathered approximately 1,600 newspaper articles from Namibian and South 
African news sources about LGBT movement activity in both countries. I coded and analyzed 
national mainstream and LGBT-specific sources, but I confined my coding and analysis of local 
newspapers to those covering Johannesburg and Windhoek. Table 1 below contains the names of 
all Namibian and South African mainstream and LGBT-specific news sources from which I 
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selected articles to code and analyze. For the duration of my fieldwork in Johannesburg and 
Windhoek (September 2005-July 2006), I also purchased daily, weekly, and weekend 
newspapers and clipped articles related to LGBT organizing, rights, and issues, with the 
exception of The Windhoek Advertiser, which stopped publishing in the early 2000s. 
 




Namibia The Namibian (national, independent) Sister Namibia 
  The Windhoek Advertiser (local, independent)   
  New Era (national, state-owned)   
  The Southern Times (local, independent, weekly)   
South 
Africa Business Day (local, independent, centrist) Behind the Mask 
  The Mail and Guardian (national, independent, liberal) Exit 
  The Sunday Times (local, independent, conservative, weekly) Mambaonline 
  The Citizen (local, independent) Q Online 
  The Sowetan (local, independent, liberal)   
  The Star (local, independent, liberal)   
  
City Press (local, independent, “black community-oriented,” 
weekly)   
  The Sunday Independent (local, independent, weekly)   
 
My criteria for clipping articles included mention of LGBT SMOs by name, homosexuality, 
LGBT organizing, or LGBT cultural visibility. For example, when I searched Namibian and 
South African news sources online, I entered keywords, such as homosexuality, lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender, into sources’ search engines. I entered these articles into QSR 
NUD*IST (Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching, and Theorizing) 6 and 7, a 
qualitative data analysis program, and generated inductive codes from a glossary of themes that 
emerged from my intensive observation of SMOs, which I detail below. I also created deductive 
codes from secondary sources about LGBT organizing in the global South, such as being 
recipients of donor aid (Arnfred 2004b). I then entered the articles into SPSS and coded them 
according to the following: day, month, year, LGBT SMOs mentioned, LGBT-related issue, and 
                                                 
41 Unless otherwise indicated, all mainstream newspapers are daily newspapers. Political classifications of 
newspaper sources come from the World Press Review. The World Press Review describes its mission as the 
following: “to foster the international exchange of perspectives and information” (http://www.worldpress.org/, 
accessed 14 April 2007). 
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type of source. 
I also collected approximately 500 documents from the Gay and Lesbian Archives and 
the Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs I observed. Several years ago, GALA solicited 
materials from SMOs in neighboring countries, and SMOs, such as The Rainbow Project in 
Namibia and the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, donated materials to GALA. Thus, I was able 
to gather organizational records from the Namibian LGBT movement, even though I had not yet 
visited the country. I organized and coded these documents thematically according to issue, 
event, and strategic choice.  
3.2.3 Ethnographic Observation 
Understanding the internal logic guiding SMOs’ strategic choices and how strategic 
choices shifted over time drove my ethnographic observation. By ethnography, I mean observing 
SMO activities and interacting with SMO staff and members “for an extended period of time, 
watching what happens, listening to what is said, [and] asking questions” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995:1). Studying strategic choices poses operationalization difficulties for scholars 
because, “although choices about targeting, timing, and tactics can be directly observed, the 
strategic “frame” within which we make these choices—and provide them with their 
coherence—must often be inferred (Ganz 2000:1010). I observed SMOs consistently for a period 
of time so that I could follow their internal logic and assign them “coherence” so that they were 
not a jumble of unrelated choices, when instead, they constituted a series of choices that affected 
and even constrained the subsequent choices that SMO members and staff believed to be 
possible (Blee and Currier 2005; Ganz 2000). Through daily fieldwork with each SMO, I studied 
how, when, and why they made themselves visible or invisible to the media, the state, the public, 
sexual minority populations, and other audiences. I did not limit myself to observations that 
occur in the office setting. If an SMO staged an event or meeting elsewhere, I gained permission 
to “shadow” staff and members as they represented the SMO elsewhere. This flexibility 
prevented me from privileging the office as the only “legitimate” site of organizational 
interaction. I took detailed notes about staff meetings, informal conversations I had with staff 
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members and visitors, and events that took place at and away from SMO offices.42
Purposive sampling drove my selection of LGBT SMOs for intensive ethnographic 
observation (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003; Hammersley and Atkinson 1995). Random 
sampling would have been impossible and unsuitable for my purposes, given my interest in 
choosing organizations that had been visible for some time. I entered the field not knowing 
which LGBT SMOs I would study because I wanted to avoid turning visibility into a constant 
and to ensure that there was variability in visibility over time in SMOs that I observed. My 
criteria for selecting visible organizations were that an SMO had to be in existence for at least 
two years and to have some form of verifiable, routinized visibility, such as a regular meeting 
space or office. I selected SMOs that had existed long enough to have established processes for 
making strategic choices and whose visibility I could verify through archival records, interviews, 
or historical accounts. I tracked SMOs with some identifiable level of visibility, meaning that I 
had to be able to locate them through conventional means, such as through the media, word of 
mouth, or advertised meetings. I eliminated SMOs that met sporadically, were in existence for 
two years or less, or were visible fewer than five times. Organizations that I eliminated included 
a Jewish LGBT organization and a Muslim LGBT organization, each of which met 
inconsistently and lacked public meeting space. 
Selecting SMOs to study once I arrived in South Africa and Namibia enabled me to avoid 
biasing my SMO selection because I had an adequate understanding of what organizations 
existed and were doing. Before I left for South Africa, I collected data from Namibian and South 
African print and online mainstream and LGBT-specific news sources and from the websites of 
local Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs, international human rights NGOs, international 
LGBT SMOs, and Behind the Mask. These data acquainted me with the range of LGBT 
organizing in each country and the issues that SMOs addressed. However, if I had selected the 
SMOs that I would observe before I reached South Africa and Namibia, I would have biased my 
selection. I did not have all the available information within my grasp until I arrived in South 
Africa because I was unsure which SMOs were operation and which ones were defunct. For 
instance, before leaving Pittsburgh, newspaper articles I had gathered frequently named the 
                                                 
42 See Appendix A for the ethnographic observational template I used. I drew on my experience observing SMO 
dynamics when I worked as Dr. Kathleen M. Blee’s research assistant on her National Science Foundation-funded 
project (SBE-0316436) when I drafted the observational template. I revised the template and added observational 
categories if I had not observed such discussions or decisions before. 
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Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as a leading SMO in Johannesburg; upon my arrival, I learned 
that the Equality Project’s board of trustees temporarily suspended the SMO due to allegations of 
financial mismanagement (Krouse 2005). I was not privy to this information until I spoke to 
local activists familiar with the SMO’s demise, and I ruled out observing the Equality Project’s 
activities.  
Only two social movement organizations in each city met my minimum criteria for 
documented public visibility and for being in operation for at least two years. As a result, the 
selection process was simple and convenient. The ease of this selection suggested that 
Johannesburg was no longer a hotbed of LGBT organizing. The number of Johannesburg-based 
social movement organizations had declined steadily since the late 1990s, reducing the number 
of possible organizations I could study.43 In addition, no Namibian LGBT social movement 
organizations besides Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project existed, which meant that the 
LGBT movement had remained largely confined to these two organizations.  
All social movement organizations shared organizational characteristics. All employed 
professional staff, maintained an office open to the public, received funding from Northern 
donors, and claimed to represent the interests of the entire or a segment of the LGBT community 
in their country or throughout Africa. They diverged in their constitution of membership. Behind 
the Mask has been a professional and volunteer-driven SMO since its inception, whereas FEW, 
Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project once were membership-based. FEW, Sister Namibia, 
and The Rainbow Project recently made the transition from membership-based organizations to 
trusts that an executive board oversees; responsibility for and governance of the social movement 
organization shifted from members of the Namibian LGBT community to a select few. This 
restructuring satisfied Northern donors who were sometimes uneasy about allocating funds to 
fledgling organizations. 
Studying two organizations meant that I was not able to study each SMO so intensively 
because “the more settings studied the less time that can be spent in each” (Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1995:40). What I may have sacrificed in terms of micro-level detail I made up for in 
rich observation about SMOs’ strategic choices about visibility and invisibility as I concentrated 
on staff members and visitors’ talk about audience, constituencies, and campaigns. I estimate that 
                                                 
43 In a subsequent study, I hope to document the proliferation and depopulation of LGBT social movement 
organizations in South Africa between the 1960s and the present. 
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I spent 800 hours observing activities and interactions at all four SMOs. I averaged 20 hours a 
week of ethnographic observation. Gathering data from social movement organizations with 
varying degrees of public visibility allowed me to develop a more robust analysis of the strategic 
choices that organizations made about their visibility and invisibility. I limited my observation to 
what happened at organizations’ offices or when they participated in off-site events. Below I 
describe how I analyzed my ethnographic data in conjunction with my documentary and 
interview data. 
3.2.4 Interviewing 
To ensure that I understood how, when, and why social movement organizations made 
certain strategic choices about their visibility or invisibility, I interviewed SMO staff and 
members. Using a digital voice recorder, I conducted 56 in-depth, semi-structured qualitative 
interviews with LGBT SMO staff and members in Johannesburg and Windhoek to understand 
how and under what circumstances SMO promote their visibility or withdraw from it. By semi-
structured interview, I mean that I used an interview schedule with a predetermined list of 
possible questions I could ask respondents, but I let respondents’ answers to the questions guide 
the order in which I posed questions or provoke new and follow-up questions not on the 
schedule. Semi-structured interviews allowed me to understand strategic choices “from the 
perspective of movement actors” (Blee and Taylor 2002:92).  
To capture a range of LGBT SMO staff and member attitudes, I engaged in purposive 
sampling when I selected activists to interview (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003). I strategically 
selected activists with different roles in the SMO who had been involved with the organization 
long enough to describe its decision-making process, audiences, constituency, and campaigns to 
interview. Selecting activists to interview based on their role in the organization, instead of using 
other criteria such as gender, race, age, or length of time in the organization, made sense because 
I was interested in their understanding of how the organization made strategic choices. It is likely 
that their role in the organization influenced their proximity to decision-making processes, which 
in turn provided them with a more in-depth understanding of different strategic choices. I began 
interviewing staff and members only after I had spent enough time observing an organization to 
have established trust and rapport with staff and members. During the interview, I asked 
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respondents about shifts in the group’s visibility and invisibility strategies, how the organization 
tailored its strategies for different audiences, how the organization decided to publicize its work 
and goals, and the organization’s routines for making itself accessible to the public and targeted 
constituency. Additionally, I asked respondents to comment on recent occurrences in which the 
organization took strategic steps to make itself publicly visible. I also asked respondents about 
what attracted them to the organization and their attitudes regarding the correlation between 
individual LGBT visibility and invisibility and organizational visibility and invisibility (see 
Appendix B). I compared interviewees’ responses to questions about the organization’s routines 
as checks against my notes and analysis about the SMOs’ strategic choices about their visibility 
and invisibility.  
I conducted all interviews in English, though in three instances, respondents claimed that 
their English was limited. However, they fully participated in the interview and answered in 
English, and we had little difficulty in understanding each other’s meanings. I protected the 
anonymity and confidentiality of subjects by using pseudonyms for staff, members, and leaders 
in my field notes and transcriptions of interviews, by not recording personal identifiers on tape, 
and by keeping my field notes, transcribed interviews, and digital interview files on a laptop 
computer encrypted with a password, ensuring that I was the only person with access to this 
information. After I finished interviewing staff and members, I sent the digital recordings via 
email to a transcriptionist in the United States who had no ties to Namibia or South Africa. She 
transcribed the interviews and emailed the transcripts back to me, and I began analyzing the 
interviews in QSR N6 and N7. 
Interview participants varied in terms of their nationality, race, gender, and sexuality. Of 
the 56 individuals I interviewed, 26 were Namibian, 23 South African, and 7 non-Namibians or 
non-South Africans. Foreign staff members originally hailed from Uganda, Burundi, Germany, 
Jamaica, the Netherlands, and the United States. Table 2 below contains demographic 
information about respondents regarding their race, gender, and sexuality.  
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Table 2: Total Number of Interview Respondents Affiliated with South African and Namibian LGBT SMOs 
by Race, Gender, and Sexuality 
  Black Coloured White Total
South 
Africa Male Female Transgender All Male Female All Male Female All   
Gay 6             2     8
Lesbian   15       1         16
Heterosexual   1                 1
Bisexual 2               1   3
Namibia                       
Gay 10       7           17
Lesbian   5       2     1   8
Heterosexual     2     1         3
Bisexual                     0
Total 18 21 2 41 7 4 11 2 2 4 56
 
I interviewed an almost equal number of self-identified men (n=27) and women (n=28) and one 
female-to-male preoperative transgender person. Of the staff and members I interviewed, 45 
percent (n=25) identified as gay, 43 percent (n=24) as lesbian, 7 percent (n=4) as heterosexual, 
and 5 percent (n=3) as bisexual. Gay men and lesbians dominated the staff and membership of 
LGBT SMOs in both countries. Almost 73 percent (n=41) of respondents identified as black, 20 
percent (n=11) as coloured, and 7 percent (n=4) as white. Unlike lesbian and gay SMOs in the 
1980s in South Africa or the first attempt at organizing in Namibia, LGBT SMOs in 
Johannesburg and South Africa were multiracial, and power and leadership had shifted to black 
and coloured Namibian and South Africans. Of the leaders of SMOs I studied, two identified as 
black lesbians, one as a coloured gay man, and another as a white lesbian. Leadership positions 
in LGBT SMOs thus were no longer solely the domain of white gay men.  
3.2.5 Data Analysis 
I analyzed the news media articles and organizational records data separately from the 
interview and ethnographic observational data. This separation made sense given my interest in 
understanding LGBT social movement organizations’ strategic choices contemporaneously and 
over time. In QSR N6 and N7, I utilized the same thematic coding categories for all data as a 
way to ensure consistency in coding. I integrated news media articles and organization records 
and then coded them together thematically, and I repeated this process for interview and 
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ethnographic data. Deductive codes that I gleaned from secondary sources, such as social 
movement literature, included audience construction, constituency construction, talk about 
opponents, and antigay sentiments. Inductive codes that emerged from my initial perusal of my 
data include mention of foreign donors and international nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), democratic procedures at SMOs, and how organizations perceive and react to political 
opportunities.  
3.3 SAFETY, ACCESS, AND RAPPORT 
3.3.1 Safety  
Before entering the field, I worried that my presence at Namibian LGBT social 
movement organizations as a white American researcher would make them vulnerable to state 
scrutiny. Once in Windhoek, I learned that apart from isolated incidents of the police harassing 
individuals they believed to be sexual or gender minorities, the state had not initiated a 
comprehensive crackdown on LGBT organizing such as that which had occurred in Zimbabwe in 
the late 1990s (HRW and IGLHRC 2003). Namibian staff and members assured me that my fears 
were unfounded, but I still took steps not to draw undue attention to my presence or to publicize 
my research agenda in Namibia. Similarly, when I followed community representatives from the 
Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) into townships on visits to prospective members, 
I took care in monitoring the conversations I initiated on public transport. Because I did not want 
to imperil the community representative’s work in townships, I was careful not to initiate 
“lesbian”-themed discussions, such as how black lesbians negotiated their personal visibility in 
townships. 
Conducting research in Johannesburg was also a cause of concern for me due to the city’s 
international reputation for being violent (Dirsuweit 2002; Reid and Dirsuweit 2002). I quickly 
learned that I could avoid violence by staying away from isolated areas and not carrying around 
valuable possessions, such as my laptop computer. I also discovered that research participants 
shared my safety concerns. For instance, FEW sponsored a self-defense training class at the 
request of a staff member who was sometimes hassled by youths on her way to and from the 
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organization’s office. FEW invited me to participate in the training because not only did they 
consider me to be a fixture in the organization by that time, but they also recognized that I 
traveled as they did. I commuted mostly by minibus taxis, though occasionally, I paid for more 
expensive private taxis if I had an appointment somewhere or if I was carrying my laptop or 
other valuables. In a sense, safety concerns enabled me to alleviate the unease that potential 
research participants had around me at first. Asking how I traveled to the office let research 
participants offer advice about which places in Johannesburg to avoid and how I should 
safeguard my valuables. In this and other ways, they were sources of important knowledge. 
Though participants and I shared somewhat similar safety concerns around transport and walking 
in Johannesburg, our safety concerns differed because of where we lived. Whereas many 
participants returned home to sometimes difficult township lives, I was able to rent a room in an 
apartment and then a house with numerous security features designed to counteract 
unpredictability, which included an electrified fence, electric gate, two-meter-high walls, and 
windows with burglar bars. My class position insulated me from the more volatile aspects of 
living in Johannesburg’s townships.  
3.3.2 Access 
Gaining access to Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations 
was complicated at first. Conversations with local activists proved important to how I selected 
SMOs to study and obtained permission from SMO leaders to carry out intensive ethnographic 
observation at their offices. I had to prove that I was trustworthy to staff and members. I 
prepared a short, jargon-free research proposal that explained the parameters of my research; I 
made it clear that I was interested in observing the SMO’s meetings and activities. I stated that I 
wanted to learn about how the SMO presented itself publicly, interacted with different audiences, 
and decided to work on or withdraw from certain movement campaigns.  
An archivist at the Gay and Lesbian Archives put me in touch with the director of Behind 
the Mask. After meeting with the director, I learned that the organization would be suitable for 
my study because staff monitored the media and participated in LGBT movement activities 
within and beyond South Africa. Through Behind the Mask, I was able to learn about the current 
state of LGBT organizing in Namibia, and staff put me in touch with the directors of Sister 
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Namibia and The Rainbow Project (TRP). Fortunately, in February 2006, both directors of Sister 
Namibia and TRP traveled to Johannesburg for a meeting with LGBT organizations from South 
Africa and Zimbabwe. I met with both directors and gained permission from them to study their 
organizations, even before I set foot in Namibia. I obtained access to three LGBT SMOs quickly 
and easily, but getting access to the Forum for the Empowerment for Women (FEW) proved 
difficult. I present an excerpt from my fieldnotes, which exemplifies the series of negotiations I 
had with the director of FEW before she granted me permission to observe the SMO’s activities. 
In her effort to protect FEW after negative encounters with researchers (she didn’t 
go into detail), the director wanted to ensure that researchers wouldn’t publish 
anything that portrayed the organization in a negative light. She had an 
investment in preserving FEW’s reputation as an organization. She characterized 
previous researchers as taking information from FEW, without giving anything 
back. She seemed especially angered that researchers left participants’ lives 
unimproved with their research results (Fieldnotes, 18 November 2005).  
The director’s past interactions with foreign researchers inclined her to deny my request to study 
the organization, and her comments illustrated how important the SMO’s public visibility and 
reputation were to her. Coupled with subsequent meetings with the director and the public 
relations officer, my presence at Behind the Mask enabled me to obtain access to FEW because I 
was not a “fly-in, fly-out” type of researcher the director distrusted. It took a couple of months to 
cultivate the trust of the director of FEW, an example of how forging research relationships can 
require a great deal of time and energy (Reinharz 1992).  
Delineating the boundaries of my inquiry was important because I wanted SMO staff and 
members to understand that I was not interested in telling stories of pain or in exploiting their 
members. Many Namibian and South African LGBT persons experienced negative sanctions 
associating with disclosing their sexual and gender orientations, making them “interesting” 
objects of study to outsiders like myself who wanted to understand the persistence and 
permutation of violence in these postcolonial countries. I did not want to objectify or exploit 
LGBT persons and their narratives of suffering or tragedy, and I clearly stated that I would leave 
the site of observation if staff or members began to disclose personal information, such as how 
they experienced and handled violence. The use of research participants’ stories because of their 
violence or difference violates basic feminist ethical principles because it reduces research 
participants to objects, denying them agency in the research process (Reinharz 1992; Steady 
2004). I am not suggesting that the only narrative that Namibian or South African LGBT persons 
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are capable of recounting is one of suffering. Rather, I mean the most common narratives 
selected by students of the Namibian and South African LGBT movement are those of violence, 
poverty, and limited choice (Dirsuweit 2006; see also Mbembe 2001). Though I do not deny that 
such narratives are worthy of study, I was more interested in focusing on organized expressions 
of agency (McDonald 2002; Steady 2006): LGBT social movement organizations. With such a 
focus, I attempt to dispel the notion that to be a sexual or gender minority in the global South is 
to lead a life mired in difficulty (Lewis 2004).  
My focus on organizational choices and practices facilitated my access to SMOs and to 
activists. First, my object of scrutiny was not the individual activist, but rather the SMO, which is 
reflected in my ethnographic observational template and interview questions. In this way, I did 
not stray into the realm of private experience; when I interviewed SMO staff and members, I was 
interested in their public experience with the SMO. Second, my focus on the SMO allowed me to 
construct SMO staff and members as experts on SMOs. Some staff and members seemed to 
appreciate the valorization of their expertise during the interview. A few times, respondents 
made remarks such as “I didn’t realize I knew so much” or “I can’t believe I’m saying this much 
about” a particular SMO. Respondents did not necessarily know how much they knew about the 
organizations, and this may have proven to be an important source of validation for them. 
Organizations also viewed me as a resource. I was able to contribute to SMOs by 
performing routine or special tasks if staff needed assistance. I wrote an annual report for one 
organization, composed and copy-edited a few stories for Behind the Mask’s website, taught a 
couple of communication classes for FEW about how to walk away from tense situations, 
assisted a FEW staff member with her curriculum vitae as she applied for a paid internship, 
answered the telephone if Sister Namibia or The Rainbow Project staff were in a meeting, copy-
edited articles for an edition of Sister Namibia, assisted visitors in identifying materials for 
research or personal use at Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project’s resource centers, and 
participated as a guest interviewee on The Rainbow Project’s “Talking Pink” radio show about 
bisexuality. I also shared my collection of news media articles related to same-sex marriage to 
Behind the Mask and the Gay and Lesbian Archives as they tried to encourage the South African 
Joint Working Group to pursue same-sex marriage. 
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3.3.3 Researcher Identity 
My nationality, race, gender, class, and sexuality affected my research in different ways. 
As a white woman, some black and coloured Namibian and South African LGBT activists 
regarded me suspiciously until I spoke; then they realized that I was American. Whiteness has a 
long troubled history in both countries, and potential research participants interpreted my race 
and nationality through a lens affected by apartheid laws and policies (Steyn 2001). In Namibia, 
on a couple of occasions, staff or members who did not know I was observing interactions at 
Sister Namibia or The Rainbow Project greeted me in Afrikaans, as was customary among 
individuals speaking with those they perceived to be white Namibians. After I sheepishly 
confessed that my Afrikaans was nonexistent, staff and members initially regarded me as an 
oddity, but soon adjusted to my presence. 
Most staff and members of LGBT SMOs welcomed and accommodated my presence 
after I explained my research to them. After I introduced myself to staff and members, several 
inquired, “Why are you doing research here?” I interpreted their question to mean, “Why did you 
leave the United States to come to Namibia/South Africa to conduct your research?” I explained 
my interest in comparing how SMOs make decisions under differing political circumstances, but 
the question of whether I was there to study otherness and to exoticize political organizing 
around sexual and gender minority issues remained. Ethnographers historically had unsavory 
connections to colonialism in Africa (Bleys 1995; McClintock 1995). This did not exempt the 
type of research in which I engaged; answering the difficult question about why I was doing 
research in Namibia and South Africa with a response such as “to learn about [social movement] 
processes, I had to go somewhere” would have been disingenuous (Zabusky 2002:121). I 
explained the motivation for my selection of Johannesburg and Windhoek as comparative case 
study sites in terms of my interest in showing social movement scholars who tend to study 
movements in the global North that some theories and concepts may have little bearing in the 
global South. Staff and members seemed to understand this explanation, but they also wanted to 
know how this research would benefit the movement and their organizations (Steady 2004). I 
explained that it would take some time to analyze my data and to formulate conclusions. A way I 
hope to be able to give back to these organizations is to deposit my findings with them and at the 
Gay and Lesbian Archives in Johannesburg. 
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Being a woman facilitated my entry into two organizations, the Forum for the 
Empowerment of Women (FEW) and Sister Namibia, probably because both organizations 
define women as part of their targeted constituency (see Chapter Four). My dress and appearance 
also provoked interesting questions from staff and members about whether I identified as 
“butch” or “femme.” I typically dressed very casually in keeping with the attire of staff and 
members at both organizations, and I confined my wardrobe largely to black outfits. I wore no 
makeup and almost always wore running shoes to ease my walking in Johannesburg and 
Windhoek. At Behind the Mask, FEW, and The Rainbow Project, staff and members speculated 
about my gender identity. Interestingly, such conversations demonstrated how I became a subject 
of inquiry, much in the way that organizations held my interest as a subject of research. I asked 
probing questions about what “butch” and “femme” meant for LGBT SMO staff and members. 
Some believed that I would identify as butch because I dressed so sportily and was tall and large 
in comparison to some Namibian and South African women, while others interpreted my 
customary silence and helpfulness, such as when I offered to get others coffee or tea while I 
prepared my own, as “femme” behavior. Such conversations demonstrated that some gender 
categories and behavior (dress and physical bearing) might fit into a typology of “butch” and 
“femme,” but not all gender categories were translatable as I explicate in Chapter 6.  
My sexuality became a topic of conversation for staff and members at a couple of SMOs 
(Swarr 2003). After the director of FEW granted me access to the organization, she asked me 
how I identified in terms of sexuality and stated, “You can tell me that it’s none of my business.” 
Fearful that she might revoke her decision, I answered her, which seemed to satisfy her. She 
asserted, “At least you’re one of us. There’s nothing I can stand more than straight people 
studying us.” She reclassified me as less “other” than before I answered her question. Staff and 
members also inquired about my sexuality in more circumspect ways, as an attempt to gauge my 
interest in LGBT politics generally and a way to get to know me as a person. Some LGBT 
activists and antigay opponents assumed that those who supported sexual and gender minority 
organizing were lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender. Understanding this dimension of their 
query, I answered their questions as best I could, though I instituted boundaries whenever 
possible to ensure that I did not disclose information that would restrict my access to the 
organization or potential interview participants. 
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Designing a comparative research project that involves multiple qualitative methods takes 
a great deal of thought and refinement. The project that I imagined doing before I entered the 
field is not the research I ended up conducting. For instance, I discarded a part of my project 
involving the observation of LGBT public and commercial spaces in Johannesburg and 
Windhoek because social movement organizations did not use them to recruit members or 
supporters or to advertise their work. I continued to modify the observational and interview 
templates I routinely used to reflect how my understanding of organizations’ strategic choices 
had changed. I did not want to lose or miss any data, a fear that I share with many qualitative 
researchers. Employing multiple methods allowed me to increase my confidence that I am telling 
the story about Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs’ strategic choices about the visibility 
and invisibility as accurately as possible. 
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4.0  HOW NAMIBIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN LGBT SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
ORGANIZATIONS NAVIGATE STRATEGIC DILEMMAS 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Current theorizing about strategic action assumes that social movements are free to 
choose from a range of possible strategies (Jasper 2006:2). This perspective presumes that social 
movements operate in fairly open and permissive democratic contexts in the global North. 
However, social movements in some newly democratizing nations in the global South may have 
to select from a more modest and limited strategic arsenal. The state and other institutional 
political actors at the helm of democratizing efforts configure and can potentially limit what is 
possible in terms of strategic action. Social movements can and do play an important role in 
delimiting the boundaries of strategic action, but not all social movements are equal in their 
access to resources and political opportunities. I use a comparative approach to strategic action to 
explain 1.) how sociopolitical contexts bound SMOs’ strategic choices and 2.) how SMOs’ 
strategic choices unfold in differing sociopolitical contexts (della Porta 2002). By comparing 
how SMOs that belong to the same movement deploy strategic choices in differing sociopolitical 
contexts, I examine the boundaries of strategic choices, which are finite in some newly 
democratizing nations in the global South. 
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social movement organizations (SMOs) 
encounter many strategic dilemmas as they try to find optimal ways to achieve movement and 
organizational goals (Jasper 2004, 2006). By strategic dilemma, I mean the predicament of 
selecting between “two or more options, each with a long list of risks, costs, and potential 
benefits” (Jasper 2006:1). A considerable strategic dilemma LGBT social movement 
organizations sometimes face is whether, how, when, and why to become publicly visible or to 
withdraw from public view. This dilemma can be especially salient for LGBT SMOs that operate 
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in sociopolitical contexts hostile to sexual and gender minorities because they confront 
opposition that may harm members or hamstring organizational plans (Earl 2003; Palmberg 
1999). Organizations active in accommodating sociopolitical contexts may seemingly have more 
options for sexual and gender minority activism. Thus, organizations’ orientations to strategic 
choices may depend on the external sociopolitical context in which they operate. Actions toward 
or away from public visibility involve deciding whom to represent as well as to which 
audience(s) an organization should make itself visible. I distinguish these types of dilemmas, 
following William A. Gamson (1975), as those involving target audiences (whom SMOs try to 
change or influence) and those involving constituencies (whom SMOs try to recruit and 
mobilize). 
In this chapter, I explore how one Namibian and one South African LGBT social 
movement organization navigate a series of strategic dilemmas that involve issues of visibility 
toward audiences or constituencies. I examine how these strategic dilemmas unfolded within 
each organization and with respect to each country’s sociopolitical environment. LGBT social 
movement organizations in both countries both struggled against the stigmatization and 
marginalization of sexual and gender minorities. They diverged in how they juggled and 
responded to strategic dilemmas (Ganz 2000, 2004). First, I consider how a South African 
lesbian organization, the Forum for the Empowerment of Women’s (FEW) exclusionary 
orientation guided its strategic choices. By exclusionary strategic choices, I mean decisions 
intended to shield an organization and its members from harm and scrutiny and to cement a 
homogeneous and insular collective identity. Because FEW had a primary goal of eliminating 
violence against black lesbians, they made exclusionary strategic choices that created and 
maintained safe spaces for black lesbian members. Second, I investigate how Sister Namibia, a 
Namibian feminist and “lesbian” SMO, negotiated strategic dilemmas within a context of state 
hostility to sexual and gender minorities, sexual and gender minority rights, and LGBT SMOs.  
In contrast to FEW, Sister Namibia developed an inclusionary principle that guided its choices 
about engaging the state and casting lesbian rights as women’s rights. By inclusionary strategic 
choices, I mean decisions designed to cultivate relationships with diverse audiences and to 
cement an organization’s broad, inclusive, and national collective identity. I am interested in 
understanding how, when, and why FEW and Sister Namibia made certain strategic choices and 
the consequences of those choices. I used micro-level ethnographic data to trace how FEW, 
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which was formed in 2003, made strategic decisions amid a political context full of possibilities 
in South Africa. I employed document data, interviews, and ethnographic data to illuminate how 
Sister Namibia, which was launched in 1989, made strategic choices in the more restrictive 
sociopolitical environment of Namibia.   
4.2 FORUM FOR THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN (SOUTH AFRICA) 
The Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW) devised an exclusionary orientation 
that guided its strategic choices about visibility toward its constituency and audiences as it 
created safe spaces for black lesbians who were vulnerable to violence. FEW approached gender- 
and sexuality-based violence from a perspective that emphasized “disaggregation . . . because 
homosexuals are positioned differently in their communities, and may experience violence 
purely on the grounds of their alternative sexuality . . . but homophobia also means that avenues 
available to heterosexual women may not be available to them [lesbians]” (van Zyl 2005a:238). 
In this way, African radical feminism informed FEW’s overall strategy of insularity and 
exclusion. Establishing safe spaces for black lesbians to meet and organize was a strategic goal 
consistent with a radical feminist position that was distrustful of male-dominated movements and 
prioritized “exclusively female organizations that would offer a safe organizational safe for 
women, one characterized by the values of teamwork, nurturing, and mutual support” (Hassim 
2005:33). I explore several strategic dilemmas that FEW encountered. First, I consider how FEW 
handled the strategic dilemma of creating safe spaces for its constituents, including deciding 
where to locate its office, how to monitor internal spaces, and who to allow access to the 
organization’s physical spaces. Second, I examine FEW’s dilemma of how to define its target 
constituency (who could be members). Third, I delve into how the organization navigated the 
dilemma of whether and how to participate in public protest, that is, how to present itself toward 
an audience. 
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4.2.1 The Dilemma of Organizational Space 
How to create and protect safe organizational spaces emerged as a key strategic dilemma 
for FEW. On the one hand, staff and members wanted the organization to be open to the public, 
in a limited way, to educate South Africans about hate crimes against black lesbians. On the 
other hand, staff prioritized creating spaces so that the organization’s constituency of black 
lesbians would feel safe and welcome. In February 2006, Zoliswa Nkonyana, a young black 
lesbian who lived in Khayelitsha, a Cape Town township, was murdered by a group of men 
because of her sexuality (Huisman 2006; Thamm 2006). The circumstances of Nkonyana’s 
murder mirrored the psychological and physical insecurity that many black South African 
lesbians faced everyday. A black woman’s masculine dress and behavior might lead male 
perpetrators to target supposed black lesbians—who were sometimes rumored in townships to be 
lesbians—for punishment, according to a FEW staff member.  
If you are femme, it doesn’t really show that you are a lesbian. . . . But when you 
are butch, it’s when you dress like a man and you act like a man in a way, and 
that’s when you become maybe a target, I would say. . . . That’s when they see 
that you are born with the breasts and all that, but you are acting differently. You 
dress differently because you dress like a man. That’s when they want to prove a 
point to you that actually you are a woman, you know; that’s when they start 
raping you. . . . [We’re] trying to be like them, and they [men] want to see how 
strong you are and all that. . . . Are you really, you know, can you stand for it or 
whatever, and [they] prove it to you that actually you are a women [sic] and they 
rape you (Interview, 17 February 2006).    
Though many black lesbians signified their gender and sexuality through their physical 
appearance, male perpetrators often targeted butch lesbians with masculine appearances for 
attack; femme lesbians with feminine appearances slipped by undetected. The public visibility of 
non-normative gender and sexuality was a basic concern for black lesbians. Invisibility was an 
attractive cloak to some black lesbians who had survived or feared being the targets of hate 
crimes.  
Staff resolved its dilemma of organizational space by creating an insular, homogeneous 
space for current and prospective black lesbian members as a safe haven from violence and 
uncertainty. Within a larger environment of risk for black lesbians in townships and in 
Johannesburg, FEW worked from a default position of invisibility and insularity to target 
specific, mostly local audiences and to recruit black lesbians, the SMO’s constituency. From its 
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inception, FEW prioritized fashioning and fostering a collective black lesbian social movement 
identity among members by creating and maintaining safe spaces for members (Springer 2005). 
The SMO achieved this goal by inculcating homogeneity in safe organizational physical spaces. 
In this manner, FEW’s formation and preservation of safe spaces fed into an overarching strategy 
of insularity and exclusion guiding the organization’s actions. These safe spaces attracted and 
retained members, allowing the organization to maintain its footing in Johannesburg townships. 
The organization enforced the safety of its spaces in all activities and services that it provided. 
Services and activities included, but were not limited to: a gender and sexuality resource library; 
computer, communication, and photography skills training; a theatrical troupe (SAfrodykes); 
women-only soccer team (the Chosen FEW); self-defense training; gender and sexual identity 
workshops; and counseling. These services and activities reinforced the collective identity the 
organization crafted around black lesbian women overcoming and eradicating violence. To 
maintain this narrow cohesive identity and organizational insularity, FEW made a series of 
strategic decisions about organizational physical spaces, such as where to locate its office in 
Johannesburg.  
4.2.1.1 The Dilemma of Office Location 
In 2005, FEW faced a strategic dilemma about where to locate its office. Establishing 
office space in central Johannesburg would put the SMO close to local authorities, such as the 
Constitutional Court, and to other SMOs, but creating office space in a township would facilitate 
black lesbian members’ immediate access to the organization and provide them with safe space 
to congregate and socialize. FEW ultimately decided to lease office space in central 
Johannesburg, instead of one of the predominantly black townships, where most members lived 
primarily because of safety concerns, thus reinforcing the organization’s exclusionary strategic 
choices. Therefore, FEW made an exclusionary strategic choice about office location that 
insulated the organization from danger. 
Thanks to funding from European donors, FEW leased office space in 2005 in the 
Constitutional Court complex in Hillbrow in central Johannesburg. The Constitutional Court 
occupied the site of the Old Fort and the former Women’s Gaol (Jail), which once functioned as 
prisons for black, Asian, coloured, and white men and women (Gevisser 2004). In 2003, the 
Constitutional Court Women’s Gaol complex invited organizations representing groups 
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marginalized under apartheid, such as sexual and gender minorities, to apply for office space. 
Behind the Mask—the other South African LGBT SMO that I studied intensively—originally 
obtained office space there. As two staff members at Behind the Mask became more interested in 
the needs of black South African lesbians, they agreed to launch FEW as a separate SMO with its 
own vision. When FEW received funding, the organization moved to an office downstairs in the 
Constitutional Court complex.  
Despite the Constitutional Court’s new halcyon image, the complex was located in 
troubled Hillbrow, which had a long history as a vibrant gay community from the 1950s through 
the 1970s until its economic decline in the 1980s. As the apartheid state brutally repressed 
antiapartheid protest, the national economy experienced a downturn, resulting in the disruption 
of social services to inner-city Johannesburg. Homeless and poor South Africans and African 
émigrés moved into Hillbrow, contributing to the neighborhood’s reputation for “incivility” 
(Chipkin 2005:94; see also Morris 1999 and Simone 2004). Residents of Johannesburg regarded 
Hillbrow as a dangerous inner-city suburb, despite the city’s “political, social and economic 
transformation . . . [which] had moved the city away from its racialised past by 1999” (Dykes 
2004:175). Violent muggings over the last decade put those who frequented Hillbrow, including 
FEW’s staff, members, and visitors, on alert.  
The threat of generalized violence in Hillbrow and Johannesburg townships underscored 
the specific specter of violence against which FEW organized. Eradicating violence against black 
lesbians was FEW’s chief goal. Therefore, a culture of security blanketed the SMO. FEW 
translated this need for security into insularity and homogeneity. As soon as visitors entered the 
Women’s Gaol, they had to pass through and sign in with security. A few footsteps took them 
past a well-tended garden, through a courtyard filled with apartheid memories, and into FEW’s 
buzzing office. Noise from the office confirmed the presence of staff and members and 
reinforced a sense belonging for young black lesbians, some of whom were thrown out of their 
homes due to their sexuality. That FEW had an office in the former Women’s Gaol was of 
historic significance. “Women used to be locked up in here. Now women are coming out and 
saying, ‘We're free and we're speaking our minds,’ at the same place that people were locked up” 
(Interview, 17 March 2006). Embossed testimony from former women prisoners on all the 
windows reminded visitors, members, and staff of the prison’s role in sustaining apartheid. It 
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would have been unthinkable twenty years ago for young black lesbians to congregate in the 
courtyard at the Women’s Gaol, unless they were prisoners being escorted to their cells. 
The organization worked to transform such places of inequality and discrimination into 
safe spaces. As a result, many FEW members I interviewed described FEW as a “home”:  
It’s a home in a sense that you get empowered mentally. You get information, you 
get informed . . . you get skills. . . . and you grow as an individual personality. 
You get to identify yourself, you get to assert, to learn more about yourself. And 
you get to deal with your issues in a right way, in a good way, positive way.  And 
it’s . . . a safe space for everyone. (FEW member, interview, 14 February 2006) 
The SMO structured its spaces as welcoming and nurturing to members to enable them to 
become more assertive. Likewise, FEW’s homogeneity encouraged members and staff to regard 
the organization’s space as comfortable and safe. In this way, homogeneity doubled as insularity. 
Members and staff prized the security that came from associating with other black lesbians, 
which created both homogeneity among members and staff and insulated them from cultivating 
working relationships with South Africans who differed from them. Thus, homogeneous 
members and staff were insulated when they were within the SMO’s confines, a safe haven from 
Johannesburg’s diversity and turbulence. This insularity did not prevent FEW from working with 
other LGBT SMOs or with other movement organizations, such as those that opposed violence 
against women. The narrow strategy of insularity through the creation and maintenance of safe 
spaces enabled the organization to become publicly visible to select audiences, such as the black 
lesbians FEW recruited. As I explain below, the recruitment of black lesbians also ensured the 
SMO’s continued existence, as the organization had a reservoir of members whom staff could 
train to assume leadership positions in the future. 
FEW’s decision to locate its office in central Johannesburg had some negative material 
consequences for members. This decision frustrated some FEW members because they had to 
travel long distances to reach the main office. Satellite offices would have enabled members to 
“access all of these resources near them instead of them coming all the way to town” (FEW 
member, interview, 16 March 2006). A staff member echoed this sentiment. 
If they [FEW] had offices down there, it would be easier for them [members] 
because they'd [members] know that the office is just within walking distance, 
you know, instead of having to catch a taxi. And it's quite a long drive. And they 
still have to walk up the steep hill [from the Park Station taxi rank in downtown 
Johannesburg to the office]. So, yes, it's quite a distance. If they had offices [in 
the townships], they [members] wouldn't have to walk the distance and worry 
about transport fare because sometimes they don't even have that money to go 
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there. You [members] want to speak to someone. You're dying to speak to 
someone. You’re dying to be heard. You can't even make a call because you can't 
afford it at that time. So if they [FEW] had offices in the townships, it would be 
easier for them [members] because they'd know, “I'm just walking there, and I 
know I'm going to find someone to talk to” (FEW staff member, interview, 17 
March 2006). 
Members often sacrificed materially to make the trip into central Johannesburg by forgoing cell 
phone calls and saving money. FEW’s choice for its office location constrained some members’ 
ability to visit the office.  
FEW responded to members’ concerns about its invisibility in townships by hiring 
community representatives to recruit black lesbians and meet with current and prospective 
members about their needs and concerns. FEW’s director claimed that the organization was the 
only South African LGBT SMO to bring recruitment, events, and organizing directly to their 
constituents. Due to the economic limitations that many black lesbians faced, community 
representatives traveled to one familiar township and one new township on a monthly basis. 
They met with women individually or in small groups, often in their homes. By meeting lesbians 
where they lived, community representatives circumvented the problem of requiring current and 
prospective members to travel to inner Johannesburg because it was expensive for many jobless 
women (Swarr and Nagar 2003).  
Establishing a satellite township office was an option that some South African LGBT 
SMOs in other cities had exercised. A Cape Town-based organization managed a satellite office 
for several years in a nearby township, whereas a Pretoria-based organization experienced 
difficulty maintaining an office in a township. FEW could have drawn on this precedent of 
locating its main office or a satellite office in a township. For example, FEW could have 
established office space in Soweto, as another LGBT-friendly HIV/AIDS organization, the 
Soweto HIV/AIDS Counsellors Association, had. However, the centrality of the office and 
proximity to other state entities generated new possibilities for FEW’s role within the LGBT and 
feminist movements.  
Setting up an office in central Johannesburg produced positive results for FEW. First, this 
choice created new opportunities for the SMO to influence the state. Having office space in the 
Constitutional Court complex afforded FEW credibility as a political organization by being steps 
away from the judicial branch of the South African government. For instance, FEW provided 
transport for dozens of black lesbian members from townships to the office for several 
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consecutive days in May 2005 to put pressure on the Constitutional Court to rule in favor of 
same-sex marriage rights. In this manner, FEW established itself publicly as a core player in the 
South African LGBT movement with its ability to mobilize a substantial number of members to 
participate in protests at the Constitutional Court. The organization also vaulted black lesbians 
into the South African public imaginary through their participation in protests. Additionally, 
having access to the Commission for Gender Equality, which was just steps away from FEW’s 
office, might advance FEW within the feminist movement. The Commission permitted “feminist 
activists simultaneously to represent ‘women’s interests’ within state policymaking processes to 
mobilize support for new gender relations in society at large” (Seidman 2003:546). In the future, 
feminist SMOs might turn to FEW as a physically well-placed ally to press the Commission 
about pursuing matters of importance to the feminist movement. Moreover, access to large, 
luxurious meeting spaces in the Constitutional Court complex enabled FEW to host or co-host 
(with Behind the Mask) LGBT movement activities, allowing the SMO to demonstrate its ability 
to juggle logistical concerns. This might portend the allocation of more movement-related 
responsibilities to FEW. 
A central office in Johannesburg was also practical for FEW. Some townships to 
Johannesburg’s north were quite far from townships to the city’s south. If members had to travel 
from a northern township to a southern one, it would be prohibitively expensive for them 
because most minibus taxis passed through central Johannesburg and required passengers to 
change minibus taxis, thus forcing members to pay double the fare. FEW avoided unduly 
straining members’ material resources. FEW’s office was within easy walking distance to the 
city’s transportation hub, Park Station, which served short- and long-distance buses and trains. In 
addition, locating the office in central Johannesburg ensured that FEW did not privilege one 
township over another. Members who resided in Alexandra, a northern township, for instance, 
would not be alienated because FEW’s office was located in Soweto.  
4.2.1.2 The Dilemma of Internally Monitoring Spaces 
Another strategic dilemma that FEW had to confront about organizational spaces 
involved whether to monitor the behavior of staff, members, and visitors to ensure the safety of 
organizational spaces or to let them socialize freely with other black lesbians. Sometimes, 
general members and staff behaved in ways that staff interpreted as endangering themselves, 
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other members, and the SMO. Staff had to decide how to balance their responsibilities to the 
SMO in dealing with members’ sometimes unpredictable behavior and their yearning to socialize 
with members they rarely saw. Staff also had to contend with the contradiction of disciplining 
their peers, an action that could alienate some members who might already be recovering from 
violence or dealing with familial rejection. However, staff agreed that it was more important to 
keep members, the organization, and themselves safe than to worry about infantilizing members 
who took exception to staff members’ monitoring of their behavior. Staff ultimately hoped their 
supervision of members would result in members’ absorption of ways to monitor spaces they 
entered outside of FEW and their increased self-assertiveness. 
At staff meetings, staff members continually voiced concerns about monitoring 
organizational spaces. For example, at the meeting following the organization’s annual general 
meeting (AGM), the director criticized staff for not halting the disorderly behavior of members 
at the AGM, which included making unreasonable demands on FEW about providing them with 
costly fares for private taxis, drinking too much alcohol, and stealing from other members (cell 
phones) and the organization (food and drinks). The director worried that the FEW’s landlord, 
the Constitutional Court complex, would believe the organization could not control its members 
and forbid it from holding future events there. The director attributed this breakdown to staff’s 
lack of assertiveness and guests’ unruliness. She stated, “We need to help them [members] 
understand the boundaries of the organization. . . We’re trying to balance our concern for the 
organization with our concern for people,” such as their personal safety in traveling to and from 
FEW events. The director stressed that she did not want to be the only one enforcing the rules 
and limits of the organization. She explained that one reason she trained staff to be assertive 
(besides overcoming their gender socialization, which taught them to be submissive) was to deal 
effectively and decisively with the public. With the consent of staff members, she banned alcohol 
at future events, unless it was for the executive board members who were “mature enough” to 
handle the alcohol (Fieldnotes, 13 February 2006). This decision had the effect of restoring the 
responsibility for supervising members’ conduct within all organizational spaces to all staff 
members. This episode also reminded staff members to practice their assertiveness concretely by 
asking members to behave responsibly and in a manner that respected the organization; thus, 
staff embodied and enforced the “empowerment” in the organization’s name.  
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4.2.1.3 The Dilemma of Access to Organizational Spaces 
A third strategic dilemma concerning organizational space was how to control access to 
FEW’s office and workshop spaces. Such exclusionary strategic choices worked well within the 
space of the office, but posed difficulties when staff hosted events beyond the organization’s 
office. Spatial exclusions at FEW were inflexible, as evidenced in the office’s physical safety. 
Men were not allowed to step into the office space itself. Visitors had to pass through and sign in 
with security before entering the office complex. The receptionist was able to see if male visitors 
were approaching the office from across the courtyard. Instead of allowing men in the office, 
staff met openly with them in the courtyard to preserve the gendered integrity of the office.44 No 
staff members were allowed to be alone with men. This strategic choice helped members, 
especially those who were survivors of hate crimes, feel safe within the organization. The 
presence of men might have endangered the psychological recovery of members who had 
survived violence at the hands of men. The absence of men gave women the space to mend in a 
non-threatening environment. 
Spatial exclusions based on gender and sexuality extended to the events that FEW held in 
townships, but beyond the organization’s office boundaries, FEW faced a dilemma of how to 
enforce them. Each year, FEW staged a community intervention in a township in which local 
lesbians and FEW community representatives and staff meet with local authorities, such as the 
police, educators, and health care providers, to discuss how they could better serve black 
lesbians. At a community intervention in April 2006 in Mohlakeng, a township one hour 
southwest of Johannesburg, FEW staff held an anti-violence training for members. Before the 
anti-violence training workshop began, FEW’s director asked several black gay men, ostensibly 
in drag, who helped staff to clean and set up the facility, to leave and barred them from attending 
the workshop. These men identified as gay, not as transgender, according to a FEW staff 
member. Graeme Reid (2005) explains why some black South African gay men did not identify 
as transgender, but as “ladies” (p. 213). “Ladies are gay. To be a lady does not mean that you 
want to be a woman, although some pass quite successfully as women. . . . To be a lady is to be a 
                                                 
44 Butch lesbians who were visitors or prospective members of FEW were often known by staff members and were 
not miscategorized as men. I neither observed nor heard stories of staff misrecognizing butch lesbians as men. 
Because most members came from poor or working-class backgrounds, they dressed more casually than black men 
who were employed by other NGOs and dressed well or men of different races who wore uniforms that indicated 
their business affiliations (telephone repairpersons). This difference in dress might have also distinguished FEW 
members from black heterosexual or gay male visitors. 
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gay and to be gay is to be socially effeminate and sexually passive” (Reid 2005:213). Even 
though “ladies” might suffer the similar stigmatization that black lesbians did, FEW excluded 
black gay men. A FEW member attributed the strategic choice of excluding gay men from events 
to the director who “for one doesn’t like gay men. Every time we have an event and gay men are 
here, she just tells them, you know, ‘This is a lesbian organization.’ . . . But we work with the 
LGBTI [community], but mainly it’s the L that we’re interested in” (Interview, 8 March 2006).45 
In the case of the workshop, the director worried that the presence of men would undermine an 
ethos of honesty and disclosure she hoped to instill there. She insinuated that men, no matter 
their sexual orientation, would disrupt the proceedings. She also claimed, “I don’t know what 
their [gay men’s] issues are,” suggesting that a gulf separated black lesbian issues from those of 
black gay men.  
Even though black gay men, especially those whose gender nonconformity was most 
visible, experienced violence and discrimination because of their perceived sexual and gender 
transgression like many black lesbian women, creating a woman-only space trumped LGBT 
individuals’ common experience of violence. In this way, the organization actively emphasized 
the bonds of gender within the organization. Including gay men in events might have alienated 
black lesbian members because they might have perceived black gay men as men before they 
viewed them as similarly vulnerable based on their gender and sexual nonconformity. FEW’s 
approach diverged from that a Pretoria-based SMO, which addressed the risk of black lesbians 
and gay men “in under-resourced contexts” of being raped together in its booklet explaining how 
sexual minorities can survive rape (ILGA 2006b:14). Instead, FEW treated black lesbians’ 
vulnerability more specifically by encouraging members to identify how indigenous South 
African cultures required women to be passive and to challenge this cultural norm by becoming 
assertive. As a result, FEW offered services specifically to help black lesbians to become more 
assertive. FEW’s communication, computer training, and photography classes and counseling 
services and the director’s grooming of staff members all boosted members’ self-esteem in all-
                                                 
45 Though FEW did not provide services for or represent black gay men, the SMO did participate in advocating for 
the South African National Blood Service (SANBS) to rescind its ban on blood donations from gay men on the 
grounds that “even though the issue ‘doesn’t affect us as lesbians,’ according to FEW’s director, FEW needs to 
support the LGBTI sector and fight discrimination wherever the organization finds it. FEW must stand with ‘our gay 
brothers.’ The director explained that an obstacle was proving that the ban was unconstitutional because ‘donating 
blood is not a right; it’s a privilege’. . . . The director stated that the organization supported the Joint Working 
Group’s [a national group of South African LGBT SMOs] position that the gay blood ban is discriminatory and that 
she’d represent FEW at upcoming meetings with SANBS on the issue” (Fieldnotes, 13 February 2006). 
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female environments. The presence of gay men likely would have dampened the camaraderie 
and support I witnessed, for instance, during a self-defense training for staff members. As staff 
self-consciously practiced self-defense moves, some hesitated to engage in a show of force or 
hostility. To energize reluctant staff members and focus them on practicing self-defense tactics 
on a male instructor wearing full-body padding, some shouted phrases, such as “Kick him hard 
in the groin!” Had FEW invited gay men to participate in the self-defense training, many staff 
members might have felt intimidated by them and not practiced what they had learned. 
Sponsoring self-defense training workshops and distributing pamphlets that “advise 
lesbians on the best ways to prevent themselves from being seriously injured” were also ways 
that FEW tried to instill spatial monitoring in members (Mufweba 2003). Such spatial 
monitoring was a crucial means of reducing the unpredictability of new, mixed-gender 
environments for members and staff. For example, community representatives were careful 
about their personal safety when visiting unfamiliar townships. They normally made 
appointments with gatekeepers and did not wear T-shirts that identified them as members of 
FEW. Several current and prospective members usually met the community representative when 
she arrived in the township, substantiating the adage that there is safety in numbers.46 FEW also 
encouraged members to engage in similar behavior. As FEW staff intended for the anti-violence 
training in Mohlakeng to result in participants duplicating safe spaces outside the workshop, 
FEW staff recommended that members monitor their behavior and surroundings. One staff 
member stated, “We can’t expect to be lovey-dovey in a heterosexual tavern . . . [Men think] 
‘they’re [lesbians] on each other, and we can’t put our thing [penis] there,’” which aggravated 
men because lesbians were sexually off-limits and made other women sexually unavailable to 
them. FEW’s director summarized that even though black lesbians lived in a country where 
LGBT persons had the same rights as heterosexuals, public same-gender sexual behavior was not 
tolerated: “We can do this [engage in sexual behavior] in a safe space—not in a taxi or at the 
Bree or Noord taxi rank [a hub for taxis to townships].” Being aware of the gendered 
composition of space was another strategy that FEW staff tried to inculcate in members. In a 
                                                 
46 When shadowing a community representative, I became concerned that my presence as a white woman on one 
such visit would compromise her safety, and I volunteered not to go. I did not want to draw unnecessary attention to 
the community representative because it was uncommon in this more remote township to see a black woman and 
white woman on foot together. However, the community representative assured me that my presence would not 
endanger members, and I resumed my observation of her recruitment efforts. 
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disturbing tale of violence, a member recounted how a heterosexual female friend of hers 
participated in setting up her rape served as a sobering reminder of being wary around others.47 
The director stressed that unless survivors and members knew exactly with whom they were 
socializing, it might be better to socialize only with black lesbians, further reinforcing the safety 
of homogeneous spaces.  
FEW initiated a series of strategic choices about how to constitute and monitor the 
organization’s physical spaces that coincided with its exclusionary choices about its 
constituency. These decisions about whom FEW classified as members affected members’ 
access to its services. In addition, these decisions also alienated some members who did not meet 
the detailed membership criteria. Together, these exclusionary choices about membership 
strengthened the organization’s insularity and homogeneity. 
4.2.2 The Dilemma of Membership 
A second major strategic dilemma that FEW faced concerned how to delineate its 
membership. FEW wanted to control who could access the organization, yet many potential 
members did not necessarily identify either as women or as lesbians, forcing the organization to 
confront how to recognize gender nonconformity. FEW defined its goal of stopping hate crimes 
against black lesbians within a larger framework of redressing inequalities that stemmed from 
apartheid. Poor, working-class, and jobless black lesbians who had survived hate crimes 
constituted an extremely marginalized group in a nation where blacks were denied access to 
decent education and jobs and subject to state violence (Mamdani 1996). Such violence was 
magnified in urban townships marked by violence, frustration, and an uncertain sense of the 
future. Poor, undereducated, and unemployed black lesbians who could not escape unpredictable 
township life sometimes became victims of violence (Moothoo-Padayachie 2004; Muholi 2004). 
                                                 
47 Staff approved my presence at the anti-violence workshop, but while I was there, a staff member asked me not to 
observe the small groups in which workshop attendees revealed sometimes harrowing stories of surviving violence. 
The staff member worried that my presence as an outsider (a white American female researcher) would inhibit the 
ethos of openness that staff hoped to instill in the working groups; I complied with her request. After the small 
groups concluded their discussion, a representative from each small group was tasked with summarizing, in broad 
strokes, the type of violence and harassment that attendees had experienced. However, some attendees narrated in 
detail stories of violence. The attendee who narrated her cautionary tale of how a heterosexual female friend set up 
her rape seemed to have little difficulty repeating her story in front of the larger group (and me), and I use it here as 
evidence because she intended the story to teach her peers about how to keep themselves safe. 
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FEW decided to work exclusively with poor or working-class black lesbian women in 
Johannesburg and the surrounding townships in part because the LGBT movement had not 
addressed their needs specifically. In keeping with an overall strategy of homogeneity and 
insularity, FEW decided to limit who could become members of the SMO. Prospective and 
current members were subject to a series of exclusions on the basis of race, gender, class, and 
sexuality and whether they were survivors of hate crimes.  
Community representatives primarily enforced membership exclusions because they were 
best suited to do so. FEW’s leaders did not live in townships and earned a decent income because 
of their paid positions at the SMO; though, as black lesbians, they felt at risk for violence, their 
experiences did not mirror those of prospective members as closely as those of community 
representatives. Community representatives hailed from townships and identified as black 
lesbians, and before joining FEW, they had little prior job experience, if any. Some community 
representatives had survived being raped or beaten because of their sexuality and could 
empathize with prospective members in similar situations. Thus, they embodied the members 
they were trying to recruit.  
To ensure membership exclusivity, prospective members filled out questionnaires that 
community representatives brought on their recruitment trips to townships. Questionnaires 
included questions about their sexuality, gender, class, race, and hate crime survivor status. To 
make members feel safe in the SMO’s spaces, FEW excluded all biological males, regardless of 
their sexual orientation. FEW recruited only self-identified women or lesbians as members 
because many members were survivors of rape and violence.48 FEW allowed only women 
without jobs or a secondary school diploma to enroll in the skills training it offered; however, 
women with diplomas and jobs could still participate in events and use the organization’s library. 
Women who had survived hate crimes had the greatest access to all of the organization’s services 
and spaces. Safeguarding the homogeneity of its membership enabled the organization to focus 
narrowly on increasing the public visibility of black lesbians as a social group and fighting hate 
                                                 
48 In discussions and interviews I had with staff and members about why hate crimes occurred, I got the impression 
that perpretators were often nonwhite. Survivors and FEW staff and members attributed the prevalence of hate 
crimes against black lesbians to intolerance within indigenous African communities and cultures. They did not 
address a possible racial component to hate crimes against black lesbians, but in a country where white-on-black 
hate crimes are persisting social problems, this might be a parameter of violence that FEW has not measured yet. 
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crimes against them and to allow members to share their painful narratives of violence in an 
effort to cement a black lesbian collective identity.  
FEW intentionally recruited black lesbians only, but defining what it meant to be a black 
lesbian emerged as a dilemma for the organization when members were not sure how to identify 
in terms of their gender or sexual identity.49 During a visit I made to Tembisa with a community 
representative, a township one-half hour east of Johannesburg, a prospective member hesitated in 
naming her gender and sexual orientation for a community representative. Unsure of her gender 
and sexual identity, she asked the representative, “Am I a man or a lesbian?” (Fieldnotes, 13 
February 2006). Such sexual and gender identity “confusion” was not uncommon among black 
lesbians whom FEW recruited, because those who recognized themselves as gay or lesbian might 
be commonly known as “istabane,” a person whose body was “not strictly male or female” 
(Swarr 2003:196, emphasis original). Because anatomical sex and socially constructed sex, 
gender, and sexual identity categories did not map neatly on to one another, such slippages 
sometimes erupted as identity incongruence, an unsettling idea for some conservative South 
Africans and a potential dilemma for an organization built around stable notions of gender and 
sexuality. A FEW staff member described how some black lesbians believe they were 
heterosexual men before coming into contact with FEW.  
[S]ome . . . will think that they are straight [men] at this point. They don't really 
know. Maybe they’ve got this feeling to gravitate to another woman, but they 
don’t know what to do with that.  I mean, according to the community that we are 
around, . . . it’s wrong to feel like that and because of culture, because of the 
religion . . . I mean they don’t know what to do with how they feel (Interview, 17 
February 2006). 
Another member explained how the conflation of visible sexual and gender identity caused some 
black South Africans to assume that those who dressed like men and were in relationships with 
women identified as men.  
The public has a perception that lesbians are trying to change themselves to be 
men. . . .  The only difference between me and a straight person [sic] is that I love 
women; they love the opposite sex.  At the end of the day, behind this lesbian is a 
woman.  I wouldn’t change to be a man for anything.  They need to understand 
that we're lesbians because we love other women, not because I look butch that 
I’m trying to be a man (FEW member, interview, 16 March 2006). 
                                                 
49 For example, FEW did not block bisexual women from joining, but the SMO did not zealously recruit them. 
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Women-loving women unfamiliar with the black lesbian community also often referred to 
themselves as men. Staff extended membership to such members and encouraged them to enroll 
in sexual and gender identity workshops in which they learned “about lesbianism” (FEW staff 
member, interview, 8 March 2006). According to a FEW staff member, “I didn’t know anything 
[about being a lesbian]. I just thought I was just a tomboy. . . . I didn’t know the basics of being 
lesbian, but yes, they [FEW] told me” about what it meant to be a lesbian and how to protect 
herself (FEW staff member, interview, 8 March 2006). This strategic inclusion of prospective 
members who initially identified as men instead of as women and lesbians, before enrolling in 
any of FEW’s gender and sexual identity workshops, allowed FEW to mold the collective 
identities of members and to guarantee the homogeneity of individual sexual and gender 
identities. FEW still viewed anatomical females who identified as men, by virtue of their being 
in a relationship with a woman or attracted to women, as prospective members because for the 
organization, such recruits had not been exposed to information about gender and sexual 
identities. This decision enabled FEW to cast a wider membership net than if the SMO had 
restricted itself to recruiting only women who were sure they were lesbians and were familiar 
with “lesbian” as a sexual identity category. 
These membership exclusions contributed to the creation of safe spaces for poor black 
lesbian women, insulating them from class differences that might have proven to be potentially 
divisive. FEW strategically recruited women who originated from similar backgrounds to create 
a distinctive, mobilizable, and homogeneous collective identity that addressed extreme 
disadvantage. Exclusionary strategic choices thus were acceptable, but only if they were 
performed “by a minority group or one whose oppression ranks higher on the totem pole of pain. 
Thus a whites-only group is unacceptable, but a blacks-only one is not. A gay-but-not-
transgender group is offensive, but a transgender-only one makes perfect sense” (Wilchins 
2004:148). For FEW, race, gender, class, sexuality, and hate crime survivor status were signifiers 
of disadvantage against which it worked in its efforts to empower black lesbians to become 
women who could overcome oppression. Interestingly, FEW did not politicize a black racial 
identity in its construction of a lesbian collective identity, though blackness had been a 
mobilizable force within South African townships, a legacy from antiapartheid organizing 
(Bozzoli 2004; Hirschmann 1990). For instance, FEW did not reclaim or revalorize blackness as 
a category of worth and celebration (Springer 2005). Instead, FEW coded race (black) and class 
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(working poor) to signify disadvantage. The conflation of these indicators of disadvantage 
insulated FEW’s safe spaces and members.50
In spite of FEW’s success in achieving homogeneity in members’ class, gender, sexual, 
and hate crimes survivor status, membership exclusions around race and ethnicity proved 
discordant for some members. FEW excluded South Africans of white, Asian, or coloured 
descent. Under apartheid, black South Africans found themselves continually disenfranchised, 
whereas “Coloured and Asian Indian groups” were “grant[ed] specific rights of self-rule and 
government in townships and parliament” in 1983 and 1984 (Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 
2003:30). FEW prioritized working exclusively with and on behalf of one of the most 
disempowered and disenfranchised groups in post-apartheid South Africa, even though it 
alienated some members. A member explained how the director refused to hire her because she 
identified as coloured, even though she was qualified for the post. 
When they took me in at FEW, they knew I was coloured. . . . When I went to 
apply for a job at FEW, a lot of people said to me, “You've got a lot of potential.” 
. . .  And then she [FEW’s director] said to me, “I'm first going to give preference 
to black people because it's a black organization.” And then I said, “Well, I'm 
black; my skin is black.” And then she said to me, “No, but you're coloured; that 
is the race that you come from.” And she said she was going to give coloureds last 
preference. . . . I see myself, identify myself as a black woman. . . I'm also from a 
poverty-stricken community and family. . . . I also come from a disadvantaged 
community (FEW member, Interview, 9 February 2006). 
This member’s disgruntlement originated from the director’s narrow interpretation of her racial 
identity within a post-apartheid framework. In her zeal to rectify the injustices that poor black 
South African lesbians suffered, the director ignored this member’s political racial identification 
and the rape she had survived. This coloured member understood her exclusion as another form 
of discrimination, although she was surprised that an SMO that represented her political and 
social interests would pass her over for a staff position. Except for her parentage, the member 
met all of the organization’s stringent membership requirements.51  
                                                 
50 To date, South African LGBT SMOs have not openly derided FEW’s exclusionary choices about its membership. 
51 FEW’s membership exclusions also extended to researchers. For several months, FEW declined to grant me 
research access, until staff and members of Behind the Mask (BTM), where I was already conducting research, 
vouched for me, and until I had submitted two sets of my research proposal and met with staff members three times 
to discuss the boundaries of my proposed ethnographic observation. Once I received research permission, I attended 
all meetings and events held at the office and in townships, with the exception of counseling sessions and staff 
meetings at which personal matters were discussed. However, the chairperson of FEW’s executive board was a 
white lesbian and had important connections within the South African LGBT and feminist movements that FEW 
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Some members remained immune to and incognizant of the membership exclusions that 
FEW exercised. The SMOs’ positive messages of empowerment promoted homogeneity that 
masked its exclusionary strategic choices. According to one FEW staff member,  
At FEW, they don’t look who you are. They don’t look at the face or your 
appearance or anything. They just like the soul behind the appearance, and at 
FEW, there’s no discrimination.  There’s no black or white . . . there’s no better or 
bad, there’s no ugly or beautiful. It’s all about sisterhood and womanhood. And 
whenever you are sitting in that room, you look at the person sitting next to you, 
[and] you feel that you’re all the same because in a different way you’ve been 
through the same experiences. So looking at the person next to you, you see the 
reflection of yourself (Interview, 14 February 2006). 
It is notable that this staff member claimed that members’ appearances or self-identifications 
were not important. In fact, it was just the opposite. FEW exercised exclusionary strategic 
choices swiftly and successively as soon as new individuals accessed the organization; members 
of FEW did not witness these exclusionary choices in the open because community 
representatives and staff members enacted them as embedded bureaucratic decisions, such as 
when staff decided at meetings which members to enroll in their communication, computer, and 
photography skills courses based on the answers members provided on their membership 
questionnaires. Thus, the lack of mention of difference within the organization was in keeping 
with FEW’s insularity and homogeneity. This FEW staff member likely had not observed any 
discrimination because staff ensured the homogeneity of the organization’s space. In this way, 
FEW enforced and monitored group boundaries over time, sedimenting a black lesbian collective 
identity (Springer 2005; Whittier 1995). Monitoring the group’s boundaries through membership 
exclusion was one means by which FEW created alternative cultural and political safe spaces for 
members. It made sense that the staff member did not distinguish between black and white 
sexual identities because FEW did not practice or rehash this distinction in organizational spaces. 
Instead, the organization implemented these exclusions beyond the scope of staff and members’ 
perception.  
                                                                                                                                                             
could use to its advantage. This may indicate a trend that in the future, FEW might make exceptions to its 
exclusionary practices if they did not endanger, but rather, advanced the SMO’s goals. 
  104
4.2.3 The Dilemma of Protest 
FEW also confronted the thorny dilemma of whether to participate publicly in protests as 
proud black lesbians or to protect the safety of members and the organization’s reputation. 
Underscoring this dilemma was the commonality of violence that characterized apartheid and 
post-apartheid South Africa. FEW’s director aptly captured how South Africans had become 
inured to violence when, at an anti-violence training workshop, she remarked all South Africans 
“should be in therapy [because of apartheid]. . . . We’ve grown accustomed to violence, and we 
do nothing about it. We should have a problem with violence being perpetrated against us” 
(Fieldnotes, 13 April 2006). Though FEW had a goal of eradicating violence, the SMO tried to 
avoid it. This dilemma became evident in two public protests in which FEW participated. In 
September 2005, FEW mobilized 150 black lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
persons to march in the first Black LGBT Pride parade in Soweto. A FEW staff member thought 
that the high number of attendees likely quelled any potential counter-movement activity or 
violence (FEW member, interview, 16 March 2006). However, an even larger number of LGBT 
persons and supporters could not prevent an isolated violent episode a few days later at the 
Johannesburg LGBT Pride parade. A member on FEW’s float was severely wounded when a 
broken bottle volleyed from the crowd struck and lacerated her neck. A nurse practitioner, the 
partner of a FEW staff member, rushed to the woman’s aid; the member survived this seemingly 
random act, but FEW interpreted it as a specific attack against black lesbians. Within the span of 
a few days, SMO staff and members experienced exhilaration at marching unimpeded through 
Soweto for the first time as part of a black LGBT contingent and then devastation when one of 
their own was injured. These varied experiences exemplify how FEW operated within and 
negotiated tumultuous public spaces. The salience of violence influenced how, when, and why 
the SMO engaged in public protest by selectively participating in public protests. 
The organization marshaled its intolerance for violence into judiciously joining public 
protests. From February to May 2006, FEW staff and members participated in protests 
denouncing violence against and the rape of South African women, regardless of their race, 
class, or sexual orientation at former Deputy Vice-President Jacob Zuma’s rape trial. A black 
female HIV-positive activist and family friend in her thirties accused Zuma of raping her while 
she was staying at his Johannesburg home in November 2005. The trial received much media 
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attention because just a few months before his arrest for rape, Zuma had been dismissed from his 
executive post amid a corruption scandal. In the ensuing media frenzy, issues of how 
commonplace the rape of and violence against women were in South Africa were juxtaposed 
next to sexism and misinformation about HIV transmission.52 Zuma’s defense claimed that the 
sex was consensual, an assertion with which the prosecution disagreed because the rape survivor, 
a Zulu woman, regarded Zuma as a father figure and not as a potential sexual partner; the rape 
survivor even identified herself as a lesbian to demonstrate that she was further disinclined to 
have chosen Zuma as a sexual partner (“Zuma Found Not Guilty” 2006). Zuma cited Zulu 
culture in his defense, even testifying in spoken Zulu, and claimed that the garment the survivor 
was wearing at the time constituted a request to have sex53; not to honor her “supposed” request 
would have amounted to rape according to Zuma’s interpretation of Zulu customs. The 
prosecution stated that Zuma entered the guest room where the survivor was sleeping with the 
intention of raping her. The defense refuted this version of events and also tried to discredit the 
survivor by casting her as someone who, in the past, had falsely accused other men of rape in her 
effort to gain attention. During and after the trial, Zuma maintained that the survivor accused him 
of rape as part of a wider political conspiracy that his enemies within the African National 
Congress had hatched as an attempt to derail his presidential candidacy (Evans and Wolmarans 
2006).  
Zuma’s rape trial served as a rallying call for different social movements—including 
feminist and HIV/AIDS activists—to come together to fight violence against women. On the first 
day of the Zuma trial in February 2006, several dozen “gender activists”—the South African 
media’s characterization of the anti-violence-against-women activists—protested the high rates 
of violence against women in South Africa and called for justice for all female survivors of 
violence. Hundreds of pro-Zuma activists, many of them Zulu like Zuma, demonized the rape 
survivor and gender activists with chants and signs, some of which read “Burn the Bitch,” 
referring to the rape survivor, and one even lit a picture of the survivor on fire. In contrast with 
                                                 
52 Zuma’s defense outraged HIV/AIDS activists, who participated in the protests. In his characterization of the rape 
as consensual sex, he claimed he did not use a condom. He stated that he showered after having sex with the HIV-
positive survivor—herself an HIV/AIDS activist—as a precaution against HIV transmission. Activists accused 
Zuma of setting back HIV education a decade. 
53 The survivor was wearing a kanga, a knee-length piece of fabric fashioned to cover a woman’s torso and tied 
above one’s breasts, which Zulu women often wore in the privacy of their rooms or homes. As was customary with 
the kanga, the survivor was not wearing undergarments, which Zuma interpreted as part of her supposed invitation 
to have sex. 
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pro-Zuma supporters’ anti-feminist displays, feminist activists focused on the rape charge itself 
as a manifestation of violence against South African women, the vilification of the survivor by 
Zuma supporters, and the judicial system’s unfair treatment of female rape survivors, 
exemplified by the trial judge’s ruling to allow the defense team to portray the survivor as 
someone with a history of making false rape allegations to get attention.  
FEW’s initial choice to participate in the protest as part of the gender activist contingent 
illustrates how the strategic choice about whether or not to participate in public protest can 
unfold for SMOs. The environment outside the Johannesburg High Court, which is situated in 
the downtown commercial business district, was tense on the first time that seven FEW staff and 
members attended the protest, which was the second day of the gender activists’ protest and of 
the trial. After consulting with FEW’s media and outreach officer who attended the protest on the 
previous day, staff and members carried a folded banner with the organization’s logo in a bag. 
They were careful not to be too conspicuous on the walk from FEW’s Hillbrow office to the 
High Court, a route that took them past the Park Station bus and train terminal and through a 
throng of street hawkers. Drawing attention to their sexual nonconformity on this well-trafficked 
route was undesirable for FEW staff. Underneath plain T-shirts and jackets, they wore FEW T-
shirts with catchy slogans such as “Hate Won’t Make Me Straight,” “Get It Straight, I Can’t Be 
Fixed,” and “The Rose Has Thorns,” the slogan from the organization’s anti-rape campaign. 
Once they arrived in front of the courthouse, FEW staff ducked under police cordons and melted 
into the crowd of pro-Zuma supporters who were toyi-toyi-ing.54 FEW staff looked no different 
than pro-Zuma supporters, apart from their lack of Zulu nationalist symbols such as the soon-to-
be-ubiquitous T-shirt “100% Zulu Boy,” a reference to Zuma’s adherence to Zulu customs 
(Moya 2006). They made their way through the crowd, trying to locate the gender activist 
contingent. FEW staff and members spent 15 minutes wandering through the crowd with no 
luck; they did not locate other feminist and HIV/AIDS activists. For twenty minutes, they 
discussed finding a place at the edge of the crowd to set up a protest, but all admitted to feeling 
uncomfortable and unsafe among pro-Zuma supporters. One FEW staff member who was there 
that day described her discomfort being outside the court amid Zuma’s supporters.  
                                                 
54 The toyi-toyi is a boisterous protest tactic composed of dancing and chanting reminiscent of militant antiapartheid 
protests predominantly attended by black South African youths (Bozzoli 2004; Seidman 2001). 
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It was very scary for us because the Zulu men and women were busy swearing at 
us, and we were so scared that if we just decided to leave that place, they would 
follow us. . . . They were busy swearing at us, and they had the sjambok [leather 
or plastic whip often used by the South African Police Service] in their hands and 
everything, and we got so scared. Anything could have happened in that space 
(Interview, 8 March 2006).  
This FEW member described her nervousness at the unpredictability of the protest and the 
likelihood that the Zulu pro-Zuma supporters would harass them as black lesbian activists. That 
pro-Zuma supporters and the police had sjamboks (nightsticks), a symbol of apartheid violence 
sometimes wielded indiscriminately by South African police, made FEW members nervous; the 
instrument could easily become a weapon of violence directed against them. The homophobia 
that some Zulu nationalists espoused underscored the potential violence and harassment that 
FEW members feared.55 As an LGBT student activist at a nearby university explained, 
Zulu culture is very masculine oriented, very patriarchal with very strict and clear 
definitions of what makes a man. Anything that deviates from that, which would 
include issues around sexual orientation, would then be taboo. . . . In terms of 
culture, you’d get arguments coming up like . . . if the family starts taking 
different forms, our culture will lose its vibrancy or . . . its moral fiber (Interview, 
5 December 2005). 
Because Zulu culture relied on strict patriarchal standards of conduct, Zulu pro-Zuma supporters 
likely would not have tolerated any counter-protestors, especially black lesbian protestors, in 
their midst. FEW staff and members did not want to provoke the animated crowd.  
After calling the FEW media and outreach officer who was not in attendance, staff and 
members decided against publicly protesting as members of FEW because they feared that the 
presence of black lesbian activists would aggravate the socially conservative Zulu crowd. They 
opted not to identify themselves as being with FEW or as lesbians by keeping their FEW T-shirts 
underneath jackets and shirts and the FEW banner folded. The strategic choice that FEW staff 
and members made kept them safe, they believed. Had staff donned their FEW T-shirts before 
venturing to the courthouse, they likely would not have entered the crowd of opponents. The 
decision to enter the crowd indicated that FEW staff lacked accurate information about the 
protest and did not understand how emotionally charged pro-Zuma activists were. Though FEW 
                                                 
55 FEW staff and members’ fears were well founded. In September 2006, Zuma spoke disparagingly of sexual 
minorities, as Parliament held public hearings about same-sex marriage leglislation (“Zuma Earns Wrath” 2006). 
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staff and members opted to remain publicly invisible on that day, a strategic decision that 
ensured their safety, they protested alongside gender activists on subsequent days. 
It is interesting that staff risked snaking through the multitude of opponents on the 
assumption that other gender activists were on the other side of the crowd. Making publicly 
identified gender activists pass through the crowd of the rowdy Zuma supporters to a separate 
protest area, which the police had cordoned off as the gender activist contingent area, would 
have amounted to intimidation on the part of police (see Earl 2003). Pro-Zuma protestors might 
have physically and verbally attacked gender activists if the police had not separated both groups 
with a barricade. The police continued this practice on subsequent protest days to keep pro-Zuma 
activists from assaulting gender activists. Instead, pro-Zuma activists hurled insults at gender 
activists behind the police lines and occasionally forced the police to push back their barricades 
to accommodate the swelling crowd of Zuma supporters.  
FEW’s regular participation in this protest widened the organization’s narrow vision to 
accommodate larger campaigns focused on eradicating violence against all women, instead of 
concentrating only on violence against black lesbians.56 FEW recruited members to attend and 
participate in the protests at the Zuma rape trial between February and May 2006. This did not 
conflict with community representatives’ ongoing recruitment of members because they 
simultaneously recruited new members while spreading the word about the protests; a feminist 
anti-violence SMO paid for some FEW members’ public transportation from Johannesburg 
townships. Participating in the protests also led FEW to join a larger national feminist anti-
violence campaign called the One in Nine Campaign, which referred to a statistic that only one 
in nine South African women filed rape charges with police. FEW staff envisioned the 
organization’s participation in this anti-violence campaign as a vehicle for publicizing and 
educating the general public about the rape of black lesbians as a South African social problem.  
Guided by an exclusionary orientation, FEW made a series of strategic choices about how 
to create and monitor safe spaces, who could join the organization, and whether and how to 
participate and present itself in public protest. These choices enabled FEW to become a place of 
                                                 
56 FEW never objected to the protests’ general focus on eliminating violence against all South African women, even 
though the rape survivor at the center of Zuma’s rape trial herself identified as a black lesbian as the trial unfolded 
(“Zuma Found Not Guilty” 2006). FEW and Zuma supporters interestingly did not utilize the rape survivor’s racial 
and sexual identities to advance their own goals. However, FEW engaged in public protest cautiously and in a way 
that protected staff and members. 
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comfort for members who widely regard the organization as “home.” In addition, its strategic 
choices reinforced the organization’s public collective identity as a black lesbian organization.  
4.3 SISTER NAMIBIA (NAMIBIA) 
As a feminist and sexual minority movement organization, Sister Namibia approached 
dilemmas of visibility guided by an inclusionary orientation. Launched in 1989 on the eve of 
independence, the feminist organization was poised to take advantage of the political 
opportunities that a newly democratizing country could offer. However, Sister Namibia’s radical 
feminist politics and anti-homophobic stance produced polarizing responses from state and South 
West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) leaders. Such official opposition and its radical 
feminist ethic prompted Sister Namibia to adopt an inclusionary orientation because members 
did not want the organization to be isolated as a political outcast. This principle is evident in the 
SMO’s description of itself as “an autonomous, non-governmental women’s human rights 
organisation that works toward a society liberated from patriarchal domination in which all 
people have equal rights and opportunities and live in peace, prosperity and dignity” (Sister 
Namibia 2003:2).  
Sister Namibia faced several dilemmas about visibility. The first two dilemmas involved 
constituencies: how to define its membership in a newly independent Namibia and whether, how, 
and why it should address lesbian issues in conjunction with feminist concerns. The second two 
dilemmas involved audiences: whether, how, and when it should respond to the state and ruling 
party’s antigay hostility and how to deal with Northern donors as an audience.  
4.3.1 The Dilemma of Membership 
How to define its membership was early strategic dilemma that Sister Namibia 
encountered. Based in Windhoek, Sister Namibia was launched in 1989 before Namibia formally 
declared independence from South Africa (Frank and !Khaxas 1996). As a feminist organization 
in a newly independent nation, Sister Namibia could have aligned itself with political party 
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interests, specifically with SWAPO, and recruited women along party lines; such an association 
would have facilitated Sister Namibia’s access to state officials and resources (Geisler 2004). 
The organization could also have fully embraced its radical feminist position and addressed the 
needs and inequalities that many Namibian women experienced, which did not necessarily 
correspond to political party interests (Hubbard and Solomon 1995:182). Whereas FEW strictly 
monitored membership and recruitment along race, sexuality, gender, class, and hate crime 
survivor status, Sister Namibia opted to frame its constituency broadly as consisting of all 
Namibian women and rejected the choice to hew to SWAPO’s mandate. In turn, this decision 
impacted the organization’s physical space and reputation as an inclusionary feminist 
organization. The SMO maintained a welcoming office in Windhoek, which helped the 
organization boost its local credibility by offering meeting space for different projects and 
campaigns. In this sense, Sister Namibia provided a safe, physical and ideological space for 
Namibian lesbian, bisexual, and heterosexual women to congregate. In addition, anyone could 
use the SMO’s resource center (library); while I observed the SMO’s activities, several men 
conducted gender-related research, much to the delight of staff members. Despite the SMO’s 
location on the northwestern corner of Windhoek, somewhat distant from the city’s bustling 
transport hub, visitors consistently walked up the steep driveway and past the Sister Namibia 
sign and rang the bell. After the receptionist buzzed them in through the security gate, they 
popped in and asked questions, read feminist theory or literature written by women, or conducted 
research for school projects or personal enlightenment.  
Amid the heightened emotions that accompanied the early years of Namibia’s 
independence, Sister Namibia reached out to women across the country to make gender equality 
a reality. The organization initially concentrated on publishing a magazine in 1989. The 
magazine introduced many Namibian readers to feminist concepts and issues, and writers and 
editors even included glossaries that defined terms unfamiliar to readers, such as feminism, 
bisexuality, and discrimination, and translated stories originally written in English into Afrikaans 
and Oshiwambo, the most widely spoken indigenous Namibian language. These ideas resonated 
particularly with a Sister Namibia staff member who described her initial acquaintance with the 
organization through the magazine.  
I started reading the Sister Namibia magazine because I always questioned gender 
roles, and I always questioned the role of woman in my culture, in my life, [and] 
in my family. And it never made sense to me. And so I came across this magazine 
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that explained all of these things that I had questions about, and nobody [in my 
family] could answer me (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 21 June 2006).   
For this staff member and other members like her, the magazine recruited them as members. For 
Sister Namibia, membership was a loose category, unlike for FEW. Sister Namibia wanted to 
reach as many Namibian women as possible and viewed itself and the feminist movement as 
benefiting from a more casual understanding of membership in order to enable as many women 
as possible to identify with the organization and to demand gender and sexual equality. This 
strategic definition reinforced the SMO’s image of itself as representing all Namibian women. 
As such, the magazine was a powerful recruitment tool and means of raising Namibian women’s 
expectations for equality in their lives.  
The magazine had a personal transformative effect on many Namibian women and girls, 
extending the organization’s reach beyond the capital city. The magazine’s circulation enabled 
the organization to substantiate its self-identity as a national organization and reach beyond 
Windhoek. In addition, the magazine allowed members the flexibility to raise more specific, 
central issues related to their goals for obtaining gender and sexual equality for all Namibian 
women. According to two longtime members of the organization, 
The SISTER collective and the magazine provide an important space in which we 
can develop our identity and creativity. Working together with other lesbians and 
supportive heterosexual women has brought us out of our social isolation and 
strengthened our sense of community. This has heightened our awareness of the 
need for political action on lesbian issues. Through the magazine we can share all 
this with our readers, and contribute towards the building of a new society based 
on new values (Frank and !Khaxas 1996:116). 
For these members, the magazine brought different women together and served as a rallying 
point for the organization and contributed to the growing awareness of publicly treating lesbian 
rights as women’s rights.  
4.3.2 The Dilemma of Being a Lesbian SMO 
Whether, how, and why to support lesbian rights and issues publicly constituted another 
strategic dilemma for Sister Namibia. It was one thing to demand that the state apologize for its 
antigay statements on the grounds that such intolerance was undemocratic. However, endorsing 
sexual and gender minority rights would mean that Sister Namibia was not just a feminist 
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organization, but also a lesbian organization. Sister Namibia decided to transform itself into an 
organization with a distinct ideological position and constituencies, which included lesbian and 
bisexual women. Through the issuing of press releases critical of state leaders’ antigay 
statements and its public stance in support of sexual minority rights, Sister Namibia identified 
ideologically with a budding sexual minority movement. The organization already had a 
structure in place—staff, office space, and the magazine—to facilitate its public profile as a 
lesbian organization. To remain updated on developing political issues, the SMO decided to hire 
an educational officer whose responsibilities included researching “issues that are not covered by 
the mainstream [media] such as backstreet abortions, women in the sex trade, and homosexuality 
in the various ethnic groups” (Sister Namibia meeting minutes, 19-21 February 1996). The 
organization thus mainstreamed homosexuality as a feminist concern. 
Sister Namibia played a significant role in launching The Rainbow Project (TRP), a 
LGBT rights SMO, and both organizations maintained close ties after TRP’s launch in 1997. 
Along with Sister Namibia’s denunciations of state and SWAPO officials’ homophobic remarks, 
this relationship bolstered its reputation as a lesbian organization. Sister Namibia did not have to 
support the launch of an LGBT SMO. In fact, it could have capitalized on its public reputation as 
a “lesbian organization” itself to launch and lead a sexual and gender minority rights 
movement.57 Sister Namibia backed TRP’s launch as an independent SMO because it did not 
want to relinquish its commitment to feminist goals over pursuing lesbian rights. This is evident 
in Sister Namibia’s avoidance of recruiting men as members or participants in their political 
campaigns, an indication of its dedication to promoting women’s and lesbian rights first and 
foremost, although men were welcome to visit and use the SMO’s library. Transforming its 
stigmatized public identity as a lesbian organization, Sister Namibia embraced its identity as a 
sexual minority SMO. For instance, scoffing at a foreign donor’s assumption that TRP was the 
only LGBT SMO in Namibia, Sister Namibia’s director claimed, “‘Sister Namibia is an LGBT 
organization in our own right.’ She cited Sister’s work in mainstreaming lesbian rights with 
women’s rights, the stories on lesbian issues in the magazine over the years, and the videos and 
books in the library” (Fieldnotes, 19 July 2006). 
                                                 
57 In a strange twist, TRP has consistently obtained funding since 1999-2000 and has not shown any signs of fiscal 
weakness. In contrast, Sister Namibia floundered financially during the period of my ethnographic observation, as I 
will explain later. 
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Sister Namibia’s outspoken views about lesbian rights transformed the organization into 
a safe space for many lesbian and bisexual Namibian women in the 1990s and 2000s. A staff 
member described how she discovered how the feminist organization welcomed Namibian 
lesbians even though Sister Namibia was not  
actually a lesbian organization, but Sister [wa]s providing a safe space for 
lesbians, even for gay people, because when I came in here, I also saw that there 
are books for gay men to read. . . . At that stage, Sister was situated in central 
town. . . . I felt very good for the first time when I go [sic] in there, and the 
coordinator at that time—she really make [sic] me feel welcome, and I felt that 
this is just the right place that I was looking for. And I have to say that through 
Sister, I am growing stronger and stronger to come out and to live my life [as a 
lesbian] (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 15 May 2006). 
Much like FEW, Sister Namibia provided Namibian lesbian and bisexual women with a space in 
which to meet and to discuss their sexuality safely. The organization also enabled these women 
to become political activists.  
While Sister Namibia’s identity as a lesbian organization generated positive results for 
the organization and LGBT movement in Namibia, it also yielded negative consequences for the 
SMO’s feminist projects. In 1999, SWAPO and state leaders used Sister Namibia’s controversial 
reputation against the organization (Rothschild 2005). By controversial, a staff member 
explained,  
Sister is a cutting-edge controversial organization that will say things other people 
will not say. . . [W]hatever we say, somewhere the word lesbian will be in it. 
(laughter) But they just expect that from us now, and that what we say is 
challenging of the status quo.  So I think once you have that kind of image . . . of 
being a cutting-edge, controversial, sometimes off-the-map human rights 
organization that will speak things that nobody else will speak, but that need to be 
spoken—that will break silences. And I think Sister has the same kind of 
reputation. When Sister speaks, then the journalists will listen, and people will 
come. They want to know. They want to find out what's up (Sister Namibia staff 
member, interview, 23 May 2006). 
The state’s antipathy toward Sister Namibia was not a source of contention within the SMO, but 
rather was a source of validation and attracted other audiences, such as the media to the 
organization. The staff member’s comments exemplified how different audiences structured the 
collective identity of SMOs. “It isn’t just the SMO that has a stake in defining the group’s 
collective identity. So too do movement organizations, rival SMOs, law enforcement officials, 
and the media” (Friedman and McAdam 1992:166). However, by courting these different 
audiences, Sister Namibia’s controversial reputation made it vulnerable to attack by the state.  
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The state and SWAPO discredited Sister Namibia’s ambitious campaign to empower 
Namibian women politically. The organization’s Namibian Women’s Manifesto outlined the 
50/50 Campaign, which aimed to encourage voters to consider children’s and women’s issues 
when voting, to “mobilize women as 51 per cent of the electorate to actively participate in all 
aspects of the forthcoming elections,” to demand more women appointed to cabinet positions, 
and to ask political parties to create “zebra lists” that alternated women and men’s names on 
election lists (Sister Namibia 1999). Using the election as a political opportunity, Sister Namibia 
again catapulted to public prominence. However, the organization’s categorization of lesbian 
rights as women’s human rights proved to be divisive (Rothschild 2005). The SWAPO-affiliated 
Minister of Women Affairs, the SWAPO Women’s Council, and the University of Namibia’s 
Multidisciplinary Research Centre, which were all initial signatories to the Manifesto objected to 
the inclusion of lesbian rights in the demand for rights for marginalized women and girls, which 
read: “The human rights of all women, as guaranteed in the Namibian Constitution, need to be 
ensured, including the rights of the girl child, women living under customary law, women in 
marginalised ethnic groups, sex workers, disabled women, old women and lesbian women” 
(Sister Namibia 1999). A Sister Namibia staff member recalled the clamor that ensued after these 
main objectors withdrew their support for the Manifesto. She expressed her disappointment that 
groups interested in advancing women’s political representation and empowerment could not 
work together  
to give women training on becoming decision makers, to train them on politics, to 
train them on their rights. And then all of a sudden, the Minister of Women 
Affairs . . . withdraw [sic] just because of one sentence [about lesbian rights] in 
there. . . .They just think outside that Sister is a lesbian organization, and they 
look away from the other good work that Sister is actually doing as a women's 
organization. . . . I think they really don't look at what Sister is doing—the good 
work that Sister is doing (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 15 May 2006). 
The staff member attributed naysayers’ objection to the categorization of lesbian rights as 
women’s rights to homophobia and a narrow understanding of Sister Namibia’s work. The 
organization’s identity as representing lesbians and reputation as an entity that would not 
compromise on gender and sexual equality led to its double stigmatization as a controversial 
organization and as a lesbian organization. Additionally, a few of Sister Namibia’s leaders 
identified as lesbians. Because lesbian women led Sister Namibia (see chapter 5), the Minister of 
Women Affairs stated that Namibians should avoid the SMO because the leaders were 
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opportunists who “wanted to get married.” Sister Namibia’s director believed “her legal battle to 
obtain permanent residency as part of a ‘black and white lesbian couple’ who took the 
government [SWAPO] to court over holding their family together raged on while they were 
building the 50-50 Campaign” (Fieldnotes, 13 June 2006). Staff speculated that these 
occurrences contributed to the state’s ostracism of Sister Namibia and its political work. Sister 
Namibia still did not budge from its position that sexual minority rights deserved attention 
alongside women’s rights.  
The strategy of selecting and reaching out to diverse audiences, such as opposition 
political parties, independent media, and human rights and pro-democracy organizations, 
allowed Sister Namibia to balance the narrowing strategic choices available to it in the Namibian 
sociopolitical environment. After the unveiling of the Manifesto, whenever the organization 
submitted a petition to Parliament about women’s or children’s rights, the Minister of Gender 
Equality and Child Welfare—formerly, the Minister of Women Affairs—quashed it simply 
because it came from Sister Namibia. However, it was hard for the Minister to ignore the SMO, 
according to the director, because “we’re too good at networking [with other NGOs]” 
(Fieldnotes, 27 April 2006). In spite of SWAPO’s rejection of the Manifesto, opposition parties 
were supportive and conducted their own events around increasing women’s political 
participation and representation. Independent media and NGOs also wooed Sister Namibia. 
Media support was unusual for most SMOs, which often pursued media attention with few 
results (Carroll and Ratner 1999).58 According to a staff member, the media initiated contact 
with Sister Namibia about the Manifesto and related events: “We stopped calling them; they 
started calling us” (Interview, 23 May 2006). Extensive, sympathetic coverage by independent 
media might have contributed to the reasons why SWAPO and the state spurned the Namibian 
Women’s Manifesto, 50/50 Campaign, and Sister Namibia (Hopwood 2006).  
Though diversifying its audiences as a strategy enabled Sister Namibia to broadcast its 
message and bypass state channels, these new audiences lacked resources that would help the 
SMO fund its daily operations. With its public reputation as a lesbian organization and 
                                                 
58 State-owned and –controlled media, such as the newspaper New Era and the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation, 
were under orders from the state not to give LGBT organizing favorable coverage. This ban prevented TRP from 
having a radio show on the independent Katutura Community Radio (KCR) a few years ago because KCR rented 
space in a state-owned office building, and the landlord threatened to evict KCR if TRP broadcast its show there. 
TRP succeeded in getting its own radio show when KCR moved to a privately owned building in Katutura township. 
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responsiveness to state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobia, Sister Namibia became a political 
pariah from the perspective of SWAPO and the state. The state’s hostility toward Sister Namibia 
resulted in no national funding for its efforts. 
4.3.3 The Dilemma of Responding to Hostile Audiences 
Whether and how to address state leaders’ antigay statements was another strategic 
dilemma Sister Namibia faced. Sister Namibia could have opted to respond when state leaders 
began to make antigay statements publicly in the mid-1990s and risk the wrath of state and 
SWAPO officials, or the organization could have remained silent and avoided provoking state 
and SWAPO officials’ ire. The organization decided to respond directly to leaders’ homophobic 
rhetoric, thus acquiring the public reputation of being a “lesbian” organization. This trend began 
in 1995 when it called on Deputy Lands, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation Minister Hadino 
Hishongwa and Finance Minister Helmut Angula to apologize for antigay remarks that the state-
operated newspaper New Era solicited from them. Hishongwa vilified homosexuality as foreign 
and in need of social and state control so that the state could eradicate it from Namibia. 
“Homosexuality is like cancer or AIDS and everything should be done to stop its spread in 
Namibia. . . . To him [Hishongwa], homosexuality is western, evil and destructive—and should 
be fought by an emerging society like Namibia” (Mwilima 1995). Hishongwa also rejected the 
notion that freedom fighters liberated Namibia so that sexual and gender minorities could have 
the ability to demand equal rights in the new democracy (Mwilima 1995). Setting in motion the 
organization’s strategy for responding decisively to homophobic remarks that SWAPO and state 
leaders made, Sister Namibia decided to send a press release to all major Namibian and 
Windhoek newspapers immediately. The SMO disputed the imputation that homosexuality was a 
disease with a cure, and instead, valorized same-gender sexual relationships as “alternative, life-
affirming physical, emotional and spiritual forms of love” (Sister Namibia 1995). The SMO also 
refuted the claim that homosexuality was unAfrican and un-Namibian by citing German 
anthropologist Kurt Falk’s (1998) findings that same-gender sexual relationships among 
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Namibian indigenous groups had long existed (Falk 1998; Sister Namibia 1995).59 Asserting that 
homosexual, lesbian, and gay identities would continue to be a permanent part of the Namibian 
sociopolitical landscape, Sister Namibia concluded the letter by wittily stating, “[F]ortunately for 
our two Ministers, homophobia (unlike lesbianism) can be cured!” (Sister Namibia 1995). As 
evidenced from Sister Namibia’s thorough rejoinder, the SMO established a pattern for 
responding to the state and SWAPO whenever an official spouted homophobic rhetoric, no 
matter what else the organization was doing. The organization also intended for its frequent 
appearances in the local and national media to reach the general public; by being logical and 
thorough in their rebuttals to officials’ homophobic rhetoric, members hoped that they would 
begin to persuade Namibians to tolerate sexual and gender diversity, albeit slowly.  
 Sister Namibia’s politicized identity as a “lesbian” organization solidified when the 
organization called on then-President Sam Nujoma to apologize for antigay remarks he made at 
the SWAPO Women’s Council Congress in Gobabis in early December 1996.60 The 
organization swiftly issued a press release, which highlighted the state’s “firmly entrenched 
democracy” and argued that leaders could not rule on issues of morality. Citing urgency in 
fighting “hate speech,” Sister Namibia warned that   
Today it is homosexuals and foreigners who are being labeled and 
threatened, tomorrow it may be trade unionists, unemployed PLAN [national 
liberation struggle] fighters, women, members of specific ethnic groups or 
political parties, people with disabilities, religious groups or others. 
We . . . urge him [Nujoma] to follow the example set by President Nelson 
Mandela of South Africa, who strongly supported the inclusion of gay and lesbian 
rights to freedom from harassment in the South African constitution which he 
signed into power last week (Sister Namibia press release, 17 December 1996). 
Sister Namibia issued a call for tolerance based on a principle of democratic inclusion and 
eradication of racial injustice left over from apartheid. Heralding former President Nelson 
                                                 
59 It is interesting that Sister Namibia cited a German anthropologist in their defense of homosexuality as a 
Namibian tradition. Kurt Falk conducted his research at the height of German colonialism. Antigay proponents 
could have rejected Falk’s research out of hand because anthropologists in the early twentieth century often 
produced knowledge to generate knowledge about and extract information from indigenous communities so that 
colonialists could subjugate them more efficiently (Bleys 1995). Sister Namibia risked the SMO’s reputation by 
siding with a German anthropologist over the Namibian state, but favored citing research in support of their position 
that homosexuality was African, even if the anthropologist was a German national and had conducted his research at 
the height of German colonialism in Namibia. In this sense, Sister Namibia was trying to make the point that 
homosexuality and Namibian national identity need not be antithetical, but the SMO did (unknowingly) open itself 
to attack. 
60 The SWAPO Women’s Council functioned as the women’s arm of the national-liberation-struggle-cum-ruling-
political-party (Becker 1995). 
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Mandela’s embrace of sexual minority rights in South Africa was an especially important 
strategy for Sister Namibia, given that SWAPO claimed to have democratized and decolonized 
Namibia fully. SWAPO’s version of democratization and decolonization differed from that 
pursued by the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, according to Sister Namibia, 
which questioned SWAPO’s authority and legitimacy by bringing up the example of the ANC. 
SWAPO’s legitimacy rested “on the claim of the liberation [movement] being representative of 
the majority of the people,” and SWAPO defined the majority as being heterosexual and 
traditional, which could be interpreted as SWAPO’s intention to protect indigenous customs 
(Melber 2003:144). Democratization for SWAPO meant consolidating power; instead of 
extending rights to all Namibians, SWAPO-affiliated elected officials discriminated against 
Namibian sexual minorities. Concerned that SWAPO and state leaders’ homophobic statements 
indicated a growing authoritarian streak in Nujoma’s administration, human rights SMOs—
specifically, the National Society for Human Rights and Legal Assistance Centre—joined Sister 
Namibia and The Rainbow Project, a newly formed LGBT social movement organization, in 
demanding that Nujoma and his peers retract and apologize for their remarks. The support of 
these organizations buttressed Sister Namibia’s position in civil society and prevented the state 
from singling the organization out for repression at that time. 
Sister Namibia did not have to engage the state so directly and expose itself to 
vulnerability. However, ignoring state and SWAPO leaders’ antigay rhetoric would have granted 
them carte blanche to harass and scapegoat sexual and gender minorities. The state and SWAPO 
likely would have interpreted widespread silence on its antigay position as validation. Not 
responding would have dishonored lesbians who were members of Sister Namibia and 
undermined the SMO’s feminist commitment to “work[ing] toward a society liberated from 
patriarchal domination in which all people have equal rights and opportunities and live in peace, 
prosperity and dignity” (Sister Namibia 2003:2). 
With this press release and subsequent ones, Sister Namibia emerged as a fierce critic of 
the SWAPO-led state’s persecution of sexual minorities and democratization efforts. SWAPO-
affiliated state officials correspondingly treated Sister Namibia as a scapegoat because the party 
maintained “a highly unreceptive attitude towards criticism, especially when it is articulated 
within a public discourse. Non-conformity is associated with disloyalty if not betrayal” (Melber 
2003:144). Sister Namibia proved to be effective at manipulating frames to “win advantage with 
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authorities and the public” by connecting their criticisms of the state “discursively with larger 
cultural themes and values,” enabling the organization’s message to resonate with target 
audiences (Miceli 2005:295). However, Sister Namibia was careful to assert the African-ness 
and Namibian-ness of homosexuality as a means to ensure that the SMO was not discredited as a 
puppet of Northern countries and donors. In this way, the SMO had to ensure that its messages 
and strategies “were not so blatantly Western as to provide state authorities with a legitimate 
pretext to crack down on the movement” (Snow and Benford 1999:32).   
4.3.4 The Dilemma of International Donors 
How and where to obtain financial support for their efforts was another strategic dilemma 
Sister Namibia had to negotiate. Sister Namibia could have turned the magazine into a profitable 
enterprise, but this likely would have distracted the organization from its women’s rights 
campaign. Sister Namibia also could have looked beyond Namibia to the global North for 
financial support, but this might have put the organization at the mercy of donors that had 
“differing priorities” and worked at a “different pace” (Hubbard and Solomon 1995:183). The 
organization decided to seek financial support from donors in the global North. Ultimately, the 
strategic choice to cultivate international funding partially constrained Sister Namibia’s national 
activities, as foreign donors demanded that the organization implement bureaucratic measures 
that siphoned resources it could have otherwise used for lesbian rights and feminist projects.  
Sister Namibia’s strategy for responding immediately and precisely to antigay statements 
that state and SWAPO leaders issued garnered the organization an international reputation for 
being a sexual minority organization and human rights defender. In this way, the organization 
leveraged its accrued national visibility into material benefits and international acclaim. 1997 
marked the year in which Sister Namibia ascended to international prominence because it 
publicly countered SWAPO and state leaders’ homophobia and received the Felipa de Souza 
Award from the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (Frank 2000), which 
“recognizes the courage and activism of grassroots groups and individuals working for the 
fundamental human rights of all people” (http://www.iglhrc.org/site/iglhrc/section.php?id=76, 
accessed 2 May 2007). Combined with the Namibian state’s refusal to grant Sister Namibia 
funding, the organization’s national and international reputation facilitated the organization’s 
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application for funding from foreign donors. Favorable national and international attention 
enabled Sister Namibia to obtain funding from Hivos, a Dutch NGO donor, for its “sexuality 
research and education program” (Sister Namibia staff member, interview, 23 May 2006). 
Though its international reputation reaped more opportunities for the SMO to network with 
Northern donors, this choice devastated Sister Namibia. For most of 2005 and 2006, Sister 
Namibia’s director devoted herself to developing funding proposals to launch the Coalition of 
African Lesbians and to plan the new organization’s second annual meeting in Johannesburg. 
However, Sister Namibia suffered during this time financially because the director took on too 
many extra-organizational responsibilities related to launching the Coalition of African Lesbians 
and restarting Katutura Community Radio (KCR). The director did not apologize for these 
efforts. She almost single-handedly resurrected Katutura Community Radio, the first community 
radio station in Namibia, which was suspended because of financial mismanagement in 2004. 
The director also helped to fundraise for Coalition of African Lesbians because she believed it 
was important to establish a continental organization for African lesbians that could support 
struggling lesbian SMOs and publicize the situation of lesbians in different African countries.  
These smaller strategic choices that the director made diverted her attention away from 
fundraising with current and potential Northern donors, which jeopardized Sister Namibia’s 
financial situation. During the period in which I observed the SMO’s activities and meetings, 
Sister Namibia was on the verge of financial collapse. Until June 2006, the director was unable 
to finalize the year’s contracts with staff because she was waiting for a donor, which had 
approved funding for staff salaries just one month earlier, to deposit funds in the SMO’s bank 
account. The director encouraged staff to polish their skills and résumés because the SMO might 
have to close its doors until she could obtain funding to ensure its continued existence. As the 
SMO owned the building in which its office was located, the director even discussed renting 
Sister Namibia’s office space as meeting space to raise money, a sign of the organization 
deepening financial crisis. Citing how time-intensive the organizing and fundraising for CAL 
was, Sister Namibia’s board of trustees made the director promise that “she would not start a 
new organization for at least three years” (Fieldnotes, 6 July 2006) because they needed her to 
focus only on producing the magazine and locating dedicated funding for the organization, which 
proved to be difficult. 
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 Unable to obtain funding from Namibian or southern African sources, Sister Namibia 
was totally reliant on Northern donors. All the SMOs in my study obtained funding from 
Northern donors, an indication that the philanthropic sector in southern Africa was 
underdeveloped and that southern African governments did not view sexual and gender minority 
service provision as a priority. In a meeting with Norwegian and Tanzanian researchers in April 
2006, the director of Sister Namibia explained how Sister Namibia recently lost funding from 
two donors; one donor yanked development funding from Namibia altogether because the nation 
had ascended to middle-income country status in Africa. Donors might have believed that 
Namibia was becoming more self-sufficient, although they continued to earmark funds for 
HIV/AIDS relief and prevention efforts. This set in motion for Sister Namibia a self-reinforcing 
cycle of prioritizing Northern donors as the organization’s primary target audience, forcing the 
organization to assign lesser priority to its constituency: Namibian women and magazine readers. 
The organization published the magazine irregularly and stopped maintaining its relationship 
with the magazine’s vendors and distributors in 2005 and 2006, shrinking the magazine’s 
readership and subscriptions. Sister Namibia’s inability to sustain relationships with magazine 
distributors contributed to its invisibility with readers and members throughout the country, 
leading some readers, including some members of Parliament, to contact the organization and 
inquire why they had not received their magazine. 
 Donors also forced Sister Namibia to prioritize them as a primary target audience by 
insisting on drop-in visits, unexpected audits, and training meetings that Sister Namibia staff had 
to attend. Such siphoning of time made it increasingly difficult for the organization to follow up 
on the 50/50 Campaign or to initiate the next phase of its sexuality research and education 
program, which was to consist of a broad sexual rights political campaign. Sister Namibia was 
unable to sustain this sexual rights campaign because donors refused to fund staff salaries for 
personnel who could have performed specific tasks, which would have allowed the director to 
concentrate on supporting the organization’s longevity. Donors increasingly favored funding 
consultants to work on short-term projects. This prevented Sister Namibia from hiring additional 
staff to handle complicated and specialized tasks, such as acting as liaisons with the media, 
government, other human rights organizations, and other target audiences. Instead, as Sister 
Namibia’s budget shrank, the organization could not retain its public relations officer. During the 
period of my ethnographic observation, the organization hired a former public relations officer as 
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a consultant for three months who was responsible for producing a radio show, writing stories for 
the magazine, and meeting with target audiences when possible. The director handled all 
complicated content, edited the bimonthly magazine, fielded requests from donors, and oversaw 
the daily operations of the organization. The remaining staff members—a bookkeeper, 
receptionist, and delivery person—each performed tasks within a limited range. Though the 
director encouraged all staff members to expand their task repertoires by taking classes whenever 
possible and obtaining their driver’s licenses, staff members’ limited training and the SMO’s 
strained resources prevented staff members from taking on additional specialized responsibilities 
that would have alleviated the director’s burdensome workload. 
 Sister Namibia benefited materially from its national and international reputation through 
funding from Northern donors. However, as was the case with many development projects, 
donors expected that they would quickly become sustainable, permitting donors to direct funding 
to new projects. Frustrated by the bureaucratic entanglements with donors she had to navigate, 
Sister Namibia’s director claimed on several occasions as I observed the SMO that she had no 
time to find ways to make the organization sustainable. As donors reduced or withdrew funding, 
thus limiting Sister Namibia’s strategic choices for obtaining material support, the director had to 
scramble to locate new donors or to beg donors to reconsider their decisions, hence eking out the 
SMO’s existence month by month. 
Sister Namibia’s inclusionary orientation permitted it to make choices that preserved its 
existence in a hostile sociopolitical environment. Sister Namibia has been internationally 
recognized for its inclusion of lesbian rights as women’s rights. However, the organization made 
strategic choices that ultimately inhibited its ability to influence audiences, such as a national 
audience of readers of Sister Namibia, the state, Northern donors based outside of Namibia, and 
other human rights SMOs. 
4.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Amid political receptiveness to sexual and gender minority rights among state officials, 
the South African LGBT movement crystallized sufficiently in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
making “new kinds of . . . organizations thinkable and possible” (Armstrong 2002:198). The 
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specialization of other LGBT social movement organizations permitted FEW to cultivate a 
selective approach to its public visibility with different constituencies and audiences, namely by 
fostering an exclusionary orientation, in order to provide safe spaces for black lesbians away 
from everyday hostilities. In contrast, state antagonism toward sexual minority rights in Namibia 
in the 1990s forced Sister Namibia to favor an inclusionary principle that oriented its strategic 
choices.  
FEW carefully navigated dilemmas of organizational space, membership, and protest in 
its effort to maintain its safe spaces for black lesbian members. The organization’s safe spaces 
acted as stabilizing forces in members’ lives, in turn, boosting their self-confidence and 
solidifying their collective identity as black lesbians who were trying to eradicate intolerance and 
violence against women and sexual and gender minorities. Given South Africa’s complex 
apartheid history of exclusion through spatial monitoring and segregation (Reddy 2005), FEW’s 
preference for making exclusionary strategic choices is not surprising. Responding to the 
contemporary political and social legacy of intolerance and violence, FEW prioritized providing 
psychological, physical, and social stability for members through membership and spatial 
homogeneity, whom the organization trained to represent it at public protests. In this way, 
FEW’s exclusionary strategic choices attempted to improve the situation of its constituency of 
black lesbians and to bring black lesbians’ concerns to the attention of audiences, such as the 
media and general public.  
The Namibian state and ruling party produced an environment hostile to sexual and 
gender minority organizing, prompting Sister Namibia to adopt an inclusionary orientation to 
making strategic choices. Sister Namibia reached out to a general constituency and multiple 
audiences—more audiences than FEW. These audiences included opposition political parties, the 
media, the general public, and human rights and pro-democracy SMOs. Sister Namibia pushed 
its goals of women’s political empowerment and the equal treatment of lesbian rights as 
women’s rights with these audiences. Sister Namibia targeted Namibian women for recruitment 
through the publication of the magazine, the Namibian Women’s Manifesto, and 50/50 
Campaign. To sustain such broad-based work, the SMO opted to seek funding outside of 
Namibia because the state refused to consider Sister Namibia as a worthy recipient of state funds. 
Northern donors exacted a heavy price for their funding (Zald 1992), forcing Sister Namibia into 
a cycle of bureaucratic frustration. To keep receiving money from Northern donors, Sister 
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Namibia had to submit different financial reports and funding proposals to different donors, work 
that fell to the director. In this way, Northern donors dominated Sister Namibia as an audience in 
2005 and 2006, preventing the SMO from publishing the magazine regularly and disrupting the 
SMO’s connection to different audiences. The director’s commitment to launching the Coalition 
of African Lesbians and reviving the defunct Katutura Community Radio also inhibited the 
SMO’s ability to locate additional sources of Northern funding. 
The sociopolitical context in which social movement actors like SMOs make strategic 
choices matters. Certain choices are possible in a permissive sociopolitical context, but others 
can have serious, negative consequences for SMOs. SMOs involved in marginalized politics, 
such as sexual and gender minority organizing, already struggle against a deficit of invisibility. 
When they decide to emerge from their position of invisibility, certain choices may be off-limits. 
Future studies can ascertain how and whether the development of an exclusionary orientation is 
an indicator of the range of strategic choices possible to SMOs, whereas the development of an 
inclusionary orientation may suggest that strategic choices available to SMOs are quite limited.  
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5.0  HOW STRATEGIC CHOICES CAN MAKE SMOS MISS POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITIES 
What can organizational invisibility in moments of political opportunity reveal about 
social movement organizations, their strategic choices, and the sociopolitical environment in 
which they operate? Social movement organizations (SMOs) sometimes miss political 
opportunities due to the strategic choices they make (Sawyers and Meyer 1999). Political 
opportunities are institutional political openings in which activists, social movement 
organizations, and movement can advance their standing and/or goals and/or disseminate their 
messages to different audiences (Almeida 2003; Meyer and Minkoff 2004; Tilly 1978). There are 
different types of political opportunities that social movement organizations can miss that go 
beyond institutional politics; these include gendered, discursive, and cultural opportunities 
(Abdulhadi 1998; Borland 2004a; Ferree et al. 2002; Frank and McEneaney 1999; Koopmans 
2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; McAdam 1996; McCammon et al. 2001). Holly J. 
McCammon, Karen E. Campbell, Ellen M. Granberg, and Christine Mowery (2001) argue that 
political opportunities can be gendered; they contend that transformed attitudes about the roles 
women could play in politics and society at the turn of the twentieth century in the United States 
“increased the willingness of political decision-makers to support suffrage” (p. 51). Cultural 
opportunities are elements of a social movement organization’s sociopolitical environment that 
facilitate and constrain the ability of an organization to recruit and/or mobilize members and to 
communicate its goals in a compelling way to different audiences (Einwohner 1999:170-71). 
While potentially a subset of cultural opportunities, discursive opportunities are features of 
“public discourse that determine a message’s chances of diffusion in the public sphere,” and 
when a message does not resonate with the public, a social movement organization is more likely 
to miss the opportunity to publicize its goals (Koopmans and Olzak 2004:202). Missed 
opportunities then are “moments when mobilization is possible that activists do not, or for some 
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reason can not, use to their advantage” (Sawyers and Meyer 1999:189). Occurrences of missed 
political opportunities have analytic utility for scholars because they can signal movement 
decline, as in the case of women’s movement organizing in the United States in the 1980s 
(Sawyers and Meyer 1999). Scholars tend to interpret the invisibility of social movements or 
SMOs in expected political opportunities as a sign of a movement or organization in distress 
(Bagguley 2002; Sawyers and Meyer 1999:193; Taylor 1989).  
Missed opportunities may not always indicate movement denouement. Organizations may 
be invisible in moments of opportunity for several reasons. Social movement organizations may 
intentionally miss opportunities because internal problems demand their attention (Sawyers and 
Meyer 1999). Organizations may not “frame” political opportunities as such, instead letting them 
disappear (Gamson and Meyer 1996; Kowalchuk 2005; Kurzman 1996; Meyer and Minkoff 
2004; Suh 2001). Organizations may unintentionally miss opportunities. Organizations may 
classify opportunities as advantageous, but lack the resources to optimize them, forcing them to 
let opportunities drift away, perhaps never to encounter them again. Organizations may also miss 
opportunities at first, but seize them as time passes. In this way, they may temporarily seem 
submerged or invisible in a moment of opportunity. Or, depending on the nature of the 
opportunity, organizations may recognize the opportunity as an opportunity, but because it is an 
institutional feature, organizations may figure that they can secure the opportunity at another 
time. In other words, organizations may envision opportunities as coming around again. Shifts in 
the political opportunity structure or within a social movement may also cause organizations to 
miss opportunities because organizations may have to respond to such changes first before 
seizing an opportunity, if they do at all.  
I apply Jasper’s (2004, 2006) “strategic dilemma” approach to diagnosing missed 
opportunities to understand how some strategic choices preclude social movement organizations 
from taking advantage of a political opportunity. I examine how and why South African and 
Namibian social movement organizations missed two political opportunities with legal 
dimensions. First, using ethnographic and document data, I examine how South African LGBT 
social movement organizations made strategic choices regarding campaign involvement that led 
them to abandon—for a short time—the same-sex marriage campaign early in 2006. Second, 
using interview and document data, I explain how Namibian state repression (change in the 
political opportunity structure), attitudes, and perceived inequalities kept members of The 
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Rainbow Project from pursuing a political opportunity related to sexual and gender minority 
equality.  
5.1 SOUTH AFRICA: MISSED OPPORTUNITY? 
 Johannesburg-based LGBT social movement organizations’ interaction with the internal 
movement environment and the external sociopolitical environment affected how they mobilized 
around same-sex marriage. These interactions delayed social movement organizations’ 
involvement in the marriage equality campaign for a few months early in 2006. Below I describe 
the circumstances leading to and the immediate reaction of Johannesburg-based LGBT activists 
to the same-sex marriage ruling, focusing on social movement organizations’ roles in mobilizing 
around the ruling. Then I explore how LGBT social movement organizations reacted to the void 
left by the LGBT SMO responsible for legal lobbying and advocacy, leaving organizational staff 
wondering how and what they should do following the ruling. Finally, I demonstrate how LGBT 
social movement organizations navigated the dilemma of getting involved in the South African 
National Blood Service’s on blood donation from men who have sex with men, which diverted 
the organizations’ attention away from the same-sex ruling. 
5.1.1 Mobilizing around Marriage Equality 
The African National Congress’ (ANC) ascent to power in the transition from apartheid 
rule to a nonracial democracy in the early 1990s constituted a political opportunity for the South 
African LGBT movement (Cock 2003; Croucher 2002). In 1994, South African LGBT SMOs 
formed an umbrella organization, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality (the 
Coalition), to make the Equality Clause a permanent part of the Constitution (Oswin 2007:649-
51). Between 1994 and the present, the Coalition and its successor, the Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project (the Equality Project) pressured lawmakers to revise “eighteen pieces of legislation . . . to 
ensure equitable treatment of homosexuals,” including laws pertaining to “property, tax, estate, 
refugee, and labor-relations laws, as well as the public provision of such services as education, 
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health care, protection against domestic violence, and housing” (Oswin 2007:651). The 
Coalition-Equality Project also successfully deployed legal tactics to decriminalize sex between 
men (1998), extend immigration rights to foreign same-gender partners of South African 
nationals (1999), allow same-gender partners to access pension and insurance benefits together 
(1999), enable same-gender couples to adopt children together (2002), and permit same-gender 
couples to marry (2005) (Behind the Mask 1999; Dirsuweit 2006; Epprecht 2004; Goodman 
2001; Oswin 2007:651; SAPA 1999).61 These legal wins document how the movement 
embraced litigation as a viable tactic over almost a decade. Building on these legal wins, the 
Equality Project headed the drive to legalize same-sex marriage. 
In South Africa, marriage equality was the zenith of the LGBT movement’s legal 
campaign. The Lesbian and Gay Equality Project recruited a white lesbian couple to petition the 
Department of Home Affairs to recognize their marriage. In October 2002, the Pretoria High 
Court rejected their bid, arguing that lawyers had not contested the constitutionality of existing 
marriage law. Throughout the legal struggle, the Equality Project served as amicus curiae, or 
“friend of the court,” “making information and its expertise available to the court to put it in a 
better position to make a decision” (Smith 2002). In July 2004, five LGBT social movement 
organizations banded together with several same-gender couples and filed a case with the 
Pretoria High Court challenging the constitutionality of the marriage law (Somerville 2004).62 
The case finally came to the Constitutional Court in May 2005. Whenever cases were heard in 
Pretoria or Johannesburg, staff and activists from the Equality Project and the Forum for the 
Empowerment of Women (FEW) mobilized the LGBT community to show their support for the 
right for same-gender couples to marry publicly by participating in rallies outside the court or 
marches. On 1 December 2005, the Constitutional Court finally issued a ruling on the case. 
Justices ruled in favor of same-sex marriage and stipulated in the majority opinion that if 
Parliament did not equalize marriage legislation within one year, then on 1 December 2006, the 
                                                 
61 Teresa Dirsuweit (2006:330) attributes the Coalition’s transformation into the Equality Project to the 
“unsustainability” of inclusion. The Coalition had 80 member organizations at the height of its existence and could 
not cope with the “resource drain” of so many groups that needed funding and bureaucratic support, not all of which 
were SMOs or even LGBT in focus (Dirsuweit 2006:330). The Coalition dismantled its coalitional form and became 
a “‘network’ that will be the channel of communication for people on the street and will work at grass roots level to 
ensure that everyone will have access to the law reforms secured” by the Equality Project (“Change of Face” 
2000:10). 
62 These organizations included the Equality Project, the Triangle Project (Cape Town), the Durban Lesbian and 
Gay Community Health Centre (Durban), OUT LGBT Well-Being (Pretoria) and the Forum for the Empowerment 
of Women (FEW-Johannesburg). 
  129
gender-neutral words “or spouse” would be added to existing marriage laws, making it possible 
for same-gender couples to marry and register their relationships officially with the Department 
of Home Affairs.  
Many activists were hesitant about centralizing same-sex marriage as the unitary goal of 
the movement early in 2006 due to its rhetorical and practical limitations. Some Johannesburg-
based South African LGBT activists’ expressed ambivalence about pursuing same-sex marriage 
as a movement goal because it entailed assimilating into “rigid state-regulated heterosexual 
family models,” whereas gaining access to the “legal benefits and responsibilities that go along 
with marriage, from medical decision-making, to child support, to inheritance” was enticing for 
others (Adam 2004:272). Other activists worried that a focus on same-sex marriage would 
marginalize campaigns fighting violence against sexual minorities. For instance, in an interview 
after the ruling’s announcement, Behind the Mask’s director, though enthusiastic about the 
ruling, asserted that the state had not protected LGBT persons with hate crimes legislation or 
prevented black lesbians from being singled out for rape. In her opinion, though symbolic 
recognition of the equality between same-sex and heterosexual marriages might ignite the 
gradual acceptance of LGBT persons, it would not suddenly ameliorate the poverty or 
unpredictability in which many black sexual and gender minorities live.  
Very little fanfare in the LGBT community or movement accompanied the ruling because 
social movement organizations only learned about the hearing one day before the reading of the 
ruling on 1 December 2005. FEW was unable to arrange transport for black LGBT persons to 
come from townships to participate in a rally supporting same-sex marriage, as they had done at 
previous hearings. However, members of FEW and Behind the Mask staff wore T-shirts with 
slogans that supported same-sex marriage or identified them with either organization turned out 
for the ruling. After the hearing, activists streamed outside building housing the Constitutional 
Court and celebrated the ruling. Many reporters from South African mainstream newspapers and 
radio and TV stations descended on the crowd to obtain comments on the ruling.  
Activists dispersed after the ruling’s announcement. Unlike previous same-sex marriage 
court cases, there was no public protest or sustained gathering of LGBT movement activists to 
respond to the ruling and demand immediate access to marriage. Activists and leaders from 
LGBT SMOs in Johannesburg and Pretoria met separately with the Equality Project lawyers 
away from the media to discuss the ruling’s implications and how to proceed. Leaders from a 
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Pretoria-based organization and Behind the Mask hoped that a press conference they had hastily 
organized for later in the afternoon would commence this process. Behind the Mask’s office was 
the logical site for a press conference because of its space to host reporters, close proximity to 
the Constitutional Court, computer and telephone resources, and reputation as a LGBT media 
organization with mainstream media contacts. However, only one reporter from a local radio 
station attended the press conference. While juggling the pressure to post stories featuring 
analysis and details of the ruling and interviews with activists on hand to witness the ruling on 
the website, Behind the Mask staff scrambled to locate contact information for reporters for 
mainstream news agencies, revealing a weakness in the organization’s structure. Although 
Behind the Mask had been in existence for five years and was a leading LGBT media 
organization, it clearly lacked reliable contacts among South African media and the 
infrastructure to coordinate a press conference for an event of the same-sex marriage ruling’s 
significance and magnitude. Had the organization received more advance notice than one day, 
Behind the Mask may have been able to handle the event. Nevertheless, that SMO 
representatives held a meeting so soon after the ruling’s announcement and staged a press 
conference suggests that they intended to use the ruling as an opportunity for further organizing. 
Amid celebrating the marriage verdict in the hours after the ruling’s reading, Behind the 
Mask staffers concentrated on following the media’s immediate response. Most major South 
African mainstream and LGBT news outlets carried the same-sex marriage story. For Behind the 
Mask staff, news coverage became personal. The Behind the Mask newsroom erupted in laughter 
when a staff member located a story that featured a photograph of two young, gay black interns 
embracing and kissing one another on the cheek; the photograph did not identify either one by 
name. Neither intern was in the newsroom when Behind the Mask staff discovered the 
photograph, but when one intern in the photograph entered the newsroom later, staff again burst 
into laughter, prompting him to ask cautiously what was so humorous. A staff member gestured 
to the intern to look at her computer. Upon seeing himself in an embrace with the other intern, 
who was just a friend, at first, he became worried that his father would see the photograph on the 
news; his father knew he was openly gay, but he would not approve of his son flaunting his 
sexuality on the news, which is how the intern claimed his father would interpret the picture. 
Later, the intern became angry at the photographer who took the picture. He claimed that out of 
all the pictures the photographer snapped, the media outlet used one in which two men openly 
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embraced. He suggested that the news media were perpetuating a salacious stereotype about gay 
men demonstrating their affection publicly. However, the intensity with which Behind the Mask 
staffers and mainstream and LGBT news media covered the marriage ruling did not last. Several 
days after the ruling, local and national newspapers no longer carried stories about the ruling. 
LGBT social movement organizations also did not hold any public discussions about pressing 
Parliament to amend marriage laws, although at the press conference, SMO leaders pledged they 
would urge Parliament to follow the Court’s directive to correct existing laws. SMOs also did not 
counter some homophobic statements that conservative and religious leaders made.  
The lack of mobilization for the ruling’s announcement on 1 December ran counter to the 
week of mobilization that LGBT SMOs planned for the same-sex marriage hearing before the 
Constitutional Court in mid-May 2005. On 16 May 2005, member of and staff at FEW were 
planning a march scheduled for the following day. They made signs and wore shirts with 
slogans, such as “‘10 Years of Democracy: Great Constitution, But Let’s Make It Real!’” and 
“‘Get It Straight, I Can’t Be Fixed,’” and practiced a song with the lyrics: “‘Cowards move 
backward, we brave ones move forward. Kusasa ekuseni sifuna amalungelo okushada (tomorrow 
morning we will demand the right to marry). Government we are tired of co-habitation, we need 
to get married legally’” (Msiza 2005). This effusive display of support for the same-sex ruling 
was not in evidence on 1 December 2005. On 17 May 2005, organizations such as FEW and the 
Equality Project mobilized a crowd dominated by black LGBT persons to participate in a march. 
The Durban Gay and Lesbian Health Centre, a LGBT social movement organization that 
delivered services for sexual and gender minorities, staged a “satellite” march at the Durban 
High Court in solidarity with the Johannesburg marchers. A Behind the Mask journalist 
commented that black LGBT persons “overshadowed all others present outside the 
Constitutional Court. . . . They were singing and shouting slogans of struggle reminiscent of pre-
1994 [antiapartheid movement] era” (Behind the Mask 2005). 
While I observed FEW, Behind the Mask, and Joint Working Group staff meetings from 
December 2005 until April 2006, activists occasionally discussed how to mobilize around the 
same-sex marriage campaign. The Joint Working Group was a small, loose national coalition of 
LGBT social movement organizations consisting of eight LGBT organizations: Behind the 
Mask, FEW, the Equality Project, the Triangle Project, OUT-LGBT Well-Being, the Gay and 
Lesbian Archives, Durban Lesbian and Gay Community and Health Centre, and the University 
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of South Africa’s Centre for Applied Psychology, which was directed by a longtime LGBT 
rights activist. Activists from Behind the Mask and FEW talked about pushing forward with the 
same-sex marriage ruling when they met separately and together with the Joint Working Group, 
but they did not agree on how to proceed. They questioned how they should carry on in the wake 
of the Equality Project’s demise. 
5.1.2 When an SMO Enters Abeyance 
The void left by the Equality Project forced LGBT social movement organizations to 
question whether and how to strategize about pursuing the same-sex marriage campaign. The 
Equality Project had devoted itself to legal lobbying and advocacy related to sexual and gender 
minority rights, territory that other social movement organizations generally left alone (Oswin 
2007). When the Equality Project still existed as the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality, social movement organizations “did not give direction to” the Coalition, even though 
they belonged to it (Oswin 2007:653). In this manner, social movement organizations were 
accustomed to regarding the Coalition as the leader of South African LGBT organizing around 
legal campaigns (Stychin 1996). Organizations treated its successor similarly, allowing the 
Equality Project to spearhead important legal battles for sexual and gender minority rights. 
The Lesbian and Gay Equality Project closed its doors in July 2005 and went into 
abeyance, just two months after lawyers with the Equality Project had presented their arguments 
in favor of same-sex marriage to the Constitutional Court (Bagguley 2002; Taylor 1989). 
Allegations of financial mismanagement and of personality conflicts among staff and board 
members contributed to the organization’s suspension. The Equality Project’s disappearance 
from the same-sex marriage campaign left social movement organizations unsure how to 
proceed. First, the Equality Project was an unstated media representative for the movement, due 
in part to South African media’s preference for covering legal issues. According to findings from 
a study that the Gay and Lesbian Archives (2006) conducted, of all media reports involved 
LGBT issues, rights, and persons, “legal issues and evolving legislation receive[d] the largest 
amount of media attention, i.e. changes in legislation, such as same-sex marriage,” which totaled 
almost 25% of all South African news clippings collected (p. 15). Before its suspension, the 
Equality Project frequently appeared in the media. Yet the organization’s disappearance left 
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some SMOs unprepared to engage with the media, although some organizations such as the 
Triangle Project and FEW had established clear media campaigns. For instance, Behind the 
Mask realized, in the wake of the same-sex marriage ruling, that it lacked a coherent plan for 
dealing with South African media, a deficiency the SMO was remedying by devising a media 
policy and anti-homophobia training program for journalists in the mainstream media. Similarly, 
without the Equality Project to take the lead, organizations did not know how to proceed with the 
same-sex marriage campaign. This resulted in the invisibility of Johannesburg-based social 
movement organizations in the media, to the general public, and to the state in relation to the 
same-sex marriage campaign.  
Deliberations about how to proceed kept the Johannesburg-based LGBT social movement 
organizations—and the movement in general—invisible in the months following the 
Constitutional Court ruling. In particular, the Joint Working Group had difficulty identifying a 
replacement for the Equality Project as the leader in the same-sex marriage campaign because 
LGBT social movement organizations already had too much work of their own. They lacked the 
capacity to respond quickly and flexibly to the vacuum left by the Equality Project. South 
African LGBT social movement organizations focused on very different issues, such as media 
monitoring (Behind the Mask); health and mental health service provision (OUT-LGBT Well-
Being in Pretoria); black lesbian visibility and hate crimes against black lesbians (Forum for the 
Empowerment of Women); or social and health services for LGBT persons (Durban Lesbian and 
Gay Community and Health Centre and the Triangle Project in Cape Town). Legal issues were 
the domain of the Equality Project. Organizations also limited their services and individual 
campaigns to their geographic locations. Because organizations were so distant from one 
another, few organizations regularly worked together face-to-face. Exceptions were those based 
in Pretoria and Johannesburg. With such narrow organizational and geographic focuses, 
organizations such as Behind the Mask and FEW did not have the capacity to take over for the 
Equality Project. This was especially evident in the specialized knowledge necessary for 
conducting an effective legal campaign (Stychin 1996). In the Equality Project’s absence, 
activists questioned how the movement would offer legal services for LGBT persons, 
aggressively pursue legal clarification and extension of LGBT rights in the future, or move 
forward with the same-sex marriage case.  
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Some hoped that the Joint Working Group member organizations could pool their 
knowledge and resources together to overcome the void left by the Equality Project. The Joint 
Working Group temporarily reassured LGBT persons and activists that they would push forward 
with the campaign by issuing a press release immediately after the same-sex marriage ruling, 
promising to pressure Parliament to legalize same-sex marriage. In early March 2006, the Joint 
Working Group held a meeting at which representatives from member organizations and other 
stakeholders in the LGBT community discussed the Equality Project’s revival. Consultants hired 
by Northern donors that financed many South African LGBT social movement organizations’ 
projects previewed their recommendations for the Equality Project’s resuscitation. Recognizing 
that the Equality Project’s “public image has been dented but not destroyed” after the 
organization’s collapse (Nell and Shapiro 2006), the consultants stressed that Joint Working 
Group members would have to decide how to proceed with the same-sex marriage campaign 
because the Equality Project would not be operational until mid-2006 at the earliest. In addition, 
the consultants suggested that the Equality Project would scale back its legal and media work 
once it reopened. According to the consultants, a newly-revived Equality Project would not have 
the resources to manage the movement’s response to the same-sex marriage case and would still 
have to flesh out its new mandate, ultimately leaving the Joint Working Group in charge of the 
same-sex marriage case. It seemed that the LGBT movement would remain indefinitely invisible 
in national discourse about same-sex marriage.  
However, a few organizations explained how they could overcome their invisibility with 
respect to the same-sex marriage campaign. For instance, FEW claimed that it had already 
incorporated the campaign into its agenda and advocacy work and could poll members about 
how they wanted to proceed with the same-sex marriage campaign. A former Equality Project 
staff member who had taken a position with a Pretoria-based organization revealed that her 
organization had recently begun examining possible mobilization strategies around marriage, 
which coalesced with the organization’s hiring of her. However, the Pretoria-based organization 
did not want to manage the marriage campaign because it did not know in which direction the 
campaign should develop. This worry was encapsulated by a staff member from this organization 
querying, “Who are we representing?” Not only did she question whether her organization would 
represent the entire movement on the marriage issue, but she also interrogated which audience or 
constituency the SMO claimed to represent. The lack of consensus on and clarity about whom 
  135
the movement represented and which SMOs could speak on behalf of the movement indicated 
the state of the movement’s disarray and unpreparedness to tackle the marriage campaign and 
activists’ insecurities about the Joint Working Group’s relationship to the movement and to 
LGBT constituencies. By the end of the March 2006 meeting, JWG member organizations had 
not resolved how the group would issue press statements or coordinate media work.  
The Joint Working Group and member organizations were careful not to move blindly 
forward without considering the movement and individual organizations’ placement with respect 
to the campaign. The Joint Working Group itself was a new body, having only come into 
existence in 2005. The Joint Working Group did not want to become publicly visible with 
respect to the same-sex marriage campaign in a disingenuous way. Member organizations 
wanted the national body to develop a coherent plan and strategy before moving forward. In this 
way, South African LGBT social movement organizations agreed temporarily on remaining 
invisible until they had sorted out a manageable, consistent strategy and message about the same-
sex marriage campaign. Joint Working Group member organizations acknowledged the 
importance of sustaining the same-sex marriage campaign, but some organizations could not 
commit resources to media or advocacy work because they were overstretched. At the end of the 
March Joint Working Group meeting, support for continuing joint media work around the 
campaign emerged. Behind the Mask and the Gay and Lesbian Archives (GALA) offered to 
compile and give their articles and research on the marriage case to a committee. Organizations 
emerged from their invisibility in September 2006 and mobilized around the drafting of the Civil 
Unions Bill, which had been introduced in Parliament. The bill passed in November and allowed 
couples to register their partnerships as civil unions with the Department of Home Affairs, but 
not to call them “marriages,” generating possible grounds for another campaign (LaFraniere 
2006; Pressly 2006).  
5.1.3  The Dilemma of Participating in a Campaign 
Just two months before South African LGBT social movement organizations met to 
discuss how to handle the absence of the Equality Project and to advance the same-sex marriage 
campaign, their attention was siphoned from the campaign by a scandal. Responding to the 
scandal kept organizations, including Johannesburg-based LGBT social movement 
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organizations, from working on the campaign. The Gay and Lesbian Alliance claimed in a press 
release on 10 January 2006 that a number of gay male members had donated blood at South 
African National Blood Service (SANBS) centers without disclosing their sexual orientation to 
staff or knowing their HIV status in defiance of a ban prohibiting men who have sex with men 
from donating blood. Organizations, including FEW and Behind the Mask, faced a strategic 
dilemma regarding how and whether to respond to this crisis. Not responding to the Gay and 
Lesbian Alliance’s alleged action would appear to anti-LGBT opponents and the general public 
that LGBT social movement organizations sanctioned this action, possibly giving anti-LGBT 
opponents fodder for a countermovement campaign. However, becoming involved meant that 
organizations would likely divert attention and resources away from the same-sex marriage 
campaign.  
At stake was the movement’s credibility and sexual and gender minorities’ standing in 
the national imaginary. The Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s supposed action against South African 
National Blood Service centers constituted a “threat” for some South Africans (Muller 2006; 
Saturday Star 2006). Militaristic rhetoric in The Saturday Star’s sensationalized headline, “Gays 
Launch Blood War,” put LGBT activists on alert not just because of the exaggerated diction, but 
also because of the allusion to sexual and gender minorities’ attack on the general South African 
populace (Gallagher 2006). HIV/AIDS threatened millions of South Africans, and a tainted 
national blood supply was unthinkable. The notion that LGBT activists would jeopardize the 
blood supply available to all South Africans threatened to delegitimize activists’ demands for 
full, inclusive citizenship. If angry (heterosexual) South Africans ceased to recognize sexual (and 
gender) minorities as citizens, then violence based on misrecognition could ensue (Butler 2004). 
For activists, the legal gains the movement made over the previous decade, such as winning the 
right for same-gender couples to marry, would be meaningless if antigay sentiments transformed 
into homophobic violence and rhetoric.  
 Concerned about sexual and gender minorities’ political and social status and the 
possibility of violent response, LGBT social movement organizations, including FEW, Behind 
the Mask, and the Joint Working Group, decided to become involved in the gay blood donation 
imbroglio. Condemning the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s tactics and distancing themselves from 
it, LGBT social movement organizations sought to control the situation before the Gay and 
Lesbian Alliance damaged the movement’s reputation. Not only were South African LGBT 
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SMOs shocked by the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claims about gay men donating blood without 
knowing their HIV status, but they were also infuriated by the mainstream media’s lack of fact-
checking before publishing the story. Using the Joint Working Group as an institutional 
mouthpiece, organizations issued press releases that deplored the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s 
supposed action and indicted the media for treating the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as a credible 
organization without ascertaining the validity of its claims. Several days after the gay blood 
donation scandal broke, South African National Blood Service centers reported that there was no 
proof of hundreds of gay men donating blood in contravention of the ban. Disturbed by the 
mainstream media’s tendency to run with sensationalized, unproven stories that attract readers, 
LGBT social movement organizations registered a complaint with the Press Ombudsman, who, 
in turn, “reprimanded” The Star for its unethical conduct in not thoroughly vetting the Gay and 
Lesbian Alliance’s claims (Linington 2006). LGBT social movement organizations regarded the 
lack of journalistic fact-checking as “anti-LGBT prejudice” because no journalists publicly 
questioned the  
absurd claim that hundreds of HIV-infected gay men descended on the blood . . .  
services with only one goal in mind: tainting the life-giving resource which is our 
blood reserves. The immediate question is: why would hundreds of gay men want 
to do this? . . . The patently ridiculous claim of mass-infection of blood reserves 
was accepted at face value, suggesting a framing of LGBT people as sociopathic, 
which probably springs from perceptions of homosexuals as socially deviant (van 
der Westhuizen 2006). 
These comments published in a Pretoria-based LGBT social movement organization’s newsletter 
attributed the sensationalize coverage of the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claims to a persisting 
belief among heterosexual South Africans that sexual minorities were socially aberrant and to the 
media’s unacknowledged bias against sexual and gender minorities. Thus, LGBT social 
movement organizations found themselves with two opponents, the Gay and Lesbian Alliance 
and the media. 
LGBT social movement organizations treated the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as hostile 
and as a countermovement organization working against sexual and gender minorities and the 
movement (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Rohlinger 2002). LGBT social movement 
organizations discredited the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as the “true voice” of the “lesbigay” 
movement, which it regularly claimed in its press releases. Behind the Mask staff joked that the 
Gay and Lesbian Alliance press release writer was “one man who sat in his home drafting 
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ridiculous, antigay press releases all day” and faxed them to the media and organizations. They 
also noted that the press releases were difficult to read, due to their rambling nature. The Cape 
Town-based Triangle Project (2006) agreed with these assessments in a press release:  
The GLA has a long history of issuing frequent “press releases” that range from 
controversial to bizarre. The so-called organisation does not have an address or a 
land-line phone number and all previous efforts to meet with the GLA have failed. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the GLA consists of more than one attention-
hungry individual with a fax machine and a cell phone. 
The Triangle Project disputed the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s organizational capacity and 
commitment to the movement in the press release, isolating the “organization” as a front for one 
person. The Triangle Project even questioned whether the Gay and Lesbian Alliance qualified as 
an organization because South African LGBT activists had surmised that one man was behind 
the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s outlandish claims. In this press release, the Triangle Project 
suggested that to label the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as a gay and lesbian organization demeaned 
other South African LGBT social movement organizations because the Gay and Lesbian 
Alliance had made claims and taken actions that hurt sexual and gender minorities. Staff 
members at the Triangle Project and other South African LGBT social movement organizations 
Like the Triangle Project, a Behind the Mask reporter had tried and failed to contact the 
individual listed as the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s media spokesperson several times. The 
reporter admitted that she personally wanted nothing to do with a man and organization she 
viewed as antigay; in this sense, she regarded the Gay and Lesbian Alliance as an enemy. When I 
asked another Behind the Mask staff member if the organization would issue a press release 
about the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claims related to the ban on blood donations from men 
who have sex with men, he stated that Behind the Mask was in a “tough position” because it had 
a mandate to be an “objective” media organization, but it also engaged in “journalistic activism” 
on behalf of LGBT persons by writing and publishing stories about African sexual and gender 
minorities. Therefore, not responding to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s tactics could be 
construed as indifference. Behind the Mask ultimately did not issue a press release, leaving the 
impression that it was maintaining an objective position on the issue, though it scrupulously 
followed and reported on developments in the story. However, Behind the Mask and FEW 
approved the Joint Working Group’s press release and efforts to discuss the ban on blood 
donation from men who have sex with men with the South African National Blood Service. 
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Circumventing the Gay and Lesbian Alliance, LGBT social movement organizations 
directly approached and met with the South African National Blood Service and the South 
African Blood Transfusion Service in mid-February 2006 about rescinding the male blood 
donors who have sex with men. FEW staff participated in these negotiations, an example of how 
the gay blood donation ban gripped a variety of organizations. Explaining the importance of 
supporting their “gay brothers,” the leader of FEW claimed at a staff meeting that fighting the 
ban on gay blood donation was a chance to battle institutional homophobia and show solidarity 
with other members of the LGBT sector (Fieldnotes, 20 February 2006). LGBT activists who 
met with representatives from the South African National Blood Service and the South African 
Blood Transfusion Service alleged that the ban was “blatantly homophobic” (Mambaonline 
2006), though they tended to agree that giving blood was a privilege, not a right. Both the Blood 
Service and Transfusion Service used studies that the United States Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC) had conducted to justify the ban, citing statistics that men who have sex with men were 
more at risk for contracting HIV. Activists disputed such logic, asserting that the ban was 
heterosexist and discriminatory and that in South Africa, HIV transmission rates were higher 
among heterosexuals.63 The South African National Blood Service premised the ban on blood 
donations from men who have sex with men on the CDC’s conclusions that HIV transmission 
rates were higher in men who have sex with men because they supposedly engaged in 
unprotected anal sex more frequently than other populations. When meeting with the South 
African National Blood Service, LGBT activists reminded those who advocated the ban on gay 
male blood donations that South African heterosexuals sometimes had unprotected anal sex and 
that some gay and bisexual men did not engage in anal sex. The Blood Service representative 
and LGBT social movement organizations agreed that before the Blood Service finally ruled on 
whether to allow men who have sex with men to donate blood, it would commission a study on 
HIV transmission rates among South African gay, bisexual, and heterosexual men and women. 
Beginning on 1 November 2006, the Blood Service would allow men who had abstained for six 
months from having sex with men to donate blood, but this did not satisfy the Joint Working 
Group, which argued that “the question should not be whether you have had sex with another 
                                                 
63 In 2003, the Triangle Project contended that “[b]etween 12 and 30%” of gay South African men are HIV-positive, 
but did not elaborate on the discrepancy in these figures (Smetherham 2003).
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man but that all blood donors should be asked if they use a condom while having sex” (Behind 
the Mask 2006).  
 Within a few months, organizations realized they had pursued the gay blood donation ban 
as far as they could until the South African National Blood Service finished investigating 
whether using the United States’ Centers for Disease Control’s parameters was appropriate for 
South Africa. LGBT social movement organizations thus resumed their mobilization around 
same-sex marriage. Organizations pressed Parliament to pass favorable legislation affording 
same-gender couples the right to marry. In November 2006, just a few weeks before the 
Constitutional Court’s 1 December deadline to resolve the matter, Parliament passed the Civil 
Unions Bill, which fell short of activists’ hopes of the state labeling and recognizing their 
committed relationships as marriages (Pressly 2006). 
 South African LGBT social movement organizations missed the opportunity of 
mobilizing around the Constitutional Court’s favorable same-sex marriage ruling only for a short 
time. Changes in the external sociopolitical environment and internal movement environment 
affected organizations’ strategic choices about whether and how to follow the ruling. The void 
that the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project left when it disappeared forced LGBT social 
movement organizations to question how to move forward with the same-sex marriage campaign 
and which LGBT organization would helm the effort. Deliberation about how to proceed kept 
LGBT social movement organizations publicly invisible with respect to the same-sex marriage 
campaign for a few months. In addition, LGBT social movement organizations faced the 
strategic dilemma of becoming involved in the crisis initiated by the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s 
claims. LGBT organizations decided to address the crisis and work with the South African 
National Blood Service to end the ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men. 
This decision diverted attention and resources from the same-sex marriage, contributing to social 
movement organizations’ invisibility with respect to the political opportunity of the 
Constitutional Court ruling. South African LGBT social movement organizations intentionally 
missed the opportunity posed by the same-sex marriage ruling only for a short time so that they 
could respond to the changes in the external sociopolitical environment and internal movement 
environment. Sometimes, social movement organizations’ invisibility in moments of political 
opportunity is attributable to perceptible shifts in the external and internal environments. 
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5.2 NAMIBIA: MISSED OPPORTUNITY. 
Using logic similar to that of South African LGBT activists who elicited the African 
National Congress’ support in protecting sexual minority rights, Namibian LGBT activists 
worked with the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) in the early 1990s (Cock 
2003; Croucher 2002; Oswin 2007; Stychin 1996). Through well-placed political connections, 
activists managed to get a sexual nondiscrimination clause included in the Labour Act of 1992 
(Interview, TRP member, 11 July 2006), making Namibia the first African nation to protect 
sexual minorities from employment discrimination based on sexual orientation.64 The Namibian 
LGBT movement seemed set to pursue legal sexual and gender minority rights. However, TRP 
failed to mobilize around a case involving one of their own. In 1999, Liz Frank, a founding 
member both of TRP and Sister Namibia, filed a legal claim for permanent residency based on 
her long-term relationship with a Namibian woman with whom she was raising a child. I argue 
that not mobilizing around this case constitutes a missed opportunity—a moment when The 
Rainbow Project could have mobilized publicly around sexual and gender minority rights but did 
not. How and why did The Rainbow Project miss this opportunity? The organization made 
strategic choices that prevented it from taking advantage of this political opportunity. First, TRP 
had to decide how it would respond to the repressive sociopolitical environment. Second, TRP 
had to determine whether and how it would provide social services in response to the material 
needs of many black and coloured members.  
5.2.1 The Dilemma of State Repression 
The Rainbow Project (TRP) faced the strategic dilemma of whether or how to respond to 
state repression. TRP formed in 1997 precisely to counter state leaders’ homophobia and threats. 
However, the organization had to decide whether it was worth openly opposing state and 
SWAPO leaders and risk provoking the state leaders’ unleashing of police and making good on 
                                                 
64 In 2004, the Namibian Constitutional Assembly replaced the Labour Act with more conservative legislation that 
omitted the clause prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which The Rainbow Project (TRP), 
did not challenge (Fenwick 2005). I do not elaborate on TRP’s lack of mobilization around the new Labour Act 
legislation because I am still investigating this. 
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their threats of repression. If TRP did not respond, state and SWAPO leaders might construe 
TRP’s silence, or the lack of opposition from LGBT social movement organizations, as 
validation of their homophobia. TRP opted to respond swiftly to state and SWAPO leaders’ 
homophobic comments, much like its parent social movement organization, Sister Namibia, had. 
But beyond reacting pointedly and immediately to state leaders’ homophobic rhetoric, TRP staff 
and members were unsure how they should proceed with their plans to improve the legal and 
political situation of Namibian sexual and gender minorities. TRP made a series of related 
decisions that ultimately kept it from pursuing legal action. 
TRP’s start was quite strong, given the tumultuous political environment in which it 
operated. Despite the state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic remarks, TRP members still 
regarded Namibia’s fledgling democracy as a political opportunity. Members hoped that 
Namibians would “react negatively to the marginalisation of groups whom they feel have a valid 
right to co-exist in the community,” a view that emerged from “the struggle for Independence 
and overthrowing the apartheid regime” (TRP XminusY funding proposal 1997:1; see also Frank 
and !Khaxas 1996). However, to ensure that Namibians believed that LGBT persons had a “valid 
right to co-exist” with them, TRP decided to pursue educational and cultural events alongside 
legal and political mobilization because the organization wanted Namibians to “[accept] 
homosexual, bisexual, and transsexual individuals as possessing this right” (TRP XminusY 
funding proposal 1997:1). TRP decided to commit itself to responding decisively to state leaders’ 
homophobia because not to do so could result in worsening legal and political circumstances for 
sexual and gender minorities. TRP members firmly believed they had an important 
democratizing role to play in a country that “possesses abundant optimism” (TRP XminusY 
funding proposal 1997:2). 
[Namibia] is grappling with many issues inherent in a fledgling democracy. . . . It 
is now that different groups in the community are exploring their new-found 
freedom. They are discovering that with this freedom comes responsibility to all 
members of their society. It is in the fluid constructions that are currently taking 
shape in Namibia that TRP would like to build its base. We do not want to wait 
until these constructions are set rock solid and have to undergo the painful task of 
disassembling them (TRP XminusY funding proposal 1997:2).  
TRP members interpreted the country’s democratization process as a political opportunity for 
pursuing its goals and for finding a place in Namibia for LGBT persons. 
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At TRP’s first meeting in 1997, members discussed how the new organization should 
respond to state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobia. Some members seemed more inclined to 
institutionalize spaces for gays and lesbians to socialize without fear, while others stressed the 
need to “change laws” and “not hide away” like “closet cases” because Nujoma and his peers 
verbally attacked sexual minorities (TRP meeting minutes, February 1997). A few attendees 
offered concrete suggested courses of action, such as filing a complaint with the Office of the 
Ombudsman or suing the state because of leaders’ statements.65 Different actors had 
conventionally filed “complaints relating to maladministration by public officials” with the 
Namibian Office of the Ombudsman (Gomez 1995:157). But actors had increasingly requested 
the Office of the Ombudsman “to investigate violations of human rights as well. . . . In the 
Namibian case, the ombudsman may also give legal assistance or advice to those seeking 
enforcement of fundamental rights through the courts” (Gomez 1995:157). TRP members were 
acquainted with the expanded role of the Office of the Ombudsman due to their close ties to the 
Legal Assistance Centre, which would continue to be a close ally of the organization. 
 TRP also decided to prioritize legal mobilization. At its yearly strategic planning meeting 
in 1998, which members of the South African National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality 
moderated, members agreed the organization would prioritize “decriminalising sodomy, 
employment benefits, immigration cases, and gay-bashing” as pressing concerns (TRP 1998:16). 
Members of the Coalition shared their experience organizing around sodomy and advised TRP to 
pursue the decriminalization of sodomy very carefully, given the hostile sociopolitical 
environment in which TRP operated. Members identified several avenues for their legal program 
including “going to court” and “lobbying political leaders” and the public (TRP 1998:17). 
However, TRP members agreed that “[c]hanging the Constitution to include sexual orientation” 
as the South African movement had was “not ideal” because state and SWAPO leaders might 
interpret suggested Constitutional amendments as a threat to their authority (TRP 1998:17). 
Members seemed satisfied that “[b]asic rights [were] covered” and instead decided to work 
within existing frameworks (TRP 1998:17). 
 In June 1997, TRP filed a legal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman objecting to 
homophobic remarks President Nujoma made in December 1996 and to SWAPO leaders’ 
                                                 
65 I refer to the Office of the Ombudsman by its official name. The Rainbow Project consistently referred to the 
Office of the Ombudsman in gender-neutral language (“Ombudsperson”). 
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statements made in January 1997 and disclosed this action to the Namibian media (“Gay Rights 
Group” 1997; Günzel 1997). Citing equality statutes in the Namibian Constitution, the 
organization requested that the Office of the Ombudsman probe Nujoma’s statement as a human 
rights violation. TRP alleged that “discrimination can also come verbally . . . . This request is 
further motivated by a fear that such remarks can lead to incitement to violence and 
discrimination against law abiding [sic] citizens” (TRP Submission to the Ombudsperson, 4 June 
1997). However, the Office of the Ombudsman declined to investigate the matter for two 
reasons. First, the Office of the Ombudsman claimed that it could only investigate grievances 
pertaining to employment discrimination due to a person’s sexual orientation in compliance with 
the Labour Act of 1992, and TRP’s complaint did not fall within this framework. Second, the 
Office of the Ombudsman rejected the complaint because TRP publicized its filing, which 
violated the principle of confidentiality under which the Ombudsperson operated, such “that it 
would seem that the Office was used as a stepping stone to raise publicity for your cause” 
(Office of the Ombudsman letter, 30 September 1997). Thus, TRP’s pursuit of publicity related 
to the investigation resulted in negative sanctions by the Office of the Ombudsman and limited 
the redress that the organization could seek with respect to state and SWAPO leaders’ 
homophobic remarks. Unless Parliament prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation, as the South African Parliament had done one year earlier in the Constitution, 
Namibian sexual and gender minorities would not be able to pursue legal redress through the 
Office of the Ombudsman.  
 TRP members also decided to pursue the decriminalization of sodomy, understood as sex 
between men, a law “inherited from the colonial regime” (Tibinyane 1998:20).66 TRP members 
understood the sodomy law as “a violation against their human rights because as long as both 
parties [were] consenting adult, there could be nothing wrong with it” (Tibinyane 1998:20). One 
member recommended publicizing a statement made by then-Ombudsperson Bience Gawanas 
that “sodomy [would] be decriminalized” (TRP meeting minutes, 18 March 1997:2). Early in 
1997, a couple of law school students demanded a public discussion about the legal position of 
gay and lesbians (Davids and Shanghala 1997:11). Uncertainty about this statute remained. On 
                                                 
66 Dianne Hubbard (2000), a Legal Assistance Centre researcher, supported repealing the sodomy law because the 
Combating of Rape Act, which was passed in 2000, “expanded the definition of rape to include forcible sodomy” (p. 
11). 
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behalf of TRP, in 1998, the Legal Assistance Centre requested clarification about the sodomy 
law, specifically asking if Prosecutor General “would continue to prosecute charges of sodomy 
where the sexual act has taken place in private between two consenting adult males” (LAC letter, 
24 April 1998). The Prosecutor General declined to discuss the issue (TRP meeting minutes, 6 
May 1998, 3 June 1998). The Attorney General, however, asserted that “the sodomy law [was] 
unconstitutional and [had] to be challenged” (TRP meeting minutes, 3 June 1998). The Attorney 
General apparently did not push this constitutional inquiry further, constituting another 
institutional obstacle to TRP’s effort to decriminalize sodomy. 
 Amid a sociopolitical environment that was increasingly antagonistic toward sexual and 
gender minorities in the frequency and intensity of state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic 
remarks, TRP decided to switch strategies. The organization decided to pursue the 
decriminalization of sodomy less publicly with the help of the Legal Assistance Centre, though 
by the end of 1999, it was not clear how the organization would proceed with this campaign 
(TRP meeting minutes, 20 June 1999, 1 December 1999). In 2000, the political opportunity of 
pursuing the decriminalization of sodomy narrowed when President Nujoma made homophobic 
remarks, and Home Affairs Minister Jerry Ekandjo who was “in charge of the police . . . 
commandeered 700 newly recruited police officers to ‘eliminate’ gay men and lesbians ‘from the 
face of Namibia’” (Amupadhi 2000). These statements put TRP on the defensive. In a press 
release condemning these remarks, TRP criticized SWAPO members and state officials who had 
publicly stated that “the Constitution included the rights of homosexual people,” requested the 
state to snub Ekandjo’s demand that police arrest sexual and gender minorities, and demanded 
the state “to repeal or amend all laws that discriminate against lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender people in Namibia.”67 In this tense atmosphere, “[a]s an organisation fighting for 
minority rights,” TRP internally and publicly recognized “the importance of the support of the 
majority” and invited heterosexual Namibians to join the organization (TRP 2000:11). 
Nervousness about publicly clarifying the legal status of homosexuality made activists 
hesitate about moving forward with law reform. Writing in 1996, before Nujoma’s highly 
publicized attacks on lesbians and gay men, Liz Frank and Elizabeth !Khaxas (1996) confessed 
                                                 
67 Clarifying that his call for the police to “eliminate” sexual minorities in Namibia did not mean killing them, 
Ekandjo explained that sexual minorities had no rights under the Namibian Constitution, unlike sexual and gender 
minorities in South Africa.  
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they did “not know which way Namibia [would] develop on” legal reform, even though Namibia 
was a safe haven for same-gender couples (p. 116).  
[A] number of couples . . . moved from South Africa to Namibia during the 1980s 
to escape the persecution of interracial and lesbian love that exists there. No one 
we have asked, including the State Attorney, can remember a single case of legal 
prosecution of lesbians or gay men in this country (Frank and !Khaxas 1996:115).  
Fearful of provoking a repressive state response, activists let SWAPO determine which South 
African laws to repeal. This fear intensified for LGBT activists between 1999 and 2001 when 
President Nujoma and Home Affairs Minister Ekandjo rekindled their homophobic commentary, 
which I outlined above. Their remarks coincided with Liz Frank’s lawsuit against the 
Department of Home Affairs. Frank was trying to obtain permanent residency based on her 
committed relationship to her Namibian same-gender partner and their raising of a son together 
(Frank 2001a). The Rainbow Project chose to defer pursuing sexual and gender minority legal 
rights at the moment of political opportunity of Frank’s case. The organization made this 
decision because it did not want to aggravate state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobia and spark 
homophobic violence, a real concern for many Namibian LGBT persons. While Frank’s case 
was underway, Sister Namibia launched the Namibian Women’s Manifesto and 50/50 
Campaign, which I described in Chapter Four. State leaders including the Minister of Women 
Affairs withdrew their support for the Manifesto because it broadened the definition of women’s 
rights to include lesbian rights (Rothschild 2005). TRP deferred launching a separate public legal 
campaign that clarified sexual and gender minority rights in order not to incur the wrath of state 
and SWAPO leaders and not to jeopardize the Manifesto and 50/50 Campaign. In addition, state 
leaders’ hostile attitude toward LGBT persons rendered TRP somewhat ineffective and invisible. 
Apart from issuing press releases at different points condemning or praising the legal system’s 
handling of the case, TRP did not mobilize constituents around expanding sexual and gender 
minority legal rights. Instead, TRP chose to ask the International Lesbian and Gay Association 
(ILGA) to call on the Namibian state to grant Frank permanent residency. ILGA could mobilize 
activists in the global North to pressure Namibian state officials about this matter when it held its 
yearly world conference in Johannesburg, South Africa, in 1999.  
Several activists believed that while Nujoma held office, any attempt to overturn the 
sodomy law or to expand LGBT rights would fail. Official homophobia and the Ovambo ruling 
ethnic majority’s patriarchal practices, exemplified in Nujoma’s frequent justifications for why 
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lesbians and gay men did not deserve equal rights, “[limited] the space available to the LGBT 
community to push the boundaries of the interpretation of the constitution in a more liberal 
direction” (Isaacks 2005:79).68 State and SWAPO leaders’ homophobia impacted the 
organization directly. In part, this was part of a growing backlash among conservative African 
political leaders—often those who waged liberation struggles against foreign, occupying armed 
forces—against South Africa’s liberal politics.  
The Rainbow Project decided that, as long as state leaders persisted in issuing 
homophobic threats, it would be best to postpone a public legal campaign centered on sexual and 
gender minority rights. The organization decided to develop an inclusionary orientation centered 
on human rights. TRP cast sexual and gender minority rights as human rights. Thus, to thwart 
state repression and to cultivate support from other civil society organizations, TRP styled itself 
as a broad-based human rights organization in Namibia. For instance, TRP members coached 
key political or religious readers to denounce antigay rhetoric by voicing their support for all 
human rights, instead of specifically singling out sexual and gender minority rights. TRP 
members worried that only defending sexual and gender minority rights would make LGBT 
persons more vulnerable to attack by virtue of supporters and activists discussing these issues 
publicly. The organization also joined the Namibian Non-Governmental Organisation Forum 
(NANGOF—NGO Forum) in 1999, cementing its collective identity as a human rights 
organization. The organization even renamed its yearly LGBT Awareness Week as “Human 
Rights Awareness Week” in 2001 in an effort to mainstream sexual and gender minority rights in 
Namibian human rights discourse (TRP Management Committee meeting minutes, 9 May 2001). 
TRP also collaborated with other human rights organizations on children’s rights and stopping 
violence against women. Participating in such campaigns and state and SWAPO leaders’ 
homophobic threats kept The Rainbow Project from pursuing legal clarification of sexual and 
gender minority rights and allowed it to recast itself as a human right organization.69
                                                 
68 The Ovambo constitute an indigenous majority in Namibia. 
69 Periodically, TRP staff and members resuscitated the idea of pursuing legal rights, as in the case of 
decriminalizing sodomy, which resurfaced as an issue in May 2001 and June 2002, but these discussions did not 
materialize in action (TRP Management Committee meeting minutes, 9 May 2001, 13 June 2002). 
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5.2.2 The Dilemma of Social Service Provision 
A second strategic dilemma that TRP had to navigate was whether and how it would 
meet the diverse material needs of poor, unemployed, and undereducated members. On the one 
hand, TRP founding members aspired to represent all Namibian sexual and gender minorities 
and improve their everyday lives so that members could take full advantage of their 
constitutional rights. On the other hand, members worried that providing social services would 
derail the organization’s planned sexual and gender minority rights campaign. 
First, members were unsure how to handle the differences among Namibians who 
differed in terms of their class, racial, and ethnic identities. TRP’s founding members resembled 
their South African counterparts who were “privileged mostly white, mostly middle-class, 
mostly urbanized lesbians and gays, who [were] safe enough to come out and identify as lesbian 
or gay, [and] fight for their rights” (van Zyl 2005c:31). Though TRP might have initially 
functioned as an exclusive social movement organization (SMO), founding members aspired to 
transform it into an “inclusive” SMO, which, according to Bernstein (1997:539), tries “to 
educate and mobilize a constituency or maximize involvement in political campaigns.” As an 
inclusive SMO, TRP founding members successfully recruited black and coloured sexual 
minorities from diverse class backgrounds in Windhoek. They were so successful that several 
white founding members dropped out from the organization, presumably because of racial 
tension and divergent interests among white members. According to a founding member of and 
staff person at TRP, the organization had to diversify its membership in terms of race, ethnicity, 
and class. In the new post-apartheid Namibia, if activists “were going to form a group that only 
had white members, you were not going to be a voice that people were going to take seriously. 
You're not going to have any credibility in this country” (TRP staff member, interview, 11 July 
2006). The organization held meetings and recruited black and coloured members in Katutura, a 
black Windhoek township, and Khomasdal, a coloured Windhoek township. This resulted in a 
shift in membership from a dozen white members to several dozen mostly black and coloured 
members, and membership increased steadily between 1998 and 2002.  
TRP founding members also decided to empower black and coloured members, who 
dominated the organization in number of members, and to encourage them to participate in the 
organization. This internal focus detracted attention from sexual and gender minority rights, but 
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members prioritized it anyway in an effort to institute a democracy within the organization that 
they hoped to duplicate more widely in Namibia. Thus, the organization devised democratic 
practices intended to elicit participation from black and coloured members and to establish rules 
and procedures for decision making. This introduction of democratic practices reinforced TRP’s 
collective identity as a promoter of human rights and democracy in Namibia. The organization’s 
constitution afforded all members decision-making power through voting at meetings. From 
1997 to 2003, a core group of about a dozen volunteers from middle-class backgrounds managed 
TRP and held open monthly meetings at which members could voice their concerns or make 
suggestions about current and future projects. Despite leaders’ best intentions, however, the 
polyvocality that democratic practices nurtured stymied the organization’s decision-making 
processes and devolved into cacophony. Beginning in 2001, meetings became fora for members 
to gripe about minuscule issues within TRP, such as which kind of paper to buy (Interview, TRP 
member, 11 July 2006). These complaints brought TRP to a standstill. Becoming too accessible 
to members through democratic procedures prevented TRP staff from providing services and 
information to a broader LGBT community for a time. Such squabbling masqueraded as attempts 
by discontented members to shift TRP’s focus to social service provision; for a short time, TRP 
ran a medical clinic and soup kitchen at their Windhoek office. A member who “believed he 
would eventually become the TRP director” promised to create jobs for TRP members who sided 
with him or give people money to pay rent, an assurance at which several members scoffed 
because it revealed how little some members knew about what foreign donors—TRP’s main 
source of funding—would finance (Interview, TRP member, 11 July 2006). Eventually, the in-
fighting escalated to verbal and physical attacks and personal vengeance. A gay coloured 
founding member of TRP commented that some members engaged in petty payback: “I hate you, 
so I’ll sleep with your boyfriend” (Interview, TRP member, 11 July 2006). Members also 
concocted conspiracy theories. Some disgruntled TRP members accused staff of 
misappropriating funds and increasing their salaries, accusations that continued to persist.70 Staff 
offered to let members examine the organization’s finances, but no one took them up on this 
offer, probably because most members had little experience navigating complex budgets. These 
                                                 
70 Alleging financial misconduct, a former TRP member told a staff member he was going to sue the director 
because the director had purchased a new car recently. The director downplayed the threat, pretending to taunt the 
absent former member, “Fine. Come and try to take my car. See who you’re dealing with” (Interview, 11 July 2006). 
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episodes resulted in the drafting of a code of conduct that outlined how members were expected 
to behave in the office and at staff and membership meetings.  
TRP members and staff regarded the provision of social services as a strategic dilemma, 
even though it did not have to be one. In this sense, the “recognition-distribution binary [that] 
haunt[ed]” the South African LGBT movement also affected the Namibian movement (Dirsuweit 
2006:328). On the one hand, some members and staff believed that if TRP offered social services 
to members, it would overwhelm and prevent the organization from pursuing legal rights that 
would lead to social and political recognition of LGBT persons’ equality in Namibian society. In 
addition, they feared that Northern donors would not fund poverty-alleviation programs designed 
for sexual and gender minorities because other nongovernmental organizations offered such 
services. On the other hand, some members and staff believed that they owed it to poor, 
unemployed, and undereducated members to provide social services to them because they had 
nowhere else to turn, which constituted the redistribution of resources and opportunities that 
would enable Namibian LGBT persons to improve their everyday material existence. As long as 
they obtained funds in the name of Namibian LGBT persons, they believed that members should 
have equal access to them. Staff and members regarded the provision of social services as an 
“either-or” dilemma; either they provided social services, or they did not. Members wanted to 
end the internal fighting before the organization imploded. Poor, black, and coloured members 
requested that TRP provide basic services, whereas white, middle-class members envisioned the 
organization taking on less tangible projects, such as law reform. After TRP’s office opened in 
2000, in-fighting intensified because members expected the organization to provide for some of 
their basic needs; the organization’s ability to open an office signaled to some member that TRP 
had money. Such needs diverged from those that white middle-class core members had 
diagnosed for Namibian sexual minorities, but for a time, the core group addressed these 
concerns until providing services like a soup kitchen for members became too chaotic for staff 
members, as soup kitchen visitors traipsed in and out of the office.  
Fulfilling poor black and coloured members’ basic needs overwhelmed TRP for several 
years, telescoping its plans for law reform. Pursuing a legal campaign did not make sense for 
those unfamiliar with the Namibian legal system and Constitution. Many TRP members I 
interviewed cast the concerns of LGBT persons in terms of basic needs like education and jobs, 
which they interpreted as removed from the legal arena. TRP members widely upheld the view 
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that if Namibians could marry persons of the same gender, few black and coloured LGBT 
persons would seize this opportunity because marriage would hold few immediate material 
benefits. Several black and coloured members eventually defected from TRP because they 
perceived that the TRP’s leaders were not attuned to their needs.  
Members found it difficult to recognize and maintain class diversity among the 
organization’s members. It was easy to run a meeting when twelve mostly white and middle-
class people with similar life experiences, values, and worldviews agreed on a common vision 
for fighting state homophobia, but incorporating “250 to 300 voices from diverse backgrounds 
[became] very difficult” (Interview, 11 July 2006). One member concluded that TRP’s original 
constitution could only have worked if all members hailed from the middle class. “An 
organization like ours can’t be completely democratic,” or else members will run it into the 
ground with endless basic needs (Interview, 11 July 2006). According to this perspective, some 
members expected the organization to solve their basic problems immediately.  
Several former and current black members alleged that TRP’s management was racist. 
Very few black LGBT persons had been hired as staff members or included in important 
decisions, despite founding and core members’ claims that the constitution facilitated the 
incorporation of members of previously underrepresented racial and ethnic minorities. One 
member claimed that because so many black LGBT persons turn out for events, those unfamiliar 
with or new to TRP might assume that the office staff members were all or mostly black, which 
was not the case (Interview, 30 June 2006). Sharing the view of another member I interviewed, 
the same member alleged that staff only informed black TRP members about events when they 
wanted to show donors how racially diverse the Namibian movement was, as a way to prove to 
donors that TRP was doing its part to repair race relations damaged by apartheid policies 
(Interview, 30 June 2006). 
While conflict roiled TRP, core founding members asked donors to order and pay for an 
external review in 2002 because TRP was “being smothered under personal shit” (Interview, 11 
July 2006). Donors financed an external review that recommended that TRP become a trust, an 
organizational form in which TRP staff would be accountable only to an executive board and not 
to hundreds of members, and abandon social-service provision for members with “bread-and-
butter” needs. Donors worried that too many service provision programs like the soup kitchen 
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would bankrupt TRP.71 If members had not voted to transform TRP into a trust that could initiate 
programs, such as a law reform project, donors would have suspended funding and restarted TRP 
as a trust after a cooling-off period, forcing the organization into abeyance. This was not 
necessary because core group members persuaded enough members to vote for TRP to become a 
trust with a board of directors to whom staff reported.  
5.3 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Johannesburg-based South African LGBT social movement organizations were in a 
unique position to take advantage of the favorable Constitutional Court same-sex marriage 
ruling. However, when the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project folded, organizations found 
themselves questioning how they would proceed with the same-sex marriage campaign because 
the Equality Project had pioneered this campaign. This change in the LGBT movement’s 
composition made organizations examine how they would fill the void that the Equality Project 
left. In addition, organizations had to make a strategic choice about whether and how they would 
react to the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s allegation that gay men donated blood without revealing 
their sexual orientation or knowing their HIV status. Organizations’ hesitation about the 
campaign and decision to refute the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s credibility and to fight the ban 
on blood donations from men who have sex with men caused them to become invisible with 
respect to the same-sex marriage campaign. However, they were temporarily invisible and 
resurfaced in support of the campaign later in the year.  
The Rainbow Project initially made the strategic choices to address state and SWAPO 
leaders’ homophobic remarks as soon as they occurred and to pursue legal clarification of sexual 
and gender minority rights by beginning with the decriminalization of sodomy. The organization 
encountered institutional obstacles when the Office of the Ombudsman refused to consider 
TRP’s complaint of discrimination due to President Nujoma’s 1996 homophobic comments and 
                                                 
71 Though the soup kitchen proved to be a logistical impediment at the office, one staff member reflected fondly on 
the camaraderie that accompanied this effort. She told me that different members donated funds or ingredients for 
the soup, and one member came in a couple of days a week to prepare and serve the soup. It was heartening for her 
to see LGBT persons pull together and take care of their own. 
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also when the Prosecutor General and Attorney General did not investigate the constitutionality 
of the sodomy law. Amid intensifying state leaders’ homophobia, TRP decided to refashion itself 
as a human rights organization to garner wider support for LGBT rights. Internal clashes 
involving divergent visions for how the organization should develop also drew staff and 
members’ focus inward between 1998 and 2002, which would have prevented the organization 
from dedicating resources and attention to a legal campaign, if members and staff had agreed to 
pursue it. Hence, TRP deferred its legal campaign for several years, and discussions of 
decriminalizing sodomy disappeared from the organization in 2002. 
Being invisible in or dropping out of a campaign altogether can indicate movement or 
organizational distress. In the case of The Rainbow Project, its invisibility with respect to a legal 
campaign was a sign of inner turmoil, but there was also another dimension to the organization’s 
apparent disinterest in mounting a legal challenge. The organization opted to respond to 
Namibian state and SWAPO leaders’ homophobic remarks by issuing press releases to the 
media, but it did not want to endanger the fragile position of LGBT persons, which members 
feared might worsen if state and SWAPO leaders felt threatened by the organization. On the 
other hand, South African LGBT social movement organizations disappeared en masse in the 
wake of the same-sex marriage win. The movement’s invisibility was not due to a crumbling 
movement, but rather to strategic planning and decision making related to how to proceed with 
the campaign and how to handle the unexpected debacle initiated by the Gay and Lesbian 
Alliance’s threat about possibly contaminating the national blood supply. 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how social movement organizations’ strategic 
choices coupled with changes in the external sociopolitical environment (or political opportunity 
structure) can make them miss moments of opportunity. South African LGBT organizations were 
eventually able to seize the opportunity to promote its same-sex marriage campaign, but in 
Namibia, TRP had not yet initiated a legal campaign due to internal problems and to state 
repression. Missed opportunities constitute interesting analytic puzzles for social movement 
scholars interested in social movement development and internal dynamics. As I have shown, 
being invisible in (or missing) a moment of opportunity does not connote an inevitable demise 
for social movements or social movement organizations. 
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6.0  THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA OF PUBLIC PRESENTATION 
How to present the movement publicly is an important strategic dilemma of visibility in 
the Namibian and South African lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) social 
movement organizations (SMOs) I studied. By public presentation, I mean how a social 
movement organization projects itself to target constituencies and audiences, usually in an effort 
to gain support (Bob 2005). Without a public presentation that resonates with target 
constituencies and audiences, SMOs can lapse into invisibility and find it difficult to identify 
audiences they can influence or constituencies from which to recruit (Benford and Snow 2000). 
For example, feminist activists in the United States in the 1950s found it difficult to advance 
women’s rights amid political and social conservatism, specifically public antifeminist attacks. 
In this hostile environment and amid media outlets’ unfavorable portrayal of feminist leaders and 
organizations, some feminist activists retreated from public view (Rupp and Taylor 1987:18-23). 
A public presentation that grips the attention of a constituency or audience can enable SMOs to 
widen their base of support, extending their visibility to different audiences.  
The dilemma of public presentation can be especially vexing for social movement 
organizations that advocate for unpopular political or social change or that operate in a repressive 
sociopolitical environment. Prior social movement scholarship demonstrates that it is difficult for 
social movement organizations to garner support within a hostile or repressive sociopolitical 
environment (Blee 2002; Earl 2003; Johnston 2006; Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 
2004; Linden and Klandermans 2006; Tamale 2007). SMOs whose messages and goals are at 
odds with social convention may find it hard to garner public attention or to sustain dialogues 
with chosen audiences. In such cases, SMOs sometimes seek out favorable media coverage or 
publicity in order to generate support for the movement. Kathleen M. Blee (2002) explains that 
some women who participated in racist movements in the United States volunteered to be 
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interviewed in the hope of correcting, in their view, unsympathetic and “superficial media 
reports” (p. 10, see also Blee 2006).  
Public presentation is one element of a social movement framing strategy (Benford and 
Snow 2000). By “framing,” I mean how SMOs “fashion shared understandings of the world and 
of themselves” to “legitimate and motivate collective action” (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 
1996:6; qtd. in Miceli 2005:595). In particular, framing theory usefully elaborates how SMOs 
assemble messages for particular audiences and demonstrates how messages “resonate” with 
audiences and constituencies (Miceli 2005; Snow and Benford 1992). How to frame an SMO and 
present it publicly is a strategic dilemma that some SMOs encounter. SMOs’ success in 
recruiting and retaining members can hinge on organizations’ public articulation of an attractive, 
appealing goals and mission with which individuals want to be associated (Friedman and 
McAdam 1992). In this sense, projecting a movement publicly that is coherent and unified can 
benefit SMOs by garnering them continued support from target constituencies and audiences. 
In this chapter, I explore how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement 
organizations approached the strategic dilemma of publicly portraying (framing) a pan-African 
LGBT movement. Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations faced the 
same strategic dilemma of public presentation: whether and how to respond to the charge that 
homosexuality was unAfrican, a public assertion antigay opponents had increasingly made since 
the mid-1990s (TRP staff member, interview, 11 July 2006, see also Aarmo 1999; Hoad 2007; 
Mathuray 2000; Phillips 2001). Not to respond might allow antigay opponents to interpret 
organizational silence as success in suppressing LGBT organized resistance and as validation for 
their position. Yet responding could put them at risk for hostile reactions from opponents, as 
“visibility makes for an excellent target” (Weston 1997:xiii).  
Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs confronted the claim that homosexuality was 
unAfrican on their own soil. Though the South African state had been receptive to LGBT rights, 
some state leaders openly expressed the view that homosexuality was unAfrican. Most recently, 
in September 2006, former Deputy Vice-President Jacob Zuma “condemned . . . same-sex 
marriages, saying they are ungodly and against African tradition” (Memela 2006). Namibian 
LGBT SMOs also routinely faced public statements from state leaders that homosexuality was 
unAfrican. As recently as September 2005, Deputy Minister of Home Affairs and Immigration 
Theopolina Mushelenga publicly stated at a ceremony commemorating fallen national liberation 
  156
and anticolonial heroes, “Sexual intercourse between people of the same sex is disgraceful 
according to our African culture” (Graig 2005). In the same speech, she also blamed gays and 
lesbians for HIV/AIDS (Graig 2005). Her antigay comments elicited calls from Sister Namibia 
and The Rainbow Project for Mushelenga to resign. 
The Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied 
recognized that this dilemma also had an international dimension. Namibian and South African 
LGBT social movement organizational staff and members were concerned about a possible 
growing backlash against LGBT organizing throughout Africa. Thus, Namibian and South 
African LGBT organizations found ways to forge connections with other African LGBT activists 
and social movement organizations. By helping struggling LGBT organizations in other African 
countries, such as Kenya and Uganda, Namibian and South African LGBT organizational staff 
hoped that they could generate a unified pan-African LGBT movement. If the movement existed 
in enough African countries, they decided, antigay opponents would find it difficult to ignore 
African sexual and gender minority organizing and to sustain the claim that homosexuality was 
unAfrican. Using ethnographic and interview data, I explore how Namibian and South African 
LGBT SMOs navigated the strategic dilemma of public presentation, specifically by proving that 
homosexuality was African. First, I examine how Behind the Mask and The Rainbow Project 
approached the strategic dilemma of being perceived as unAfrican for soliciting and accepting 
funds from Northern donors. Second, I consider how leaders from Behind the Mask, Sister 
Namibia, and The Rainbow Project, along with other Zimbabwean and South African LGBT 
activists, navigated the strategic dilemma of publicly presenting a pan-African LGBT movement 
to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Third, I explore how leaders from 
Behind the Mask, Sister Namibia, and The Rainbow Project approached the strategic dilemma of 
whether to include transgender persons in the pan-African LGBT activist contingent that would 
attend the African Commission.  
6.1 THE DILEMMA OF A BEING PERCEIVED AS UNAFRICAN 
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The Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied, 
specifically Behind the Mask and The Rainbow Project (TRP), faced a strategic dilemma in their 
relationship with Northern donors. On the one hand, these groups knew that funding from 
Northern donors would allow them to retain staff and engage in advocacy on behalf of Namibian 
and South African sexual and gender minorities, while they would have difficulty locating 
African sources willing to finance controversial issues, such as advocacy for African LGBT 
rights and persons. But such funding risked their efforts to work within a pan-African LGBT 
movement, if they were perceived as unAfrican because they received funding from Northern 
donors.  
Behind the Mask and TRP faced the allegation that because they received funding from 
Northern donors, they were “gay for pay” (Interview, TRP staff member, 22 February 2006). 
“Gay for pay” had different meanings for LGBT social movement organizations and for antigay 
opponents. Some translated the term as suggesting that Africans only engaged in same-sex 
sexual acts with foreigners for money out of financial necessity. Others interpreted “gay for pay” 
in terms of organizational mandate; activists might only claim to represent sexual and gender 
minorities to receive funding for different initiatives, such as poverty alleviation or HIV/AIDS 
prevention, when, in reality, they might not serve LGBT persons at all. This reinforced the belief 
that homosexuality was unAfrican among antigay opponents across the continent who equated 
funding from Northern donors with LGBT social movement organizations obtaining ideas and 
resources for political organizing from non-African sources. According to antigay critics, when 
LGBT SMOs totally relied on foreign funding, they were little more than puppets of Northern 
donors (Epprecht 2001; Oswin 2005; Richardson 2005). For critics, Northern donors were 
sources for sexual and gender identities that disrupted indigenous and traditional African social 
norms, and LGBT organizations that received international funding operated neither 
independently nor in an authentically African way. Within a growing pan-African LGBT 
movement, some activists voiced concerns that Northern funding damaged their public profile 
with audiences that they wanted to influence in their respective countries. According to those 
activists opposed to relying solely on Northern funding, depending too much on Northern 
sources not only diminished LGBT social movement organizations’ resourcefulness and 
innovation, but also prevented LGBT organizations from working with one another across 
nations (ICC and GALZ 2004:8). Such African LGBT activists feared that they would never be 
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able to forge a truly “African” LGBT movement because LGBT social movement organizations 
would have to submit their ideas and projects to Northern donors before getting funding. In other 
words, an African LGBT movement would always bear the rubber stamp of Northern donors’ 
approval and might never attain visibility and credibility with different audiences.  
Like Sister Namibia and the Forum for the Empowerment of Women (FEW), Behind the 
Mask and TRP decided to accept funding from Northern donors and continue to solicit funding 
from such sources. This strategic choice placed these SMOs in a position of being indebted to 
Northern donors. When donors requested that Behind the Mask and TRP perform a task, they 
had little choice but to accept or risk losing some or all of their funding.  
In 2005-6, Northern donors, namely Hivos and the Ford Foundation, asked Behind the 
Mask and TRP to work with struggling LGBT social movement organizations in Kenya, Uganda, 
and Tanzania.72 Northern donors were responding to dysfunctions they had encountered in 2003 
when they began funding young LGBT SMOs in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. They grew 
concerned when they learned that some organizations had obtained funding under possibly false 
pretenses. Donors hired an independent researcher to investigate where their funds went and 
which LGBT SMOs were or were not legitimate. Donors defined legitimate SMOs as those that 
could account for how they spent funds and carried out projects they included in their annual 
reports. In other words, legitimate SMOs documented their activities and spending in ways that 
assured them a public profile. With respect to the alleged fraud among LGBT organizations, 
donors reasoned that they could not indefinitely fund LGBT SMOs in Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania that kept “disappearing into bottomless pits” (Interview, TRP staff, 3 July 2006). 
Donors wanted assurances that these organizations would have some longevity and could be 
accountable for funds and training. Thanks to the independent researcher, donors discovered that 
SMOs had been submitting annual reports that “could not be true” (Interview, TRP staff, 3 July 
2006). Repressive laws prevented public LGBT organizing and other forms of critical 
oppositional political organizing in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, as donors knew. As a result, 
                                                 
72 According to the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) (2005:30), Hivos, a Dutch 
nongovernmental organization, mainly finances “HIV prevention” and work with men who have sex with men. As a 
former antiapartheid organization, Hivos has maintained a financial and political commitment to organizations in 
southern Africa (http://www.hivos.nl, accessed 4 May 2007). The Ford Foundation’s East Africa Office funded this 
investigation through its “Education, Sexuality, and Religion program,” which aims to “build knowledge, develop 
policy and deepen public understanding of sexuality and its relationship to human fulfillment, culture, religion, and 
identity” (Urgent Action Fund 2005:41).  
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these LGBT social movement organizations could not have held large public events without 
drawing attention and ire from the police or Kenyan, Ugandan, or Tanzanian state (Tamale 
2007:21). When the donor-hired researcher interviewed individuals in Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania who claimed to represent LGBT organizations that received funding from Northern 
donors and that had hundreds of members, owned property, and/or held large events, she 
discovered that many claims were only partially true. For instance, LGBT organizations that had 
existed for less than a year in a repressive country likely did not have hundreds of members 
because LGBT persons might not want to join an organization officially in the event that the 
state cracked down on LGBT organizing and seized organizational records. The donor-hired 
researcher learned that in a few cases, individuals did not work with LGBT persons at all. In fact, 
when interviewed by the donor-hired researcher, some admitted they hardly knew any LGBT 
people. Instead, such individuals improperly obtained and used funds from Northern donors. 
Northern donors turned to southern African LGBT activists to help solve the funding 
problem in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Donors invited the directors of Behind the Mask and 
TRP to act as consultants with budding LGBT social movement organizations and disseminate 
the donor-hired researcher’s findings among activists in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. The 
directors were tasked with conducting in-country meetings with activists in each country. 
However, they canceled the meeting with Tanzanian LGBT activists for several reasons. First, 
they had fewer contacts among Tanzanian LGBT activists who would be willing to participate in 
such a meeting; issues of trust and fear of being outed kept some Tanzanian LGBT activists from 
attending. Second, since many activists were not proficient in English, it presented a language 
barrier for the Behind the Mask and TRP directors. Third, religious differences would have made 
it difficult for them to discuss the researcher’s findings. TRP’s director hailed from Namibia 
where 95% of the population identified as Christian, and in Tanzania, many LGBT activists 
identified as Muslim; adherents of each belief system defined and interpreted gender and 
sexuality differently, according to TRP’s director. In this way, cultural and religious differences 
posed potentially insurmountable obstacles to a pan-African LGBT movement. 
Going into the meeting, donors and the Behind the Mask and TRP directors expected 
Ugandan and Kenyan LGBT activists to develop country-specific strategies and an overall 
regional strategy. They also hoped the meeting would also help foster trust among activists, who 
had apparently been fighting among themselves. At the meetings with Ugandan and Kenyan 
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activists, the Behind the Mask and TRP directors talked about the research findings and 
explicated that activists would not immediately and automatically receive funds from donors 
simply because they attended these meetings. They also helped meeting attendees enumerate 
their needs, which donors defined as obstacles that kept SMOs from applying and receiving 
donor funding. After the meetings, both directors recommended that donors meet individually 
with SMOs to assess the risk and worth of investing in them.  
Donors assumed that LGBT activists from Kenya and Uganda would listen to and work 
well with southern African LGBT activists, presumably because of their common collective 
identity as Africans. Donors also supposed that activists’ common experience of organizing amid 
state homophobia and repression would enable southern African activists to have access to more 
information about Kenyan and Ugandan LGBT organizations’ needs than Europeans or North 
Americans would have (Interview, TRP staff, 3 July 2006). As the directors of Behind the Mask 
and TRP learned, Kenyan and Ugandan LGBT activists were wary of southern African activists 
because they feared being outed publicly more than anything, due to the hostile political 
situations in which they operated.  
Self-preservation initially motivated Behind the Mask and TRP’s directors’ decision to 
participate as facilitators. In 2003, southern African LGBT activists learned that the fate of their 
organizations might be intertwined with that of Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian SMOs, 
prompting them to cultivate an interest in identifying the problems in the region. Hivos informed 
its African LGBT “partner” organizations in an email message that it was difficult to work with 
LGBT SMOs in East Africa. 
On several occasions organisations did not show up for scheduled meetings with 
Hivos staff. Correspondence is often slow and questions raised are not answered 
or answered too late. Narrative and financial reports are sent too late and do not 
provide sufficient insight into the results of the project supported. When contract 
periods end no follow up proposals for further support are submitted. New 
proposals arrive very late. Meanwhile organisations are building up debt because 
office rent and utilities are not paid and subsequently expect Hivos to pay for 
these debts. 
As a result of these experiences, Hivos opted to “discontinue” direct funding to African LGBT 
social movement organizations and explore indirect means of support such as “short courses or 
exchange meetings.” Due to the East African financial scams, Hivos, in particular, suspended 
funding to some LGBT organizations, with the exception of southern African SMOs, such as 
TRP, the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe, and Behind the Mask. After Hivos disclosed its 
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concerns, Behind the Mask and TRP staff worried that scam artists had referred to their 
organizations in their fraudulent funding applications, sullying the organizations’ names without 
staff knowing a scam was taking place. Behind the Mask and TRP staff members also grew 
concerned that widespread fraud could result in cessation of funding of all LGBT projects in 
Africa, which would jeopardize their operations (Interview, BTM staff, 22 February 2006). Thus, 
they developed a vested interest in ascertaining the existence of East African LGBT social 
movement organizations and decided to honor Northern donors’ request that they work with 
Kenyan, Ugandan, and Tanzanian LGBT activists. 
Interest in creating and sustaining a pan-African LGBT movement also motivated Behind 
the Mask and TRP’s directors’ choice to participate in investigating and mentoring Kenyan and 
Ugandan LGBT activists. The Rainbow Project, in particular, benefited from similar advice and 
mentoring from the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe and the South African National Coalition 
for Gay and Lesbian Equality. Behind the Mask and TRP staff believed their organizations 
should continue the tradition of supporting struggling LGBT organizations elsewhere. According 
to a TRP staff member,  
[W]e would not have been where we were. [The Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe 
and the South African National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality] were 
very actively involved in helping us strategizing and doing workshops . . . so that 
we could acquire the skills that were necessary in helping us understand the 
political landscape as it was unfolding in Namibia and helping us understand why 
we should not be tackling some laws and giving some attention to other. . . . So in 
that sense they were really invaluable to us (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 
2006). 
The staff member describes how the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe and the Coalition 
supported TRP’s development through mentoring. The Coalition played an especially significant 
role by advising TRP to pursue the decriminalization of sodomy cautiously. Sharing their 
organizing experiences with budding LGBT social movement organizations in East Africa 
appealed to TRP staff because they “wanted to play a role in providing assistance and support to 
some of the young LGBT initiatives out there,” which donors supported in principle and with 
funding (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006). Similarly, Behind the Mask was partly 
founded to ensure African LGBT activists could access information about homophobia and 
LGBT movement success in other African countries and to train activists to report on political 
developments related to LGBT organizing in their countries. Both Behind the Mask and TRP 
  162
consulted with new LGBT social movement organizations in neighboring countries early in their 
history, as a TRP staff member explained. 
And so from the beginning Hivos, for instance, would push us to engage with 
young groups in . . .  Botswana . . . .  And . . . a precedent was set.  So when the 
East Africa Initiative . . .  came up and [donors] had to identify organizations, by 
then, Behind the Mask, for instance, were already involved in training in different 
southern African countries. They [donors] found that TRP and BTM [Behind the 
Mask] were the most suitable organizations to help these organizations through 
some of the difficulties that they experienced because in East Africa there wasn't 
an established LGBT organization (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006).  
Due to TRP’s experience trying to initiate LGBT organizing in Botswana and Behind the Mask’s 
training of activists to chronicle their organizing experiences, donors sought them out as well-
equipped mentors. Northern donors could rely on Behind the Mask and TRP to advise struggling 
organizations in East Africa, an example of the close ties between these organizations and 
donors. Namibian and South African LGBT organizations could prove to donors that they were 
using funds in ways that supported and sustained the LGBT movement’s growth in other African 
countries. And Behind the Mask and TRP regarded this as a way to create a stronger African 
LGBT movement. 
[E]very established LGBT organization on the continent, in the end, benefits your 
position. Because if there's a strong voice in Kenya and there's a strong voice in 
Uganda and Tanzania, you know we can break away of this whole issue of it 
[homosexuality] being unAfrican (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006).  
Despite what seemed to be a mutually beneficial working arrangement, the directors of 
Behind the Mask and TRP felt uncomfortable playing any role in evaluating East African LGBT 
organizations for funding. They believed it was problematic for a LGBT social movement 
organization to vet newer organizations for funding. This situation placed established social 
movement organizations in an unequal power relationship with new or struggling LGBT 
organizations. LGBT organizations with international funding such as Behind the Mask could 
put “more grassroots organisations” at a disadvantage because donors flocked to the former, 
boosting their public visibility while “contribut[ing] to the invisibility and/or the de-resourcing of 
less mainstream organisations,” such as struggling LGBT organizations in East Africa (Chasin 
2000:202, cited in Richardson 2005:528). Behind the Mask and TRP staff had thought about how 
to handle this contradiction. In particular, a TRP staff member believed that an organization’s 
continued funding benefited the African LGBT movement, even though organizations might  
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be competing for the same resources. . . .  I don't necessarily think that is 
unhealthy. I do believe, however, that there's a bigger picture. . . . It's great that at 
the moment, TRP has access to donors; we have close relationships with them. 
The donor money seems to come to us much easier than to most other 
organizations. . . .  And that is good. But I think there's a bigger picture that as 
TRP we're trying to see. . . . [W]e really feel that a movement in other African 
countries benefits the continent. We see how things spill over” (Interview, TRP 
staff member, 11 July 2006).  
Behind the Mask and TRP staff did not believe that applying for organizations funds from 
Northern donors conflicted with their commitments to helping struggling LGBT activists and 
movement organizations elsewhere in Africa because if they ceased to exist, then there would no 
continental watchdogs for LGBT rights. Behind the Mask and TRP staff couched their 
organizations’ work in a pan-African LGBT movement context.  
To outsiders, foreign donors might seem unusually interested and invested in cultivating 
the LGBT movement in East Africa, as evidenced by their recruitment of the directors of Behind 
the Mask and TRP to brief Kenyan and Ugandan LGBT activists on the donor-hired researcher’s 
findings about fraud among East African LGBT organizations. As a TRP staff member 
commented, the repressive “political atmosphere in these countries [was] ripe for LGBT 
activism,” implying that the political repression of LGBT organizing could generate outrage and 
organized resistance against the increasingly authoritarian Ugandan and Kenyan state leaders 
(Interview, 22 February 2006). For example, President Yoweri Museveni’s increasing 
unpopularity with Ugandans might jeopardize his chances for another term in office. Namibian 
and South African LGBT activists believed that Uganda was “becoming another Zimbabwe. 
Everyone’s being stepped on as the government becomes more and more paranoid. It’s now 
more of a police state than it used to be” (Interview, TRP staff, 22 February 2006). The TRP 
director claimed he could feel the air thicken with oppression when he stepped off the plane in 
Entebbe during a visit to consult with Ugandan LGBT activists. A Behind the Mask staff 
member reported experiencing similar feelings of discomfort when she attended a weeklong 
conference on developments in information and communications technologies in Uganda. 
Former Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi was widely criticized for his authoritarian leadership, 
evidenced by election fraud and his threats to fire civil servants who supported the political 
opposition (Brown 2001:726; 2004). Much like former Namibian President Sam Nujoma, he 
condemned homosexuality while he was in office, though the Kenyan state “assume[d] the . . . . 
LGBT community is too small to warrant its time and attention. . . . Current LGBT organisations 
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therefore operate so as not to antagonise the government” and opt to become publicly invisible 
(Baraka 2005:27). Thus, Namibian and South African LGBT SMO leaders and Northern donors 
interpreted the state repression of sexual and gender minority organizing as an indicator of 
mounting authoritarianism in postcolonial African nations, such as Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, and 
Cameroon (see also Melber 2004). 
State officials in postcolonial African nations hostile to LGBT organizing additionally 
opposed LGBT organizing as a way to curb foreign cultural and political influence in their 
countries. Such opposition was consistent with their concerns about being recolonized by 
Northern countries. Some governments proposed legislation to prevent LGBT organizations 
from registering with the state (Nigeria) or simply refused to let them to register at all (Uganda). 
This presented Northern donors and East African LGBT activists with a vexing problem. Unlike 
southern African countries such as Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa that are based on the 
Roman-Dutch legal system, the Ugandan state follows the English legal system and requires 
social movement organizations to register with the state as voluntary associations in order to 
receive funding from foreign sources. As long as LGBT SMOs remained unregistered, they 
could not receive funds from donors. Donors could channel money through other registered 
organizations and develop the movement in each country, but they would prefer to let SMOs 
gain expertise in handling and being accountable for the funds. More importantly, donors had to 
obey the laws within the countries in which LGBT social movement organizations operate. This 
would bar them from channeling funds to underground activists in countries that did not let 
LGBT social movement organizations register with the state. 
All the Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied 
consistently encountered the strategic dilemma of being perceived as unAfrican for receiving 
funding from Northern donors. However, they opted to continue applying and receiving funding 
from them, even though it jeopardized their credibility and claim to be African. Suspending or 
scaling back their efforts did not appeal to LGBT SMO staff; hence, they decided to keep 
applying for and receiving funding from Northern donors. This strategic dilemma of being 
perceived as unAfrican for soliciting and accepting money from Northern donors is related to a 
dilemma of how to present a pan-African LGBT movement publicly to an African institutional 
political body. 
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6.2 THE DILEMMA OF PRESENTING A PAN-AFRICAN LGBT MOVEMENT 
 Activists faced two dilemmas related to presenting themselves as a pan-African LGBT 
movement to an African human rights body. First, staff members of Behind the Mask, Sister 
Namibia, and The Rainbow Project (TRP), along with other southern African, European, and 
North American LGBT activists, had to decide if they would press LGBT rights violations at the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The African Commission would be one of 
the first times for the African LGBT movement to present itself to an African political 
institution; hence, its first impression on commissioners was important to Namibian and South 
African LGBT social movement organizational staff. If African LGBT activists remained silent 
about sexual and gender minority rights abuses, then officials in their respective countries might 
continue to turn a blind eye to such violations. However, if African LGBT activists moved 
forward with abuse claims, they could spotlight how LGBT rights abuses qualify as human rights 
abuses and insist that the African Commission lean on African nations in which such abuses 
were rampant. In other words, African LGBT activists could effect top-down change if the 
African Commission ordered member nations of the African Union to stop persecuting sexual 
and gender minorities. Second, they had to determine how to present a unified African LGBT 
movement for the first time to the African Commission. Attending the meeting as self-identified 
African LGBT activists could help elevate the pan-African LGBT movement’s continental 
visibility and dispel the misconception that homosexuality was unAfrican. On the other hand, 
emerging publicly as a united African LGBT movement might detract attention away from the 
contingent’s LGBT rights abuse claims, if commissioners and those in attendance viewed an 
African LGBT movement as a spectacle. Thus, presenting themselves publicly would likely be 
tricky, as activists would have to decide who could join the contingent, which violations to 
pursue, and to which audiences they would introduce a pan-African LGBT movement. 
In March 2006, representatives from the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission (IGLHRC) convened a meeting of southern African LGBT activists, including staff 
members from Sister Namibia, The Rainbow Project, and Behind the Mask, to discuss 
broadening and forging a pan-African LGBT movement. Behind the Mask hosted the meeting, 
befitting the organization’s reputation for updating African LGBT activists about what was 
happening throughout the continent. The IGLHRC representatives broached the possibility of 
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approaching the African Commission with LGBT human rights abuse claims at the meeting in 
Banjul, The Gambia, in May 2006. Proving the organization’s reputation as an international 
authority on sexual and gender minority rights, the IGLHRC representative first described her 
organization’s objectives, record with approaching regional and supranational human rights 
commissions elsewhere, and interest in collaborating with African LGBT activists. She cast 
IGLHRC as an advocacy organization, focused on documenting LGBT human rights abuses 
cooperatively with local LGBT activist groups. After elucidating how IGLHRC had worked with 
Special Rapporteurs at the United Nations (UN) at the 1995 Beijing, 2000 Beijing +5, and 2005 
Beijing +10 meetings to disseminate information about LGBT human rights violations, which 
gave the organization some international credibility (Bob 2005; Tarrow 2005), a representative 
stressed, “The UN isn’t going to save us,” though she admitted that it was an important vehicle 
for addressing violations. Revising its focus from the supranational to the regional level, 
IGLHRC had partnered with Latin American LGBT SMOs and regional human rights 
commissions, such as the European Union Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights. Despite success with legal human rights tactics, an IGLHRC representative posed 
two important questions to the southern African LGBT activists who attended the meeting: “Will 
changing laws necessarily change culture? Is it possible to work with the African Commission?” 
Casting the African Commission of Human and Peoples’ Rights as a potential political 
opportunity constituted a reversal of position for IGLHRC (Murray and Viljoen 2007:106). In 
2000, IGLHRC had advised against filing LGBT human rights complaints with the African 
Commission because if activists did not give commissioners adequate warning and time to 
prepare for the contentious issue of sexual and gender minority rights, commissioners might 
sanction “the idea that homosexuality is opposed to ‘African values.’ Such a precedent would be 
extremely difficult to reverse” (IGLHRC 2000:39, qtd. in Murray and Viljoen 2007:106).  
Before making a decision about whether to regard the African Commission as a political 
opportunity for drawing attention to LGBT human rights violations on the continent, activists 
named obstacles to LGBT organizing in African countries. They linked these obstacles to LGBT 
human rights abuses appropriate for the African Commission to address. Activists enumerated 
different pressing issues facing African sexual and gender minorities, including the following: 
lack of access to information; freedom of expression; police impunity, harassment, torture, 
extortion, and illegal detention; difficulties organizing and registering with the state as LGBT 
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rights organizations; violence and hate crimes; state and religious homophobia; lack of research 
on LGBT issues; and the eroding rule of law and weakening judiciaries. This inventory put 
parameters on subsequent discussions of what would constitute the pan-African LGBT 
movement’s agenda at the African Commission, encouraging activists to strive for clarity and 
consistency in articulating their goals. Naming countries in which LGBT human rights abuses 
were egregious, such as Cameroon, Nigeria, and Uganda, convinced activists of the need to bring 
these abuses to the African Commission’s attention. They decided to regard the African 
Commission as a political opportunity for addressing LGBT rights violations on the continent 
and to plan to attend the upcoming meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 2006. Activists’ 
support for this plan grew when an IGLHRC representative mentioned that a commissioner 
informed him that the African Commission would welcome a sexual minority rights case.  
In light of such possible receptiveness at the African Commission, activists believed that 
addressing the antigay backlash in Nigeria was even more urgent for activists. In December 
2005, IGLHRC invited six African LGBT activists to the 14th International Conference on 
HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections in Africa conference in Abuja, Nigeria. As a 
result of the recent legalization of same-sex marriage in South Africa and LGBT activists’ 
presence at the conference, Nigerian lawmakers and supporters of a bill drafted preemptive 
legislation that would outlaw same-sex marriage and prevent sexual and gender minority 
activists from forming organizations or registering with the state (Ekwowusi 2006). An IGLHRC 
representative who attended the Nigerian conference seemed astounded that the “queer noise” 
they made in Abuja resulted in this legislation, although he noted, “When there’s activism, 
there’s a response.” Activists at the IGLHRC meeting discussed how this response constituted a 
negative response to South Africa’s dominance as a progressive nation beloved by Northern 
democracies and to the idea that LGBT activists were “importing [homosexuality] from southern 
Africa all of a sudden” (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006). Due to the political 
fragility that the legal preemption of LGBT organizing and same-sex marriage in Nigeria 
represented, activists recognized that they had to present an LGBT movement that the African 
Commission recognized as “African.” If African LGBT activists did not present the movement 
as African, such as through their depiction of LGBT rights abuses, commissioners and NGOs 
could dismiss the movement as the puppet of Northern donors.  
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Analyzing the antigay outcry in Nigeria led activists and IGLHRC representatives to 
question whether the African Commission constituted an international political opportunity after 
all. Southern African LGBT activists shared the IGLHRC representative’s understanding that 
antigay legislation and homophobia were negative responses to sexual minority visibility in 
Africa. The IGLHRC representative warned that a “direct push to file” a claim with the African 
Commission might not be the best approach because it could spawn a worse backlash in 
countries like Cameroon where police had arrested, detained, and convicted several alleged gay 
men and lesbians of sodomy, a punishable legal offense, a few months earlier. An IGLHRC 
representative also reminded participants of the prevalent perception in Africa that once LGBT 
issues showed up in the press, they would be on everyone’s radar, increasing the likelihood of a 
backlash against sexual minorities. While understanding the potential negative response that 
might accompany the increased public visibility of an LGBT activist contingent at the African 
Commission, some participants advocated filing LGBT human rights abuse complaints there, 
albeit with some parameters. Proposed parameters involved framing sexual and gender minority 
rights violations within a framework that commissioners would understand. For instance, a 
member of the Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe suggested that activists should frame sodomy 
laws and the death penalty as colonial laws. Southern African LGBT activists agreed that they 
wanted to encourage the African Commission to recommend that some African nations no longer 
punish sodomy or homosexuality with a death sentence. They were savvy in linking sodomy 
laws and the death penalty because they could introduce a hot-button issue, the decriminalization 
of sodomy, through a more benign issue, the elimination of the death penalty. In addition, by 
casting sodomy and the death penalty as left over from colonialism, southern African LGBT 
activists hoped to capitalize on commissioners’ preference for decolonizing legal statutes. By 
packaging the potentially contentious issue of decriminalizing sodomy with a commonly 
understood human rights violation, the death penalty, southern African LGBT activists intended 
to present an image of an African LGBT movement as not making waves and as working within 
a preexisting African political framework.  
A concern related to the packaging of LGBT rights abuse complaints was preparing 
audiences for the complaint and which audiences at the African Commission might be the most 
sympathetic. Staff members from Behind the Mask, Sister Namibia, and TRP knew about the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) rejection of the International Lesbian 
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and Gay Association’s application in January 2006 for consultative status on lesbian, gay, 
bisexual, and transgender issues without a hearing “[f]or the first time in [ECOSOC’s] history” 
(ILGA 2006a). A European LGBT activist living in Zimbabwe suggested the Nongovernmental 
Organisation (NGO) Forum as a safe place to announce the African LGBT movement’s presence 
and to facilitate networking with interested and sympathetic human rights NGOs. At the NGO 
Forum, many African and international organizations “discuss particular themes which are then 
usually presented in a number of resolutions to the Commission, some of which it goes on to 
adopt in its own forum” (Murray and Viljoen 2007:110).  
The NGO Forum could be an important sounding board for the African Commission 
because it responded more positively to complaints and resolutions that appeared first before the 
NGO Forum (Murray and Viljoen 2007:110). An IGLHRC representative warned against 
springing LGBT human rights resolutions on unsuspecting NGOs or the African Commission 
because the global LGBT movement “got killed in Geneva” when a Brazilian contingent 
advanced a resolution at the United Nations without consulting other organizations. She 
suggested strategically inserting references to sexual minorities on mainstream issues that 
affected many people; she noted that IGLHRC succeeded in getting language about sexual 
minorities and orientation included in torture legislation because “no one wants to say, ‘It’s okay 
to torture gays.’” Reminding African activists of IGLHRC’s successes and experience might 
have encouraged participants to suggest mainstreaming LGBT issues by interjecting them into 
other discussions at the NGO Forum, such as those about torture and illegal detention, and 
gauging the response. The group of southern African LGBT activists deliberated how to infiltrate 
and participate in the NGO Forum. A Sister Namibia staff member advocated approaching 
feminist NGOs that had prior experience working with the African Commission. Southern 
African LGBT activists also concurred that those who went to Banjul, The Gambia, to attend the 
African Commission’s meeting should resist the temptation to dominate discussions by 
portraying LGBT issues as more dire than other situations. For instance, a member of the Gays 
and Lesbians of Zimbabwe warned against exaggerating LGBT human rights abuses not only 
because the African LGBT movement could be discredited as too self-important, but also 
because hyperbolized LGBT rights abuses could enable the African Commission to set aside 
serious, widespread human rights violations in places like Darfur, Sudan, in favor of addressing 
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LGBT rights abuses first. The Zimbabwean activist acknowledged that some human rights 
abuses were just as pressing, if not more so, than LGBT rights violations. 
The strategic choices that southern African LGBT activists made at the March meeting 
resulted in moderate success. When the contingent of LGBT activists from throughout Africa 
attended the African Commission’s meeting in Banjul, The Gambia, in May 2006, they liaised 
with a Nigerian human rights NGO. The NGO allowed a member of the contingent, a 
Cameroonian lesbian woman who had obtained asylum in the United States, to take its first 
“speaking slot and address the case of illegally detained and imprisoned gay men and lesbians in 
Cameroon” (Fieldnotes, 15 May 2006). According to a Sister Namibia staff member who was 
part of the African LGBT activist contingent, commissioners “‘perked up’ when [the 
Cameroonian lesbian woman] addressed the plight of gays and lesbians, perhaps because it was 
the first time someone from an LGBT organization had addressed the African Commission or 
because LGBT issues titillated the commissioners” (Fieldnotes, 15 May 2006). Staff members 
from Sister Namibia and The Rainbow Project regarded their trip to the African Commission as 
successful because no one refused to grant them access to the NGO Forum or to the African 
Commission, and they forged ties with Nigerian and other African feminist and human rights 
organizations. In a sense, they packaged the pan-African LGBT movement’s concerns about 
LGBT rights violations in a way that fit preexisting discussions about human rights. Careful 
deliberation about which strategic choices to make regarding how to present a pan-African 
LGBT movement to the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights resulted in success 
for activists’ first foray into this venue, in the opinion of Sister Namibia and The Rainbow 
Project staff members.  
6.3 THE DILEMMA OF INCLUDING TRANSGENDERED ACTIVISTS IN A PAN-
AFRICAN LGBT MOVEMENT 
A strategic dilemma that emerged during the discussion about how to present a pan-
African LGBT movement to the African Commission involved whether to include transgender 
activists in the contingent. On the one hand, including transgender activists would be consistent 
with some Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations’ efforts to 
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overturn exclusionary apartheid policies and to represent the interests of marginalized sexual and 
gender minorities. On the other hand, commissioners and representatives of African NGOs might 
become confused by the presence of transgender activists alongside gay, lesbian, and bisexual 
activists and concentrate on the difference of transgender activists, instead of the merits of LGBT 
rights abuse claims.  
Participants initially disagreed about the level and type of visibility activists should have 
at the African Commission meeting. Such disagreements demonstrated the lack of consensus 
about what a pan-African LGBT movement should look like. They drew on their knowledge of 
sexual and gender minority organizing throughout the continent to explain possible restrictions 
on organizing. Everyone agreed on an equal representation of men and women and a black 
African majority, which would help the contingent to debunk the myth that only whites were 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender. A European LGBT activist living in Zimbabwe suggested 
that the contingent should not include transgender individuals because their presence might 
unnerve conservative African leaders and attract unwanted negative attention to LGBT issues. 
He argued that it would be more strategic to introduce issues and activists whom commissioners 
would understand, namely gay and lesbian activists. He worried that including transgender 
activists and issues on the first time LGBT activists approached the African Commission would 
derail their efforts to address LGBT human rights abuses because African officials would 
concentrate on trying to understand what being transgender means or disparage transgender 
individuals because they did not understand them. An IGLHRC representative contextualized the 
European activist’s concern by acknowledging that transgender activism was not as 
mainstreamed with African sexual minority activism, as it had been in Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Argentina, but disagreed with him about delaying the inclusion of transgender activists. Other 
southern African LGBT activists also demurred and stated they would invite transgender 
activists if they could identify individuals willing to participate publicly as transgender persons. 
Southern African LGBT activists’ unity was indicative of their reputation for being inclusionary 
by using criteria that international human rights and LGBT organizations favored. Overall, 
African activists agreed on a policy of inclusion to ensure that the African LGBT activist 
contingent to the African Commission represented the diversity of the LGBT movement on the 
continent and decided to include transgender activists in the contingent.  
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The dilemma of whether and how to include transgender activists in the African LGBT 
contingent—or how to present the African LGBT movement—dovetailed with another strategic 
dilemma: how to deal with the growing perception that South Africa’s political progressiveness 
in terms of protecting sexual minority rights and affording same-gender couples the right to 
marry was a threat to state officials in African nations who favored a more conservative social 
and political agenda. For instance, Nigerian lawmakers interpreted the presence of African 
LGBT activists at an AIDS conference in Abuja and South Africa’s marriage equality laws as 
threats. A Namibian LGBT activist asserted that it was not just South African LGBT activism 
that alienated antigay opponents in West and East Africa, but also the visibility of southern 
African LGBT activists from Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe since the mid-1990s. 
According to a TRP staff member, opponents had “the idea that we’re importing it 
[homosexuality] from southern Africa all of a sudden because that's the new argument that we're 
hearing more and more (Interview, TRP staff member, 11 July 2006). In this sense, antigay 
opponents regard southern African LGBT activists as a front for Northern dominance, due in part 
to their reliance on Northern donor funding, as I elucidated above. The visibility of Namibian, 
South African, and Zimbabwean LGBT social movement organizational staff as leaders of a 
budding African LGBT movement could pose problems for its development, if suspicion about 
southern African activists’ dominance persisted among African LGBT activists and antigay 
opponents. 
Once again, I turn to the dilemma of public presentation that LGBT activists faced in 
proving that homosexuality was African through a pan-African LGBT movement. It seems 
difficult to speak of a unified pan-African LGBT movement, which was in its infancy, when the 
movements in Namibia and South Africa developed so differently around incorporating and 
understanding transgender persons, rights, and issues. For instance, southern African LGBT 
activists did not discuss bringing transgender rights violations to the attention of the African 
Commission. This may have been due to a lack of clarity about what transgender rights and 
issues were in the pan-African LGBT movement and within individual African nations. 
Differences in LGBT movement development across African nations underscore the dilemma of 
including identities, rights, and issues that Namibians, South Africans, and Africans in other 
countries have not claimed and forging a unified African LGBT movement. How can the pan-
African LGBT movement represent transgender identities, rights, and issues when some 
  173
movements have not clearly defined or organized around them, and others have incorporated 
transgender rights and issues? How can movements that unfold differently unify under an 
umbrella of a pan-African LGBT movement?  
6.3.1 Incorporating the “T” with the “LGB” in Namibia and South Africa 
Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations strove to be 
inclusionary in the wake of exclusionary apartheid policies and laws, but differed in their 
handling of and timing in integrating transgender rights and issues. Staff at Behind the Mask and 
TRP recognized the hurdles they faced in including and representing bisexual and transgender 
members. It makes sense to compare the delay in including bisexual and transgender persons and 
concerns in Namibian and South African LGBT organizations because, according to one critic, 
contemporary activists still have “a long way to go in terms of inserting the B [bisexual] and T 
[transgender] into the G&L [gay and lesbian] discourse, and thus officially beginning to 
recognise sexual preference beyond . . . homo and hetero” (Muthien 2005:56). Thus, there have 
been slippages in Namibian and South African LGBT movement organizations and their 
structures, related to the gradual introduction of bisexual and transgender persons, rights, and 
issues. 
In the mid-twentieth century and beyond, gay and lesbian identities gained traction 
among South African sexual and gender minorities both as social and collective political 
identities. Much discourse about sexual minority organizing in South Africa before the late 
1980s only referred to gay and lesbian activism. In contrast, bisexual persons, rights, and 
identities historically were invisible in South African society and within sexual and gender 
minority organizing. Few black, coloured, and white bisexuals publicly claimed a bisexual 
identity probably because they were married, and “heterosexual marriage and procreation are 
strongly enforced social obligations” (Stobie 2003:45). Married men and women who engaged in 
same-sex sexual practices were unlikely to advance bisexual interests publicly because they had 
not publicly embraced their bisexuality.  
Another reason for the invisibility of bisexual persons in South Africa was the 
polarization of homosexuality and heterosexuality. Some activists and researchers perpetuated 
this dichotomy by claiming African men and women who had sexual and romantic relationships 
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with members of the same and opposite gender as gay men and lesbians, instead of treating them 
as bisexual persons (Stobie 2003, see also Kendall 1999). One was either homosexual or 
heterosexual, making bisexuality an impossible personal or collective identity to realize. Thus, 
bisexual persons found themselves rejected by gay, lesbian, and heterosexual persons and 
communities. A South African bisexual woman explained that gay men and lesbians did not trust 
bisexuals. “Sometimes we are seen as sitting on the fence and enjoying the best of both worlds; 
usually we are seen as being unable to come out of the closet” (Sam 1995:191). As a result, 
“[m]ost lesbian and gay organisations [didn’t] really cater for bisexuals” or transgender persons 
(Sam 1995:191).  
In the 1980s, most South African gay social movement organizations concentrated only 
on gay or lesbian issues. Later in the 1980s, a few gay and lesbian SMOs incorporated bisexual 
concerns. By the mid-1990s, the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality had publicly 
integrated transgender persons, rights, and issues into its claim to represent the interests of 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons. With the notable exception of the Forum for the 
Empowerment for Women (FEW), most South African social movement organizations include 
bisexual and transgender in their descriptions. Recently transgender organizing took off in South 
Africa. A transgender SMO called Gender DynamiX, based in Cape Town, worked with South 
African LGBT social movement organizations on incorporating transgender issues and interests 
into their work. Unlike South African LGBT organizations, The Rainbow Project (TRP) in 
Namibia included transgender rights and issues in its goal-setting process from its start in 1997. 
In its constitution, TRP described itself as mobilizing around “equal rights and opportunities for 
gays, lesbians, bisexuals and transsexuals and any other group that suffers discrimination in 
public life and under law.” Later, TRP substituted “transgender” for “transsexual” in its self-
description.  
Transgender persons were not always invisible in South Africa and Namibia, when they 
constituted the same country. The apartheid regime offered a few perquisites for gender 
minorities, specifically for transsexual persons, which are unavailable today (Swarr 2003). 
Black, white, and coloured transsexual persons could undergo sex reassignment surgery and 
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could legally change their identity documents to reflect their altered gender under apartheid 
(Swarr 2003).73  
[P]oor South Africans (most often those who were coloured or black, as a result 
of apartheid’s linked racial and economic policies) were increasingly given access 
to free sex reassignment procedures. . . . Such procedures had contradictory 
causes and effects; . . . they legitimized gender binaries by shaping South 
Africans’ bodies to fit them, and . . . they allowed the advancement of apartheid 
medical science with little regard to the suffering caused to transsexuals who had 
to live with the consequences of failed procedures (Swarr 2003:57-8). 
Apartheid authorities believed that performing such surgeries restored gender balance to society 
and social institutions, such as the military, which enforced the regime’s policies and laws. As 
such, transsexuals could obtain sex reassignment surgeries at no financial cost to themselves, 
though as Amanda Lock Swarr (2003) explains, there could be severe physical and psychological 
consequences from botched procedures. The state also used sex reassignment surgeries as means 
of oppression to “correct” gay men and lesbians’ sexualities by changing their genders. Activists 
affiliated with the Lesbian and Gay Equality Project unearthed evidence that South African 
Defence Force (SADF) doctors performed sex reassignment surgeries against the will of at least 
900 gay and lesbian military personnel; SADF intended such surgeries to correct recruits’ sexual 
anomalies by altering their gender (van Zyl et al. 1999). The goal of the Equality Project’s 
research was to uncover evidence of human rights abuses against LGBT persons so that South 
Africans in a post-apartheid era could ensure that such abuses and intolerance were eliminated.  
While sexual minorities were able to obtain legal protection and additional rights after 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was banned in the Constitution, gender 
minorities languished for a few years in South Africa because “transsexuals . . . had no activist 
presence in South Africa” (Swarr 2003:68). It was “impossible to change one’s sex legally” for a 
few years until 2003 (Swarr 2003:42). With the passage of the Alteration of Sex Description and 
Sex Status Act 49 in May 2003, individuals who underwent sex reassignment surgery could 
modify their identity documents to reflect their accurate gender identity (Dirsuweit 2006:336). 
Transgender and intersexed persons could thus register their gender changes with the state. But 
“apart from the odd support group for transgender people, there is very little by way of active 
                                                 
73 Following Amanda Lock Swarr (2003:43-4), I use the term “sex reassignment surgery.” Swarr (2003) uses it 
because South African transsexuals and medical personnel favor it, but acknowledges the incongruity of the term 
because it “supposes that such surgeries bring bodies into alignment with a person’s gender, i.e. that the body has 
developed incorrectly and sex must be ‘reassigned’” (pp. 43-4).
  176
organisation around these communities. Within the LGBTI community, these . . . identities are 
abjected by those who see themselves as the normal majority” (Dirsuweit 2006:336-7). 
Nevertheless, transgender persons, rights, and identities have a history in South Africa and 
Namibia, when the latter was still part of the former. 
6.3.2 Representing Transgender Persons, Rights, and Issues Now 
Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizational staff recognized that 
the low representation of transgender (and bisexual) activists, leaders, and issues was a strategic 
dilemma for their LGBT movements (Muthien 2005:56). How could these organizations make 
claims on behalf of persons who did not exist in their countries? In March 2006, at a Joint 
Working Group meeting, representatives from leading South African LGBT social movement 
organizations pledged to recruit more transgender (and bisexual) persons as members and 
activists. A representative from the new Joint Working Group member organization, Gender 
DynamiX, volunteered to guide the umbrella group through this process 
(www.genderdynamix.co.za, accessed 26 April 2007). In Namibia, The Rainbow Project (TRP) 
decided to pursue public education about gender and sexual identities through workshops for 
members and a weekly radio show, “Talking Pink.” TRP staff acknowledged that few members 
and Namibians knew what it meant to bisexual or transgender.  
On one episode of “Talking Pink” that took place one week after a discussion about 
bisexuality, a pre-operative male-to-female transgender person named Noël called TRP and 
volunteered to participate in an interview with the host and an invited “expert”—TRP’s 
director—about her gender.74 TRP’s director recognized how little Namibians understood about 
gender and sexuality, which was evident in the radio program host’s commentary about what it 
might mean to be transgender.  
Host: [S]he's [Noël] not comfortable in terms of explaining herself [her gender 
and sexuality] to people.  How do you see that? The term gay is more commonly 
used; it's more commonly understood.  So what is your point of view on that? 
TRP director: I think that only now are people really beginning to understand the 
issue of being gay. As we know, there's a lot less tolerance towards bisexual 
                                                 
74 I use a pseudonym for the guest on “Talking Pink” in keeping with the principle of confidentiality and anonymity 
I used with interview participants. 
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people. And at the moment there's no understanding of transgender issues at all. 
And I can imagine what an incredibly difficult time it must be explaining to 
people what it means to be transgender. . . .  
The TRP director acknowledged that few Namibians, even members of The Rainbow Project, 
really understood the meanings attached to being gay. Within the last few years, gay men and 
lesbians felt comfortable and safe enough to come out publicly as homosexual and talk openly 
about their lives on “Talking Pink” and in Namibian print, electronic, and televisual media. 
However, bisexual and transgender persons were invisible to the general Namibian public. The 
director suggested that being visible equated to being understood; if Namibians could see and 
talk to individuals who identified as gay or lesbian, they could understand their experiences. Yet 
this was not the case for bisexual and transgender persons, whose gender and sexuality did not 
correspond to a dichotomy of homosexuality-heterosexuality, which Namibians were beginning 
to understand and tolerate, in the opinion of TRP’s director. A person who visibly deviated from 
dichotomous gender and sexual categories was at risk for violence.  
[R]esearch has shown that transgender people, of all the sexual minorities, 
experience the most violence from outside towards them and that an incredible 
eighty percent of violence that transgender people face come from families of 
people that are close to them. So those are just shocking figures.  And you know, 
with the odds stacked against you like that, who would you want to share the fact 
with that you are transgender?  
TRP’s director acknowledged that transgender persons might not identify publicly as transgender 
in light of the potential for violent responses from strangers and their families. Some families 
employed violence as a means of social control to coerce transgender persons to adhere to 
gendered social norms and familial expectations about individuals marrying persons of the 
opposite gender and having children (Aarmo 1999). The director continued to interrogate 
dichotomous sexual and gender identity categories and asserted,  
I think that more people should be confused about their sexuality, including 
heterosexual people. There's no such thing as a neat little box in which you fit as a 
heterosexual person or I fit as a gay person or Noël fits as a transgender person. 
And so I'm really surprised that there aren't more people that [sic] would 
acknowledge the fact that they are confused . . . . So there's nothing wrong with 
being confused about your sexuality. I do think the old issue that bisexual or 
transgender people specifically are confused is completely nonsense. I do feel that 
bisexual and transgender people go through a much more difficult time coming to 
terms and identifying accurately what their sexuality is. But I think it has a lot to 
do with the fact that there is so little understanding of bisexuality and being 
transgender in our communities (Radio show, 3 July 2006). 
  178
The director acknowledged the relative newness of transgender and bisexuality as identity 
categories and experiences for Namibians. However, even though the director stated that it was 
“nonsense” to believe that bisexual and transgender persons were more “confused” than 
heterosexuals, gay men, or lesbians, bisexual and transgender persons might experience trouble 
expressing their gender and sexual identities to other Namibians who only understood gender 
and sexuality in a dichotomous framework. In light of this difficulty, The Rainbow Project 
decided to educate Namibians and members of the Namibian LGBT community about 
bisexuality and transgender identities. But TRP did not clearly articulate what transgender (or 
bisexual) rights and issues are. For instance, it is evident from the director’s statements that 
violence intended to punish gender nonconformity was a serious issue facing Namibian sexual 
and gender minorities, but TRP did not explicitly frame it as a transgender rights violation. 
Nevertheless, a detailed discussion about bisexual and transgender identities seems to be a first 
step for TRP in putting transgender identities, rights, and discourses into circulation. 
 Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations differ in how and 
when they included and addressed transgender rights, issues, and persons. TRP did not offer a 
clear definition for “transgender.” In contrast, a South African transgender social movement 
organization, Gender DynamiX, defined transgender as “the sense of self [that] is in conflict with 
the gender assigned to a person at birth, and its corresponding stereotypical role.” The 
organization also recognized that transgender could be an umbrella term for different identities, 
such as “transsexual, cross-dressing, transvestite, consciously androgynous people, people who 
are genderqueer, people who live cross-gender, gender blenders, butch women, effeminate men, 
drag kings, and drag queens”  (www.genderdynamix.co.za/content/view/24/115/, accessed 26 
April 2007, emphasis removed). Discussions about how to obtain rights for and represent 
transgender persons are ongoing in South Africa, but they are just starting in Namibia. Yet, in 
their discussions about how to participate as a pan-African LGBT movement at the African 
Commission, Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizational staff did not 
discuss what they meant by transgender. How will a pan-African LGBT movement handle such 
discussions and take into account how LGBT movements unfold differently with respect to 
transgender issues?  
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6.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Publicly presenting a pan-African LGBT movement constituted a strategic dilemma for 
the Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations I studied. They 
consistently faced criticism from antigay opponents that homosexuality was unAfrican. 
Choosing to apply for and accept funding from non-African sources put LGBT SMOs, such as 
Behind the Mask and TRP, at risk for being perceived as unAfrican. The Namibian and South 
African LGBT SMOs I studied chose to seek and accept funding from Northern donors so that 
they could remain in operation, even though they risked being perceived as unAfrican. This 
dilemma exemplified how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations 
found themselves and a pan-African LGBT movement increasingly vulnerable to attack from 
antigay opponents.  
Another dilemma that Namibian and South African LGBT social movement 
organizations encountered was how to present a pan-African LGBT movement to the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, an African institutional political body. Leaders 
from Sister Namibia, TRP, and Behind the Mask joined other Zimbabwean and South African 
LGBT activists and representatives from the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission in deliberating whether to view the African Commission as a political opportunity 
and then how to portray the pan-African LGBT movement to the African Commission in terms 
of LGBT human rights violations to pursue, to which audiences to present the movement, and 
how to compose the pan-African LGBT activist contingent. This discussion led to the dilemma 
of whether to include transgender activists in the pan-African LGBT activist contingent, and 
Namibian and South African LGBT SMO leaders ultimately supported the idea of including 
transgender activists.  
Yet how to portray a unified pan-African LGBT movement prompts lingering questions. 
First, there is the prickly question of what exactly is African about the LGBT movement. It is a 
substantive issue that antigay opponents, intentionally or unknowingly, raised when they charged 
that homosexuality was unAfrican. What is unAfrican about homosexuality? Opponents might 
argue sexual identity terminology—lesbian, gay, and bisexual—is unAfrican (Aarmo 1999; 
Hoad 2007; Mathuray 2000; Phillips 2001). Sister Namibia, TRP, Behind the Mask, and the 
Forum for the Empowerment of Women all participated in collecting narratives from individuals 
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attracted to those of the same gender to demonstrate that some Africans are homosexual (see 
Morgan and Wieringa 2005). Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations 
affirmed that those who hailed from African nations and identified as a sexual or gender minority 
were indeed African. Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations seemed 
to define “African” in terms of working within African countries and with native Africans who 
identified as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender, expressed their sexual attraction to members 
of the same gender, or articulated some form of gender nonconformity. Do these definitions 
correspond to how LGBT social movement organizations or activists in other African countries 
define “African”? 
Another possible obstacle to creating and portraying a unified pan-African LGBT 
movement involves how the movement unfolds differently in various African countries. In 
particular, Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs incorporated and defined bisexual and 
transgender issues, persons, and identities differently, one indication that the LGBT movement 
developed differently in each country and possibly in other African countries. Sexual and gender 
minority identity categories may gain traction in some countries and not in others, just as some 
LGBT issues and rights may emerge as more important than others. Handling these social and 
political differences across African nations may prove difficult, as it did for activists discussing 
how to present a unified movement to the African Commission. Namibian, South African, and 
Zimbabwean LGBT activists agreed on the importance of portraying a unified pan-African 
LGBT movement that reflected the diversity and political positions of activists from different 
countries. Nevertheless, they may eventually face opposition within the movement as it recruits 
more activists from throughout Africa whose agendas and identities diverge from those of 
southern African LGBT social movement organizations.  
A backlash against South Africa’s political position and southern African nations’ 
economic growth that is starting to ripple throughout the continent may impact a budding pan-
African LGBT movement. In particular, opposition to southern African LGBT activists’ 
hegemony is mirrored in complaints that southern African LGBT activists are exporting 
homosexuality and LGBT organizing to different African nations (Interview, TRP staff member, 
11 July 2006). Behind this antagonism is a negative reaction to the introduction of foreign 
political and social influence, even if it comes from another African source, what Francis B. 
Nyamnjoh (2006) labels xenophobia. Antigay opponents have grown wary of South Africa’s 
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political dominance and neoliberal democratic agenda, exemplified by the state’s support of 
sexual and gender minority rights. For instance, Nigerian lawmakers cited South Africa’s 
embrace of LGBT rights as negative social and political development.  
A pan-African LGBT movement will likely not be immune to sociopolitical shifts and 
negative reactions from antigay opponents to South Africa’s reputation as a budding neoliberal 
democracy. To ensure that the pan-African LGBT movement does not alienate future allies, 
southern African LGBT social movement organizations may find themselves having to 
relinquish control of the movement. Namibian, South African, and Zimbabwean LGBT social 
movement organizations may find themselves having to retreat to a position of lesser public 
visibility in the pan-African LGBT movement, in order to prevent the emergence of an African 
anti-LGBT counter-movement and to preserve gains that the pan-African LGBT movement may 
make with political institutions such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
This may constitute a long-term strategic dilemma of deciding how to portray a pan-African 
LGBT movement in a shifting external sociopolitical environment. 
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7.0  REVIS(IBILIZ)ING LGBT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
7.1 THE ANALYTIC UTILITY OF STRATEGIC DILEMMAS 
Analyzing Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations’ (SMOs) 
strategies of visibility and invisibility from a strategic dilemma approach afforded me the 
flexibility of tracing how decision making and deliberation within SMOs about becoming visible 
or invisible to certain audiences or constituencies unfolded (Jasper 2004, 2006). This analytic 
approach kept me from treating visibility and invisibility as unchanging qualities of SMOs. My 
use of strategic dilemmas advances social movement theorizing by demonstrating how changes 
in SMOs’ public visibility and invisibility can reveal how and when SMOs miss or forgo 
political opportunities, how they deal with state repression, and how they respond to changes in 
the external sociopolitical environment.  
In addition, my use of a strategic dilemma approach helps me to question the universality 
of visibility as a necessarily desirable quality of and outcome for LGBT social movement 
organizations. LGBT social movement organizations in the global South may not want to be 
visible because in a repressive sociopolitical environment, they might be vulnerable to attack by 
the state (Earl 2003). Sister Namibia encountered the strategic dilemma of whether or not to 
embrace its unofficial identity as a “lesbian organization.” Accepting this identity put the 
organization at risk for negative state sanctions, as exemplified in the state’s refusal to extend 
funding to Sister Namibia and state officials withdrawing their support for the Namibian 
Women’s Manifesto and 50/50 Campaign. Moreover, being visible to certain audiences at all 
times could be taxing on SMO staff and members. The Rainbow Project (TRP) faced this 
strategic dilemma in the guise of whether to provide social services to members in need; TRP 
staff were overwhelmed by the volume of requests for services, as members demanded 
unfettered access to the organization. The SMO was too available and too transparent to 
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members who flooded the organization with requests. Therefore, TRP decided to discontinue 
social services for members and to transform its organizational structure. The change in 
organizational structure disappointed some members, especially those who lived outside of 
Windhoek, because staff members did not frequently update members, as they had in the past. A 
TRP member from Swakopmund, a Namibian town on the Atlantic Ocean, stated, “We don't 
even know what the social events are they are doing there in Windhoek. We don't know 
anything. We don't even know the members. We don't even know who's working there” 
(Interview, 19 May 2006). In these ways, issues of visibility and invisibility often involve 
strategic dilemmas for SMO. 
7.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation makes several scholarly contributions to social movement, postcolonial 
feminist, and queer theorizing. 
7.2.1 Contributions to Social Movement Theorizing 
First, I regard visibility and invisibility as social movement organizational dynamics 
worthy of further study. Widely accepted definitions of social movements state that organized 
collective action must be sustained and visible over time (Tilly 1978). Such a definition places a 
premium on the publicity of political organizing, yet treats it as an unquestioned assumption. 
Indeed, few studies interrogate how social movement organizations (SMOs) become publicly 
visible or withdraw from public view into invisibility.75 As I argue, an SMO’s visibility or 
invisibility involves strategizing and deliberation. For instance, Sister Namibia decided to 
respond publicly to Namibian state leaders’ homophobic comments to demonstrate that some 
Namibians would not accept such intolerance; their visibility was calculated and specific to state 
leaders’ homophobic remarks. TRP’s invisibility in not pursuing the decriminalization of 
                                                 
75 Exceptions are those studies that examine the decline or abeyance of social movements and/or SMOs and how 
SMOs take advantage of discursive opportunities in the media (Bagguley 2002; Borland 2004b; Guidry 2003; 
Koopmans 2004; Koopmans and Olzak 2004; Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989). 
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sodomy indicates staff and members’ internal discussions about whether such litigation would 
provoke hostility from the Namibian state; the SMO’s invisibility also resulted from staff and 
members’ internal debates about providing social services to members.  
Second, my research demonstrates that when social movement organizations are invisible 
in moments of political opportunity, it does not necessarily mean that they are floundering. SMO 
invisibility may be a sign that an SMO is forgoing a political opportunity. Social movement 
organizations may withdraw from public visibility and intentionally forgo political opportunities 
while they deliberate whether to take advantage of them. For instance, South African LGBT 
SMOs withdrew from public visibility with respect to the same-sex marriage win first to weigh 
how they could fill in for the defunct Lesbian and Gay Equality Project, which had overseen the 
same-sex marriage campaign. They deferred becoming involved in the campaign for a few 
months while they defused a tense situation involving the Gay and Lesbian Alliance’s claim that 
dozens of gay men who did not know their HIV status donated blood at South African National 
Blood Service centers to protest a ban on blood donations from men who have sex with men. 
Careful dissection of such missed or forgone opportunities—when researchers can reasonably 
expect SMOs to take advantage of a political opportunity—can illuminate whether SMOs are in 
decline or have withdrawn in order to regroup and plan their next step.  
Third, my research casts light on LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa, which 
social movement scholars have hitherto overlooked.76 Using a comparative case study approach, 
I demonstrate how state responsiveness in South Africa to LGBT organizing facilitated the 
visibility of LGBT organizing, whereas state hostility in Namibia to LGBT organizing caused 
LGBT social movement organizations to consider their visibility to audiences carefully. I have 
shown how LGBT SMOs in two countries that shared a common sociopolitical history varied in 
their handling of strategic dilemmas related to their visibility and invisibility. As I explicated in 
Chapter 6, LGBT organizing continues to emerge in countries throughout Africa, including 
Kenya and Uganda, providing social movement researchers an excellent opportunity to consider 
the growth of a new social movement outside the global North. In such rapidly democratizing 
nations, scholars may witness an increase in the number of movements of disenfranchised 
citizens organizing to take advantage of available political opportunities. 
                                                 
76 Isolated studies of LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa include Cock (2003), Croucher (2002), 
Dirsuweit (2006), Epprecht (2004), Lorway (2006), and Oswin (2007). 
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7.2.2 Contributions to Postcolonial Feminist Theorizing 
Though I have consciously avoided using the rhetoric of citizenship in my analysis of 
how Namibian and South African LGBT social movement organizations handled strategic 
dilemmas related to their visibility and invisibility, LGBT organizing in these countries is an 
example of a citizenship movement. A “citizenship movement” like the LGBT movement makes 
demands for full political and social inclusion on behalf of a constituency, such as sexual and 
gender minorities (Jasper 1997:7). My focus on how Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs 
navigate how and when they are visible or invisible to state appendages advances postcolonial 
feminist theorizing, which places urgency on understanding and challenging how the state 
regulates the bodies and pleasures of women and sexual and gender dissidents (Alexander 2005; 
Kim-Puri 2005). 
Postcolonial feminist theorizing has prioritized understanding how nationalist and 
anticolonial movements utilize women’s rights and feminism to advance their causes, only to end 
up silencing women in liberated nations (McClintock 1995). I documented a similar trend with 
respect to Namibian state leaders’ attempts to silence organized sexual and gender minorities by 
claiming that homosexuality is unAfrican. I demonstrate how state repression could derail LGBT 
SMOs’ plans, forcing them into invisibility. Members of TRP deferred demanding their legal 
rights as Namibian citizens in light of state leaders’ homophobic statements in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. In this manner, TRP, and by extension, LGBT persons, were sacrificed in favor of 
decolonization. State leaders who belonged to the South West African People’s Organisation 
(SWAPO) hewed to the position that homosexuality was unAfrican and that eliminating 
homosexuality was a necessary step in decolonizing Namibia. This situation differed from that of 
South Africa when supporters of “gay and lesbian rights reject[ed] their exclusion from the new 
South Africa by a cultural-nationalist solution to colonialism” (Spruill 2001:5). TRP members 
agreed that overturning the sodomy law and initiating a legal campaign for sexual and gender 
minority rights could generate hostilities for TRP and the movement unless more human rights 
organizations articulated support for LGBT rights. Thus, the organization decided to shift its 
attention to styling itself as a human rights organization and strengthening bonds with Namibian 
human rights organizations. As long as SWAPO retains control of the Namibian state, TRP will 
likely tailor its strategies to suit the ruling political party.  
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In addition, I show how sexuality can be an instrument “used to attack women’s 
organizing” in postcolonial African countries such as Namibia (Rothschild 2005:1). Sister 
Namibia braved antigay opposition and embraced its unofficial reputation as a lesbian 
organization by including lesbian rights in its women’s political empowerment and rights 
campaign in 1999. However, state and SWAPO leaders tried to discredit the organization’s 
campaign by attributing more grandiose plans to Sister Namibia, such as obtaining the right for 
same-gender couples to marry. Despite such obstacles, Sister Namibia embraced its controversial 
reputation for its feminist organizing and as a lesbian SMO and continued to obtain media 
coverage. The experiences of Sister Namibia and TRP stand in stark contrast to the ability of 
South African LGBT SMOs to protect sexual and gender minority rights. However, these 
experiences may be helpful for sexual and gender minorities in other African nations in which 
leaders link a ban on homosexuality to decolonization. How Sister Namibia and TRP handled 
these impediments may provide LGBT activists in places such as Nigeria, Cameroon, and 
Uganda possible templates for action or inaction. 
7.2.3 Contributions to Queer Theorizing 
Social movement scholars recently have turned to queer theorizing for resources on how 
to understand mobilizing around shifting collective and sexual identities (Bernstein 2005; 
Gamson 1995; Rupp and Taylor 2003). According to Mary Bernstein (2005), “queer politics was 
. . . the antithesis of identity politics: a theory and a politics with which to transcend group 
categories and to bring diverse groups of marginalized people together under one umbrella” (p. 
56). In this way, queer theorists encourage activists and scholars to imagine ways to destabilize 
and decenter sexual and gender identity categories (Berlant and Warner 1998). I borrow this 
notion of destabilization by concentrating on how power shifts and how Namibian and South 
African LGBT social movement organizations opt to participate or withdraw from power 
struggles (Foucault 1978). Instead of examining how these SMOs define and mobilize sexual and 
gender identity categories, I focus on the strategic actions and choices of Namibian and South 
African LGBT SMOs. Thus, my analysis does not freeze SMOs’ use of sexual identity 
categories, but instead demonstrates how SMOs refine and shift such categories, rendering them 
more flexible. In my analysis, I have tried to demonstrate how some identities and categories 
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undergo modification through Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs’ actions and decisions, 
such as through the Forum for the Empowerment of Women’s delineation of black lesbian 
membership and the discussion of transgender identities on TRP’s radio show. Finally, my use of 
strategic dilemmas enables me to parse out how LGBT SMO staff and members perceive power 
shifts and whether or not they can optimize them. 
Just as I have avoided crystallizing sexual and identity categories in Namibian and South 
African LGBT SMOs’ work, I have also tried not to ascribe political strategies to organizations 
simply because of their geographic location or relationship with a receptive or hostile state. I 
eschewed using preexisting categories of LGBT organizing strategies in the hope that grounding 
my data collection and analysis in the everyday political realities of Namibian and South African 
LGBT social movement organizations would allow me to understand the strategic dilemmas that 
SMOs faced in all of their complexity. For instance, I did not use the trope of “coming out” in 
this dissertation, unless Namibian or South African LGBT SMO staff or members mentioned it 
to me. Some scholars assert that “coming out” can be an important political strategy for LGBT 
persons in the global South (Chabot and Duyvendak 2002). Coming out tends to refer to the self-
disclosure of one’s non-normative sexual and/or gender identity to a target audience (Cage 
2003). Sean Chabot and Jan Willem Duyvendak (2002) blur the distinction between individuals 
coming out and the formation of LGBT social movement organizations. In other words, they 
conflate individuals coming out with the establishment of SMOs. I do not disagree that coming 
out as a strategy has gained in popularity around the world or that it differs in implementation, 
frequency, and quality in local arenas (Bacchetta 2002; Manalansan 1997). However, a rise in 
the number of LGBT social movement organizations does not necessarily mean that more LGBT 
persons have come out publicly. LGBT social movement organizations may be “out” even before 
many individuals are. TRP staff and members acknowledged that the organization was a beacon 
for closeted Namibian LGBT persons. The organization’s existence emboldened LGBT persons, 
especially young people, to disclose their non-normative sexual and gender identities to their 
families. Future research could elucidate how, when, and why LGBT social movement 
organizations favor or shun coming out as a strategy. 
LGBT social movement organizations do not even have to be populated by sexual and 
gender minorities; they merely have to claim to represent them. As my research shows, LGBT 
social movement organizations are cropping up in East Africa, but some do not actually 
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represent LGBT persons. Those who claimed to lead these potentially fraudulent LGBT 
organizations did so because it was lucrative. They knew Northern donors wanted to support 
democratic growth and human rights throughout the continent. Northern donors’ interest in 
financing LGBT organizing and Namibian and South African LGBT SMO leaders’ mentoring of 
lone LGBT activists in East Africa may indicate a pattern of establishing LGBT social 
movement organizations before LGBT persons have emerged to organize themselves.  
What is different about the pattern of Northern donors’ financial support of fledgling 
organizations and Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs leaders’ advising of LGBT 
activists is that they are encouraging East African activists to build organizations very quickly, 
even if they lack LGBT persons to support the organization. These actors hope to imbue East 
African LGBT organizing with a sense of permanence that antigay opponents cannot erase. In 
other words, the combined work of Northern donors and Namibian and South African LGBT 
SMO leaders may result in LGBT organizations being out before many individuals in East Africa 
are. Creating LGBT organizations for persons who have not yet (and who may not ever) claim 
these collective identities demonstrates how manipulable sexual and gender identity categories 
are, a key contribution of queer theorizing. This is also an example of how African LGBT 
organizing does not follow the patterns of sexual and gender minority organizing in the North or 
elsewhere in the global South.   
7.3 TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF NAMIBIAN AND SOUTH AFRICAN 
LGBT SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa has been fraught with success and failure, 
much like LGBT organizing in countries in the global North and South. Future research could 
trace the origins of contemporary LGBT social movement organizational forms and compare 
them with LGBT organizing in the global North (Armstrong 2002). Subsequent research could 
also investigate the influence that South African, Namibian, and Zimbabwean LGBT organizing 
has had throughout Africa and map out resistances to southern African hegemony with respect to 
LGBT organizing on the continent. Such research could illuminate the geopolitical dimensions 
and limitations to organizing around sexual and gender minority rights. In particular, cultural and 
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national differences between African nations may impede African LGBT organizing, especially 
if African LGBT activists contest southern Africans’ dominance of LGBT organizing on the 
continent. Social movement theorizing could be greatly enriched by considering the complexity 
of organizing, especially around LGBT rights, in countries in the global South. To demonstrate 
the importance of decentering social movements in the global North as normative referents in 
social movement analysis, I chose to study how LGBT social movement organizations 
negotiated strategic dilemmas related to their visibility and invisibility in Namibia and South to 
show that SMOs fighting for similar rights converge and diverge in how they handle such 
dilemmas. 
Future research projects on southern African LGBT organizing will likely have a 
transnational and/or comparative slant to them in recognition of the increasingly transnational 
quality of LGBT organizing in Namibia and South Africa. The Namibian and South African 
LGBT social movement organizations I studied attained international visibility with Northern 
donors and international human rights organizations through their local work in advancing the 
rights of LGBT persons. For instance, Sister Namibia was recognized in 1997 by the 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Right Commission for standing up to former Namibian 
President Sam Nujoma’s homophobic statements. Western European LGBT and antiapartheid 
activists similarly pressured the African National Congress (ANC) to support sexual minority 
rights as ANC officials pioneered the direction of the new post-apartheid South Africa (Croucher 
2002; Gevisser 1995). However, I did not situate these SMOs in a global LGBT movement 
because such an endeavor exceeded my data collection capacity, though this is a promising 
avenue for future research.  
Approaching research on LGBT organizing in the global South with some caution is 
wise. Postcolonial feminist and queer scholars have been attentive to how the global South is still 
a laboratory for some Northern scholars interested in testing the universality of sexual and 
gender identity categories (Alexander 2004; Binnie 2004; Mohanty 2003; Hoad 2007). Along 
these lines, some queer studies scholars have raised questions about the international attention 
paid to LGBT rights and the repression of sexual and gender minorities in countries in the global 
South. Though Neville Hoad (2000) admires what groups such as IGLHRC have accomplished 
in prosecuting LGBT rights violations, he expresses concern about how they engage in these 
campaigns because “they have an interest in making conditions look as bad as possible in other 
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countries” (p. 153, see also Bacchetta 2002). In this way, international human rights 
organizations like IGLHRC may be (unwittingly) complicit in universalizing the experiences of 
LGBT persons in the global South as victims. Some queer studies scholars argue that 
ethnocentrism underlies international human rights organizations and some lesbian and gay 
studies scholars’ focus on LGBT persons in repressive countries in the global South (Binnie 
2004:76). Jon Binnie (2004) contends that ethnocentric, normative assessments accompany 
international NGOs and Northern LGBT activists’ interest in liberating LGBT persons in 
countries like Namibia and Uganda. “The logic goes something like this: you are less developed 
than us because you treat your gays badly. . . . [W]e are more civilized than you because we give 
more rights to lesbians and gay men” (Binnie 2004:76). I share these scholars’ concerns about 
reducing the experiences of LGBT persons in Namibia and South Africa to victimization and 
reproducing ethnocentric, normative judgments in my analyses (Binnie 2004; Hoad 2007). My 
interest in examining how LGBT social movement organizations navigated strategic dilemmas 
related to their visibility and invisibility stemmed from a commitment to demonstrating how staff 
and members of Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs were actively engaged in 
transforming the sociopolitical environments in which they operated and in which their 
constituencies lived.  
I also wanted to debunk the “developmental narrative of lesbian and gay rights” (Binnie 
2004:76). Namibian and South African LGBT SMOs did not cast the pursuit of LGBT rights as 
political, economic, or social development that would allow these countries, once they granted 
them to sexual and gender minorities, to be regarded as developed nations. Rather, they cast 
these rights as Namibian, South African, and ultimately, African, as demonstrated in southern 
African LGBT activists’ discussions about how to approach the African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights. Though I do not offer an authoritative account of Namibian and South 
African LGBT organizing, I have demonstrated how scholars can study LGBT organizing in the 
global South and interrogate assumptions about social movement visibility and the political 




Date of Observation 
Group Name 
1. What is the SMO’s atmosphere like today (office, other location)? How do staff, volunteers, 
and visitors interact? Are there any visitors? 
2. How are external groups such Northern donors discussed?)  
3. How do SMO staff, volunteers, and visitors discuss target audiences, such as the state, media, 
sexual and gender minority community, or other LGBT SMOs? 
4. What is the SMO’s publicity efforts like? 
5. How do staff, volunteers, and visitors discuss withdrawing from or their ambivalence about 
an audience, constituency, or campaign (if they do)? 
6. How do staff, volunteers, and visitors talk about recruiting new members or staff (if they 
do)? 
7. How do staff, volunteers, and visitors talk about the SMO’s website (if they do)?  
8. What internal problems or disagreements (about publicity, visibility, invisibility, audience, 
constituency, or campaign) take place? 
9. How are choices (specific or general) made? 
10. What is your general impression about the SMO?  
11. Does anything new or unexpected occur? 
12. Does anything that you expected to occur not happen? 




Script for interview: I am Ashley Currier, and I am a Ph.D. student in the Department of 
Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America. 
I am conducting a study of the gay and lesbian movement organizations in 
Johannesburg/Windhoek. I will be interviewing you about your history of activism (if 
applicable) and, particularly, your impressions of the movement in Johannesburg/Windhoek. The 
interview will take approximately one hour. Dr. Kathleen Blee, Professor of Sociology at the 
University of Pittsburgh in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, United States of America, is supervising 
my progress on this project. 
B.1 DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS 
I noted respondents’ answers to the following questions by hand and did not record them 
digitally. 
1. Date/Time of Interview: 
2. Location of Interview: 
3. How old are you? 
4. How do you identify in terms of gender? 
5. How do you identify in terms of race or ethnicity? 
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6. Could you describe your history of activism with this SMO? (Take notes on the 
respondent’s role in the organization, length of time with the organization, and type of 
activities performed with/for the organization.) 
B.2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
I recorded respondents’ answers to the following questions digitally. I asked additional 
questions so that respondents could clarify or expand on their answers. 
1. How did the organization’s offices come to be located here? What are the advantages of 
this location? Disadvantages? Have members ever discussed moving the office to another 
location? What prompted the discussion? When did this discussion take place? (Probe for 
specific information: Could you give me an example of what you mean by 
disadvantage?) 
2. Does the group hold events or meetings in other places? Why do they hold them in those 
places? How does the group go about securing the space? In the past, did the group hold 
events or meetings in different places? Why did the group stop using those places? (Probe 
for ties to other groups/organizations.) 
3. Could you name some organizations with which your group works? What kind of work 
does your organization do with them? Why does your organization work with them? 
When did your group start working with these organizations? How has your group’s 
relationship with other groups change over time? When did these changes occur? (Probe 
for specific names of groups.) 
4. Could you name organizations with which your group does not work? Did your 
organization work with them in the past? Why doesn’t it work with them anymore? Are 
there organizations with which your group will not work? Why not? (Probe for specific 
names of groups.) 
5. Could you describe the organization’s purpose to someone who is not familiar with it? 
What services/activities does the organization offer? Did your group once offer 
services/activities that it has since discontinued? Why and when did the group 
discontinue these services/activities? (You could lead into visibility questions with the 
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following: If someone were looking for ________ services—name some from the 
organization—where would this person look? How would s/he know where to go?) What 
attracts people to your organization? Why do you think people go to these places? What 
specifically is it about the organization that makes people come back? 
6. Could you describe the organization’s membership (racial/ethnic, class, age, gender, 
religious affiliation, where they live)? How did they find out about the group? Do 
members recruit others? Has the membership changed over time between 1995 and the 
present? 
7. What audiences is your organization trying to reach? Why is your organization trying to 
reach them? How does your organization identify these audiences? How does your 
organization try to reach these audiences? When do you know if you’ve reached these 
audiences? Have you have “success” with your approach in reaching these audiences? 
Has the organization tried to reach other audiences in the past? How and when did your 
group try to establish this contact? (Probe for specific names of groups.) 
a. Has your organization tried to reach sexual minorities of different racial or ethnic 
backgrounds? 
b. Of different age groups?  
8. What audiences does the organization try not to reach? Why does the organization try not 
to reach these audiences? Has the group ever been interested in these audiences? When 
was your group interested in these audiences? What led to your group’s disinterest in 
these audiences? 
9. How would you describe your organization’s relationship with mainstream media? With 
black media? With white media? With movement-oriented media? With print media 
(newspapers)? With television media? With Internet media? Does the organization have a 
contact at _______ (name media source)? How did the organization develop this contact? 
10. If the organization doesn’t seem to pursue media attention, ask: Why does the 
organization not have a relationship with the print/TV/Internet media? 
11. Do you think that it is important for the organization to have contacts in the media? Why?  
12. When does the organization contact the media? Are there times when the organization 
does not contact the media? Were there points in the organization’s past that it did not 
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maintain contact with the media? How did the organization avoid contact with the media? 
Why did the organization avoid contact with the media? 
13. Are there times when the media contact the organization? What happens? (Probe for 
specific instances.) Have the media contacted the organization in the past? What 
happened when the media contacted the organization in the past?  
14. Does your organization have a website? (If “yes,” ask questions a and b. If “no,” ask c 
and d.) 
a. Who designs the website? How did the organization come to decide on the design 
and content of the website? How long has the organizaiton had a website 
b. What does the organization use the website for? How often is it updated?  
c. Has the organization discussed having a website?  
d. Did the organization ever have a website? (If yes, ask: What led to the website’s 
dismantling?) 
e. What do you think prevents the organization from getting a website? 
15. How do people come to learn about your organization? Does the organization actively 
promote itself in public?  
a. Where and how does the organization promote itself publicly?  
b. How does the organization identify venues for such promotion? 
c. What places does the organization not promote itself? Why doesn’t it pursue 
promotion there? 
d. Did the organization promote itself differently in the past? How did the 
organization promote itself in 1995? In 2000? Now? 
16. Do you think that there is a link between the visibility of the organization and sexual 
minorities “coming out”?  
17. What do you think it means for an organization to be visible? (Ask for specific example). 
18. How important do you think it is for an organization to be visible? To whom should the 
organization be visible? What are the best ways for the organization to be visible? When 
should the organization be visible? How should it be visible? 
19. How important do you think it is for an organization to be invisible?  
20. What is the organization’s relationship to the sexual minority community? Is the 
organization known in the community? What is the organization known for in the 
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community? What does the organization do in the community? (Probe by asking for 





AARI  All-Africa Rights Initiative 
ABIGALE Association of Bisexuals, Gays, and Lesbians (South Africa) 
ACHPR African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
AIDS  Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome 
ANC  African National Congress (South Africa) 
BTM   Behind the Mask (South Africa) 
CAL  Coalition of African Lesbians 
CoD  Congress of Democrats (Namibia) 
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (United Nations) 
FEW  Forum for the Empowerment of Women (South Africa)  
GAIDE Gay Aid Identification Development and Enrichment Organisation (South Africa) 
GALA  Gay and Lesbian Archives of South Africa 
GASA  Gay Association of South Africa 
GLA  Gay and Lesbian Alliance (South Africa) 
GLON  Gay and Lesbian Organisation of Namibia 
GLOW Gays and Lesbians of the Witwatersrand (South Africa) 
HIV  Human immunodeficiency virus 
HRW  Human Rights Watch 
IGLHRC International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission 
ILGA  International Lesbian and Gay Association 
LAGO  Lesbians and Gay Organisation (South Africa) 
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LGBT  Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender 
LGBTI Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex 
LGEP  Lesbian and Gay Equality Project (South Africa) 
NANGOF Namibian Nongovernmental Organisation Forum 
NCGLE National Coalition Gay and Lesbian Equality (South Africa) 
NGO  Nongovernmental organization 
NSM  New social movement theory 
OLGA  Organisation of Lesbians and Gays (South Africa) 
PPT  Political process theory 
RGO  Rand Gay Organisation (South Africa) 
SMO  Social movement organization 
SWAPO South West African People’s Organisation (Namibia) 
TAC  Treatment Action Campaign (South Africa) 
TRP   The Rainbow Project (Namibia) 
UN  United Nations 
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